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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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14 NOVEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN'S NAKASONE URGES WEST'S UNITY, SUPPORTS SDI

OW141301 Tokyo KYODO in English 1239 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo, Oct. 14 KYODO -- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said Tuesday the Western camp should unite to back up U.S. President Ronald Reagan and promote U.S.-Soviet arms talks following the weekned U.S.-Soviet summit talks in Iceland.

In a speech at the Japan, Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) building in Tokyo, Nakasone made the statements in referring to future East-West relations. Nakasone said although the summit reached no final agreement, progress was made in talks on strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and other issues. He said the summit showed the arms talks hinge on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program and that both superpowers are expected to confer with their respective allies as they work toward their next summit. Nakasone also said that SDI is acting as a lever to promote disarmament and supported SDI as a security system based on advanced defensive arms systems.

As for domestic issues, Nakasone criticized the present rice policy which calls for subsidizing with public funds the purchase of rice from farmers, calling for reforms mainly in productivity to reduce international disparities in rice prices.

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CSO: 5260/043

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN; NAKASONE SAYS NO CHANGE IN SDI DECISION

OW160336 Tokyo KYODO in English 0236 GMT 16 Oct 86

["Nakasone Says No Change in Japan's SDI Participation" -- KYODO headline]

[Text] Tokyo, Oct 16. 16 KYODO -- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said Thursday there is no change in Japan's decision to begin talks on Japan's participation in the United States "star war" research project.

The prime minister responded to reporters who called for his comment on Soviet Vice Premier Geydar Aliyev's displeasure over Japan's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Aliyev told Shigeyoshi Matsumae, president of the Japan Cultural Association, in Moscow Wednesday that a good Japanese political environment is necessary for Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev to visit Japan.

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CSO: 5260/046

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN: TALKS ON SDI TO BEGIN 28 OCTOBER IN U.S.

OW180643 Tokyo KYODO in English 0639 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo, Oct. 18 KYODO -- Japan and the United States will begin talks in Washington October 28 on Japan's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI], commonly known as "star wars" research project, government sources said Saturday.

Japanese delegates to the meeting will leave Tokyo around October 25, the sources said. Makoto Watanabe, deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau, will head the group. Officials of the Defense Department's SDI group will represent the United States at the session, the sources said.

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CSO: 5260/047

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPANESE ECONOMIC FEDERATION SEEKS SDI RESEARCH CONDITION

OW201155 Tokyo KYODO in English 1135 GMT 20 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo, Oct. 20 KYODO -- The Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) Monday asked the government to ensure that Japanese firms participating in the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) plan will not be subjected to excessive restrictions by the United States on grounds of protection of military secrecy. Keidanren, made up of big businesses, also requested that Japanese enterprises be allowed to utilize the research results of the SDI, commonly known as a "star wars" plan.

The requests were intended to clarify the stance of the Japanese business community prior to the start of talks between the Japanese and U.S. Governments in Washington on October 28 for working out details of Japanese participation in the SDI. The Japanese Government formally decided to take part in the SDI research on September 9.

Japan's industrial circles are hopeful that participation in the SDI will enable them to make great strides in the development of high technology. But an agreement earlier concluded on the participation of West Germany in the SDI clamped strict restrictions on the use of research developments by German enterprises. This generated deep concern here that even techniques already developed by Japanese firms will be subjected to restrictions on grounds of protection of military secrecy.

Keidanren, accordingly, asked the government to fully protect techniques developed by participating firms. It requested that techniques and knowhow, already developed by these firms, should be exempted from restrictions aimed at protection of secrecy. The government should also set up an adequate system to support the participating Japanese enterprises, Keidanren said.

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CSO: 5260/041

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALIAN SENATE MAJORITY IN UNITY ON SDI INVOLVEMENT

LD222236 Rome International Service in Italian 1830 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Text] The majority has confirmed its unity in the debate on foreign policy which took place in the Senate where the agreement between Italy and the United States on SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] and the zero option in relation to the recent Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, in particular, was discussed.

In reply to various questions and interpellations from the opposition, Foreign Minister Andreotti subsequently clarified the document on the agreement with the United States which involves six major Italian public and private firms. The majority did not consider it necessary to put forward its own resolution on SDI and disarmament since it adheres to the government's position. The right-wing opposition also spoke in favor of Italy's participation in the U.S. program, whereas, on the other hand, the Communist senators asked the government to put pressure on Washington to avoid the militarization of outer space. The Communists also proposed a joint action at European level to dismantle the Euromissiles, irrespective of any other type of agreements on disarmament between the United States and the USSR.

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CSO: 5200/2437

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ARTICLE URGES TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN EUREKA PROJECT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 26 Aug 86 p 10

[Article by senior engineer Bulent Buktas in "Thoughts of Thinkers" column: "High Technology and International Cooperation (EUREKA)"]

[Text] When French President Francois Mitterrand launched the EUREKA project in April 1985 in an effort to strengthen scientific and technological cooperation in Europe, everyone viewed it as a response to the U.S. President Ronald Reagan's SDI. But the EUREKA program had a spate of other goals. It is a fact that at present Europe is trailing behind the United States and Japan in technological development. Its productivity growth rate and world market shares are declining relative to Japan. Thus, while productivity grew by 50 percent in Japan during the period 1974-1986, this figure remained at an average of 30 percent in the European members of the OECD. A comparison with the United States indicates that Europe is increasingly being left behind, particularly in the development of high technology products.

Rationale for EUREKA

One of the major reasons for the launching of the EUREKA initiative is undoubtedly the concern about an impending new "brain drain" from Europe to the United States similar to the one experienced in the period 1950-1960. It is also evident that the failure of the research and development cooperation envisaged within the framework of the EEC to produce the expected results because of bureaucratic obstacles and other factors also played a role in the EUREKA initiative.

In contrast to conventional cooperation methods, EUREKA's objective is to immediately use the results of research and development work for commercial purposes.

The goals and activity areas of EUREKA were identified at a conference in Hanover in November 1985 among the relevant ministers of the countries participating in the program. These goals can be summarized as: "Enhancing the productivity and the competitive strength of European industry by strengthening cooperation between firms and research institutions." What is at issue here is industrial, technological and scientific cooperation in the development of high-technology products and processes for world markets. The

Hanover Declaration also clearly states that the EUREKA projects will be strictly restricted to the civilian sector. In sum, the basic objective of the program is to utilize the results of the work done in industrial laboratories and institutions for commercial purposes.

Let us first examine the organization of the program. The highest body of authority in EUREKA is the Ministerial Council which is made up of the relevant ministers of the member countries and a representative of the European Communities (EEC and EFTA) Commission and which takes important decisions on cooperation and oversees their implementation.

The Higher Representatives Group, which is made up of delegates from the member countries and the European Communities Commission, sets the details of the forms of cooperation and makes the necessary preparations together with the Council of Ministers. Care is taken that the forms of cooperation are as free of bureaucracy and as productive as possible. The secretariat, whose membership is kept relatively restricted, is made up of 12 experts, 6 of whom are professionals; the remaining 6 are administrators. Four of the professionals are from member countries and two are from the Communities Commission. The function of the secretariat is to ensure the circulation of the incoming proposals and to help the signing of agreements on EUREKA projects.

The cooperation proposals come directly from industrial firms or entrepreneurial groups, but at least two member countries are required to have agreed to cooperate on the project in order to accept the proposals for consideration.

In order for a proposal to qualify as a EUREKA project it has to go through the following procedures: The project proposal coming from one or several sources is put in circulation. After the required complementary information is given by relevant agencies to the secretariat, the proposal is circulated among all member countries. In at most 6 weeks after this step, a decision is made on whether the proposal is to be approved as a EUREKA project. All detailed information is regularly conveyed by the Higher Representatives Group to the Ministerial Council. However, the decision of the countries which will participate in a given project is final; that is, neither the Higher Representatives Group nor the Ministerial Council have the right to alter or to veto such decisions.

Another measure designed to strengthen and expedite industrial cooperation is to form forums and industrial groups in some sectors to discuss forms of cooperation, technological developments in various areas of activity and difficulties encountered in this work.

Conclusion

The EUREKA accord, which was signed in July of last year by 17 countries in the European Communities responding to the French president's invitation in April 1985, went into effect 1 year ago, and many of the participating countries have already formed their internal organizations and have begun

working. The number of projects that have been considered so far and the work undertaken prove clearly that EUREKA is a reality.

Meanwhile, although our country has made a decision to participate in this program, which has begun to foster broad exchange of scientific and technological information and growing industrial cooperation among member countries, it has neither made any preparations nor taken any steps. Moreover, most of our industrialists and scientists are not sufficiently informed about EUREKA's goals, organization and mode of operation. Our country, which is set on a course of rapid industrialization and development, is expected to take advantage of the extensive opportunities that the EUREKA project will create in the area of high technology. Let us not forget that every day that we lose is working to our disadvantage.

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CSO: 5200/2402

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: REACTION OF WORLD LEADERS TO SUMMIT

GDR's Honecker

LD140402 Moscow TASS in English 2128 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Berlin October 13 TASS -- Touching on the meeting in Reykjavik between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central committee Mikhail Gorbachev and the President of the United States Ronald Reagan, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the GDR State Council Erich Honecker stated here today that the Soviet side at that meeting had proposed all-embracing measures of disarmament on earth and the non-spreading of the arms race to outer space. The adoption of these measures would have protected mankind from nuclear catastrophe. These bold proposals, testifying to the Soviet Union's resolve to free the planet of all types of nuclear arms by the year 200, regrettably failed to get Reagan's approval although they accord with the interests of mankind, Erich Honecker stated.

The expressed hope that the unique steps taken by the USSR would ultimately meet with support in the United States as well.

FRG's Willy Brandt

LD160435 Moscow TASS in English 1404 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn October 15 TASS -- Speaking at the conference of the trade union of the printing and paper industry workers, now under way in Essen, Willy Brandt, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, said that in Reykjavik it would have been possible to reach an agreement on liquidating all medium-range missiles in Europe and on a 50-per-cent cut in strategic armaments.

All this collapsed due to an insane and unfeasible fantasy called the SDI, pointed out W. Brandt. He voiced support for efficient measures in the field of disarmament, for liquidating chemical weapons and for establishing nuclear-free zones in Europe.

Conference delegates were offered the resolution "Peace and Disarmament" which contains a demand on ensuring all-embracing reduction of military arsenals and liquidating nuclear weapons, as well as chemical and bacteriological means of mass destruction. It is especially important, the document points out, to put an end to U.S. plans for space militarization, creating a serious threat to peace. It is necessary to back the Soviet proposals aimed at freeing the world completely from nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and to make them the basis for negotiations on disarmament, the resolution points out.

W. Berlin's Schmitt

LD141434 Moscow TASS in English 1116 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] West Berlin October 14 TASS -- It is the American side that bears full responsibility for the fact that a historic chance for curbing the arms race and creating favourable pre-conditions for further disarmament was missed at the Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, Horst Schmitt, chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin, writes in the Newspaper "WAHRHEIT".

Expressing the viewpoint of his party's board, Horst Schmitt urges all the residents of the city to campaign against the implementation of the SDI programme by the American side and to make their contribution to the struggle of the progressive forces in the world against the threat of nuclear war and for general and complete disarmament.

The Reykjavik meeting was not a success, Horst Schmitt went on, because the American President adopted an irresponsible position on the problem of militarisation of space. The threat of war will further increase unless the USA discontinues development work on the SDI programme and the arms race and development of new types of mass-destruction weapons are stopped.

The Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, Horst Schmitt said, started the process of normalisation of relations between the two states.

And we do not want this process to be stopped by the Reykjavik meeting. We still hope that common sense will prevail in Washington. The attempts by certain circles in the USA to start a new round of the arms race must be exposed in the eyes of the world public.

Italy's Spadolini

LD141726 Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Rome October 14 TASS -- Writing in the newspaper LA VOCE REPUBBLICANA, Giovanni Spadolini, political secretary of the Italian Republican Party and defense minister of Italy, noted that the results of the Reykjavik meeting which, as everyone hoped, were not complete and final, gave the Europeans food for thought.

"East-West coexistence is the only alternative to the prospects of the complete annihilation of mankind. It is too important a matter to give up even in the face of objective difficulties that have made themselves felt in Reykjavik," he observed.

"One point should be specially emphasized for us Europeans," Giovanni Spadolini wrote: "Since the division was not on the issue of the European missile arsenals -- the area where even a measure of success was achieved at the talks -- all this again brings problems of European security into the fore and makes the countries of the old world seek more durable and efficient forms of solidarity and cooperation than those that existed in the past."

India's Gandhi

LD160331 Moscow TASS in English 1033 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Jakarta October 15 TASS -- Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India voiced concern over the outcome of the talks in Reykjavik between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan.

Speaking on Tuesday at a reception given in Jakarta in conclusion of his visit to Indonesia, Mr. Gandhi pointed out that the intention to transfer the nuclear arms race to outer space became an obstacle to a continuation of the consideration in earnest of matters pertaining to deep cuts in armaments and to an end to nuclear tests.

The prime minister of India called for immediately introducing a universal moratorium on all nuclear tests as the first step on the way to very important talks on reducing and eliminating all nuclear arms.

CPC Secretary Hu Qili

PM200915 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Tass report under the general heading "Utilizing a Historic Opportunity"]

[Text] Beijing -- Commenting on the results of the Reykjavik meeting in an interview with the newspaper ASAHI, Hu Qili, member of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat, said: "We advocate the continuation of the dialogue. It would be desirable for future talks to achieve a final result which would make a contribution to the cause of world peace without detriment to other states' interests." "Space exploration," Hu Qili noted, "should promote world peace, and its use for military purposes intensifies the arms race. That is why we oppose the Strategic Defense Initiative."

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CSO: 5200/1036

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: REYKJAVIK IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE VIEWED

PM212807 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Captain Second Class V. Kuzar military-political review: "With Faith in the Force of Reason"]

[Text] The destiny of Europe.... Since time immemorial it has worried many people and continues to worry them today. World wars which have carried away millions of human lives have begun here on two occasions. And now the two biggest groupings of armed forces equipped with the most up-to-date weapons--both nuclear and conventional--confront each other in Europe. This circumstance is generating greater and greater alarm about the future of the continent.

The first shoots of a new political thinking are beginning to show clearly of late in the social life of Europe. More and more Europeans are reluctant to see their continent as a "theater of military actions." They believe that the Old World must become an example of cohabitation for sovereign, equal, yet peace-loving states which have realized their interdependence and which are building their relations on the basis of trust.

The formation of precisely those views is being promoted above all by the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union and of the other countries of the socialist community. The USSR's specific proposals for the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Europe and throughout the world and the fraternal countries' program for a substantial reduction of the conventional arms and armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are acknowledged and supported by many people. The European peoples perceive these initiatives as socialism's adamant determination to uphold the cause of peace on the continent and throughout the planet.

Real prospects for a turnaround toward the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe have been revealed in connection with the successful completion of the first stage of the Stockholm conference. Krasnaya Zvezda has already written about the accords reached at the conference. These include the decision on the nonuse of force in all its forms, including armed force, and the decision mandatorily to give 42 day's notice of all exercises by ground forces and of actions by air and naval forces associated with these when 13,000 or more men and 300 tanks are involved; the accord on the control and monitoring of military activity, and so forth.

There is no need to stress that the implementation of the package of military and political measures drawn up at the conference is leading to the diminution of the danger of military confrontation on the European continent. The good example of Stockholm can serve as a start for more substantial accords and for the expansion of the atmosphere of trust on an international scale too.

These days, the gaze of millions of people of goodwill is firmly riveted on Iceland. Efforts are being made here to take the heat out of Soviet-American relations whose temperature has been maintained for a long time at a dangerously high level. At the "interim" meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan in Reykjavik, the situation is being evaluated directly and directives are being agreed for achieving progress in the sphere of nuclear arms. Governments and parliaments, statesmen and politicians, various parties and public organizations, and the broad masses of the people are expressing the hope that accords will be reached at the meeting aimed at curbing the arms race, and improving the international situation. The Portuguese [as published] newspaper EL PAIS, for example, wrote that the meeting "reveals hopes for detente and the possibilities for progression forward along the path of nuclear disarmament--a vitally important issue for the whole world, and especially for Europe."

What will this meeting end with? This is a question which is today exercising everyone who is anxious about the future of mankind. Let us not engage in forecasting, but let us wait until Monday. But one thing is clear right now: At the talks it is a question of the most burning problem of the present time--the problem of war and peace. The Soviet Union has come to the meeting with a whole package of compromise proposals and with a readiness to examine any problems without prejudice and above all problems pertaining to the whole spectrum of nuclear arms. Stressing this, M.S. Gorbachev stated on his arrival in Reykjavik: "We are prepared to seek solutions to the most vitally important problems which are troubling the peoples--the kind of solutions which would make it possible to thoroughly and in practical terms tackle questions of disarmament in order to reach the goal which we have set ourselves and to push aside and remove the threat of nuclear war. We call upon the entire world community to eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of the present century."

It is hoped in European progressive circles that Reykjavik will become a point of departure in the matter of purging the continent of nuclear weapons. Demands are ringing out increasingly persistently today for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Balkans, the north of Europe, and in Central Europe. Great Britain's Labor Party at its recent annual conference adopted a decision that, in the event of its coming to power, it would rid the territory of the country of U.S. nuclear weapons and rescind the modernization of the British nuclear submarine fleet.

Thus a rapprochement of points of view can be observed in Europe, and the drawing up of common approaches and criteria as regards questions of ensuring both European and international security. And this cannot fail to gladden peace-loving peoples. At the same time something else is also obvious: With the growth of Europeans' anxiety for the destiny of the continent and with the increased activity in the quest for new paths to relax international tension, the resistance offered by the opponents of this process is also increasing. And the tone here is being set by the forces of reaction and militarism.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger ticked off the British Labor Party like a naughty schoolboy for its antinuclear policy. He even threatened to take the most resolute measures to neutralize such sentiments. It should be noted that the British Government did not condemn such flagrant interference in the country's internal affairs by the Pentagon chief. Moreover, talking about the stance of London officialdom, the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH reported that British Defense Secretary Younger and his American colleague held secret talks in order to "devise a joint plan of action aimed at reducing the chances of a Labor victory in the next general election."

This example shows cogently that people across the ocean are reluctant to take into account the interests of the Europeans and that for the sake of these imperial ambitions they are ready over there to flout the Europeans' security. It has to be stated, unfortunately, that certain West European governments constantly give in to pressure from across the ocean and thereby assume no small share of responsibility for the intensification of the arms race and for the exacerbation of confrontation.

An extremely instructive document recently became public knowledge from which it can be seen that the North Atlantic bloc is preparing actively for nuclear war. As REUTERS reported from Brussels, a 40-page "guide on the use of nuclear weapons" has been drawn up in NATO headquarters. It examines questions of the planning and coordination of actions by the allies in the event of a nuclear conflict and it contains the criteria for the use of nuclear weapons by the NATO countries--from artillery shells to missiles--against targets in Warsaw Pact countries. It should be emphasized that the document reflects the "strategy of deterrence and flexible response" which, as it known, envisages the first use of nuclear weapons by the West.

Special interest is generated by the fact that the elaboration of the new NATO nuclear doctrine began 8 years ago. The first utterances in favor of stationing U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe also date from that time. Such a coincidence cannot be fortuitous. It was precisely then that Atlanticists began a new stage of material preparation for the unleashing and waging of an aggressive nuclear war, and did this secretly, without the knowledge of their peoples. And this provides, primarily, for bringing first-strike nuclear missile weapons close to the borders of the socialist countries.

The aforesaid document will be examined at the next session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. Its work at the level of the bloc's defense ministers will take place 21-22 October in the Scottish city of Gleneagles. The supposition is being voiced in the Western mass media that the session will also discuss a proposal about the creation of a European ABM system based on the technology of the U.S. "star wars" program.

This system, which has been dubbed "the European Defense Initiative" (EDI), is being persistently pushed through by General Rogers, supreme allied commander, NATO forces, Europe. "I want to have... a defensive shield adapted to regional conditions," the general declared. In practice this means that the NATO headquarters is planning to create a territorial ABM system including laser, beam, and other weapons. Its aim is the same as that of the U.S. "star wars" program--

to guarantee the impunity of a first strike. After all it is precisely toward this that the bloc's armed forces are oriented by the present NATO strategic concept known as the "Rogers Plan."

The FRG is exerting considerable pressure on its NATO allies for the purpose of creating an EDI. And this is no accident. As before, the militarist circles of that country are gambling on the intensification of military preparations and of the aggressiveness of the FRG Armed Forces which play a key role in NATO. Their mood was expressed by Admiral (Vellerskhof) who has just been appointed inspector general (commander) of the Bundeswehr. He not only demanded that the "equipping of the armed forces be improved" and that spending on arms be sharply increased, but also stated, literally, the following: "The general and complete elimination of nuclear weapons is impossible to imagine. As long as I serve, nuclear weapons will be renounced." The admiral here forcefully advocated a strategy of "nuclear deterrence [ustrasheniye]," and opposed the elimination of medium-range missiles.

So far the North Atlantic bloc has not responded to the proposal by the Warsaw Pact states concerning the reduction of the level of military confrontation in Europe. The NATO leadership conceals its patent reluctance to embark on such a step by means of various references to the need for a detailed examination of this initiative. Meanwhile, steps are being taken to build up military preparations. Thus, a meeting took place in Rome of the leaders of the national armaments departments of the European NATO member countries. According to the bulletin [NUVEL RIPORT] great attention was paid at the meeting to the question of the joint creation of a new military aircraft. There was also discussion of the creation of new ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles, artillery pieces, ammunition and the broad use of technological innovations in the production of arms.

As we can see, among the Atlanticists as before, the dogmas of thinking in terms of confrontation are tenacious. Hopes continue to be nurtured in NATO staffs of acquiring military superiority with the aid of technical refinements, super-modern types of weapons, and above all space weapons, in order to dictate their own terms of world development from a position of strength. All this fetters the political will of certain governments and makes them waste enormous sums on the arms race and the expansion of military preparations which leads to the preservation of tension in Europe and throughout the planet as a whole.

Today history poses with special force the question: What should the continent be like? Millions of Europeans see it without nuclear weapons and without wars. And objective preconditions exist for this. They repose in the Soviet program of constructive measures aimed at ending the arms race and creating an all-embracing system of international security. The Reykjavik meeting can and must make its contribution to the realization of program. The peoples of Europe and all peace-loving mankind believe in the force of reason and consider that the time has come for resolute and responsible actions.

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CSO: 5200/1052

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR GENERAL'S REACTION AGAINST U.S. REYKJAVIK STANCE

PM171401 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of directorate at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, under the rubric "Authoritative Opinion": "Seeking a Way Out of the Deadlock. Col Gen Nikolay Federovich Chervov, Chief of Directorate at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, Reflects on Key Problems in Curbing the Arms Race"]

[Text] Of course, the disarmament problem is complex, but not so complex as to make it impossible to sort out. The main idea which, in my opinion, all politicians and all realistically minded people must grasp is that today the arms race no longer makes any sense. In our age the economic, military, and technical potential of the Soviet Union and the United States is such that the attainment of military superiority by one over the other is simply impossible -- neither side would allow this. Hence it is pointless -- and even criminal! -- to seek a solution to the problem of security by improving the "shield" and the "sword." Today the question is as follows: Either peaceful coexistence, or nonexistence, apocalypse. The present nuclear balance is in any case intolerably high, and a continuation of the arms race and especially its extension into space could take it to a point where parity ceases to be a factor in military-political deterrence. Consequently, it is necessary to halt and reduce the level of military confrontation before it is too late.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that a new approach to the problem of security is needed in the contemporary nuclear and space age. It advocates that the sides' military potentials be reduced to the level of sufficiency necessary for defense purposes and that nuclear and other types of mass annihilation weapons be excluded from the strategic balance. [paragraph continues]

We back our statements with specific deeds. The USSR unilaterally halted the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, downgraded a proportion of its SS-20 missiles from standby alert status, and on four occasions extended the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests which will have remained in force for 18 months -- through 1 January 1987. Moving halfway toward the United States and the NATO countries, we put forward compromise proposals at the talks in Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm. The Soviet Union proposed a program for the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons by the end of this century and put forward specific proposals aimed at the liquidation of chemical weapons and their production base. The Warsaw Pact countries are offering the European NATO states a reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) of 25 percent, or more than 1 million men.

The purpose of these major and fundamental foreign policy actions by the Soviet Union is to improve the international situation, to interrupt the trend toward a buildup of military danger, and to halt the arms race. The Soviet moratorium is the best confirmation that we have no other intention than to end the policy of nuclear confrontation. The imposition of a ban on nuclear tests is the most realistic way to attain termination of the arms race, because new types of weapons cannot be either improved or created [sozdavat] without tests. Were we, together with the United States, to agree on a termination of nuclear explosions, this would make it possible to set in motion the entire process of nuclear disarmament. Great importance would also be attached to the political aspect of the matter, because halting nuclear tests would mean introducing into Soviet-U.S. relations the elements of confidence which are missing to such an extent.

But the Soviet course of terminating the arms race encounters no support from the U.S. Administration. The United States is unwilling to terminate nuclear explosions and continues tests for the purpose of creating [sozdaniye] new nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is trying to camouflage its militarist stance beneath various fabrications. Earlier, the U.S. Administration took refuge behind the verification [kontrol] problem which it had invented: It was claimed that the Russians would not agree on verification [kontrol], so there was nothing to talk about with them. After the USSR declared that it agreed to any type of verification [kontrol], including international and on-site inspections, it became clear that Washington's ruling circles were simply being clever. Now they are forced to admit openly that the moratorium does not suit them and they will continue nuclear explosions. The United States has already carried out more nuclear explosions than all the [other] nuclear powers together. Furthermore, if we compare the USSR and the United States, regardless of what period we take -- 5, 10, or 15 years -- superiority in the number of nuclear tests is clearly on the U.S. side. It has carried out more explosions than the USSR in every individual environment -- in the atmosphere, underground, and under water. Therefore, those who hold forth about some kind of U.S. "lag" in nuclear tests in fact want to retain for the United States reserves for the creation [sozdaniye] of new mass destruction weapons and so continue the arms race. A desire to upset the prevailing equilibrium of forces to its advantage is the only explanation of the U.S. Administration's stubborn unwillingness to renounce nuclear explosions, which are conducted for the purpose of creating [sozdaniye] new types of weapons: MX strategic missiles (which are, incidentally, partially already on standby alert status), new Trident-2 missiles, and nuclear charges for Midgetman missiles and also for strike space means being developed [razrabatyvayemy] within the "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI] framework.

Real obstacles to the arms race could have been erected at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, but the U.S. Administration deadlocked these talks through its blocking tactics. [paragraph continues]

It is pursuing a line of trying to force the USSR to accept unilateral conditions, a line of striving for military superiority over the USSR. Thus, the White House is very partial to reminding people that the Soviet Union enjoys superiority in ground-launched ICBM's which, apparently, "fly very fast": Such a missile takes only 30 minutes to reach the United States from USSR territory, or vice versa. Nothing is said, however, about the fact that the Americans have twice as many warheads on identical but sea-launched missiles which, incidentally, fly even faster and can reach the USSR's territory only 15-20 minutes after launching. Nor do they like to recall that the United States has a severalfold advantage in terms of heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles. So the result is that America feels frightened when looking at our missiles, "forgetting" what it has itself.

The Soviet Union looks at matters soberly. At the Reykjavik summit meeting, M.S. Gorbachev proposed a reduction of at least 50 percent in USSR and U.S. strategic weapons -- with the aim in mind, moreover, of totally liquidating these deadliest of weapons by the year 2000. The Soviet side displayed flexibility on the solution of this question in a desire to find mutually acceptable solutions taking the U.S. side's stance into account. For example, the United States objected to reductions in medium-range arms and in its forward-based means together with ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers. We took this into consideration and deleted from the agenda the question of forward-based means.

The United States objected to a ban on long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes. We agreed on allowing a limited number of such air- and sea-launched missiles, while the question of ground-launched cruise missiles is to be solved together with that of other medium-range means.

As regards the U.S. proposals on strategic weapons, they are totally oriented toward gaining unilateral advantages for the United States. Their implementation would not only fail to halt the arms race but would actually give it the green light for the future. According to the U.S. approach, the number of nuclear charges on U.S. strategic delivery vehicles would increase to 15,000 or more units. The United States would preserve all its military programs, while the Soviet Union would be bound to demolish [slomat] its strategic nuclear forces and rebuild them according to a U.S. model.

The clearly unconstructive nature of the U.S. stance is evident against the background of the Soviet proposal. The U.S. President was forced to agree with [soglasitsya s] the Soviet stance in Reykjavik.

Now as to medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union offers a radical solution: The complete liquidation of USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. What does this mean? Neither U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles nor Soviet SS-20 missiles would be left in the European zone. The USSR went even further at the summit meeting in Reykjavik, consenting to reach agreement on the U.S. "zero option" and expressing readiness to liquidate all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe while leaving aside the corresponding British and French nuclear weapons. This is a major compromise, a concession on our part with a view to eliminating the obstacles in the way of accord. The Soviet Union agreed to the U.S. proposal and offered [poshel na] to leave only 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Asia, while the United States would retain the same number of warheads (100) on medium-range missiles in all territories. We also agreed with the Americans to start talks on missiles on a range of less than 1,000 km.

It follows that the Soviet Union is not contemplating any advantages for itself in this sphere either. We want just one thing: to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation and strengthen strategic stability. The liquidation of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe would be an important step in this direction and could constitute a major turn for the better, both on the European continent and in the world as a whole.

All these major Soviet concessions made it possible to move closer to the elaboration of agreements on the nuclear arms problem in Reykjavik. It would have taken a matter of days to finalize these agreements in the form of agreements which could have been signed during the main summit meeting in Washington.

It would, however, be unreasonable to reduce arms in one direction while giving the green light to arms race in another, namely in space. The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that its proposed radical (50-percent) reduction of nuclear arms makes it necessary to rule out the possibility that one of the sides could achieve military superiority through space, notably via the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons. For this purpose M.S. Gorbachev proposed a strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime -- whereby agreement would be reached that over a 10-year period the sides would not exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty and would strictly carry out all its intent [pozhelaniye]. Moreover, research and testing within the SDI framework would not extend beyond laboratory boundaries.

Is this formulation of the issue correct? It is correct and legitimate from both the political and the military viewpoint. As M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, "...if we are to embark on reductions, then we must take pains to ensure that all the brakes which are in operation today and stand in the way of the creation [sozdaniye] of new types of weapons are not only preserved but are strengthened."

But the U.S. side, regardless of the fairness of the Soviet approach, rejected our proposal, effectively eliminating any opportunity to elaborate an agreement on nuclear arms reduction. Thus, through the fault of the U.S. Administration, a major historic chance to reduce nuclear arms and turn in the direction of detente was missed. It was shown yet again for all the world to see that the United States has not abandoned its imperial ambitions and the attempts to attain military superiority over the USSR.

The United States has chosen space as one of the main avenues for attaining superiority over the Soviet Union. Why has this gamble been taken? Because hitherto the nuclear arms race has failed to produce any advantages for Washington, despite all the tricks. Not a single one of the new strategic weapons systems adopted in the United States has added or will add to its confidence in its own invulnerability in a nuclear war. The Soviet Union gives an appropriate response to its actions. This is why U.S. security is not being enhanced as a result of the development [razrabotka] of new types of weapons; on the contrary, it is being eroded.

Back in March 1983, when President Reagan first announced his plans for preparation for "star wars," he declared that SDI was a defensive program and its ultimate goal was the liquidation of nuclear weapons, which would then supposedly become unnecessary. The White House still declares this today. But such talk is nothing but an attempt to fool public opinion. The space means which are being created [sozdayutsya] within the SDI framework and which Washington describes as "defensive" are offensive weapons par excellence. These are universal [universalnoye] weapons which can destroy satellites in space and hit targets on earth, weapons with a range up to 4,000 km or more. [paragraph continues]

How can weapons with such a range be defensive? It is perfectly clear that calculations here are based on the creation [sozdaniye] of a fundamentally new class of weapons -- strike space weapons. The task is to create [sozdat] a space shield above America's territory and to blackmail the USSR with the delivery of a first nuclear strike from beneath this shield -- a strike which should, according to U.S. strategists' calculations, go unpunished.

Journalists often ask: Does a program similar to the U.S. SDI exist in the Soviet Union? The USSR has no "star wars" programs, and it has no plans to create [sozdaniye] strike space weapons. We do not intend to get into space and threaten the United States or other countries from there. If the United States does not believe us and

assumes that major work is being done in this sphere in our country, why does it not accept our proposal to ban mutually any work on the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons? The USSR has also put forward another proposal: If the United States agreed to ban all strike space weapons, laboratories could be opened to verification [kontrol] for checking [proverka] purposes. But the United States has failed to respond to this proposal.

In its opposition to a threat from space, the Soviet side offers to reach agreement on a complete ban on strike space weapons now, immediately, or -- if the U.S. side is not prepared for this -- to agree on partial measures leading to the solution of this task. The USSR offered to reach agreement on banning weapons of the "space-earth" class, in other words space-based means which could be used to hit targets on the earth's surface, in the atmosphere, or at sea, and also on banning antisatellite systems.

Let me make it clear: Now there are no weapons in space, neither Soviet, nor American. The USSR's stance is that there should be no weapons there in the future, either. What does the United States propose? Even though our leaders pledged at the Geneva meeting not to allow an arms race in space, the United States has hitherto failed to submit at the talks any proposals in this direction. It evades a businesslike examination of the problem of banning strike space weapons, and in exchange assures us stubbornly and persistently that under no circumstances would it abandon the "star wars" program. Even in his 9 September Denver speech President Reagan confirmed that the United States will continue to work on the "star wars" program and will definitely test space weapons. The very same stance was taken by the U.S. President in Reykjavik too. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger went even further, declaring that these weapons will be deployed. Instead of a ban on the arms race in space, we are offered at the talks the elaboration of rules to conduct this race, in other words an agreement on what kinds of space weapons are to be deployed, in what quantities, and according to what schedules.

The White House's unwillingness to part with the "star wars" plans and embark on a compromise on this question has virtually nullified the results of the Reykjavik summit meeting where, it would seem, agreements had already been reached on nuclear arms reductions.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from all that has been said above: The arms race is programmed into the U.S. stance at the talks. This is also confirmed by Washington's practical actions and particularly by its refusal to observe in the future the 1972 interim agreement and the SALT II treaty. If we were to take into account the fact that work on the "star wars" program -- like the "Delta" experiment and others, for example -- has come right up against the ABM Treaty and could explode it at any time, it becomes obvious that the United States is aiming at having no accords whatsoever, at not binding itself by any legal pledges on arms limitation questions.

While destroying the treaty and legal base of the process of strategic arms limitation and reduction, the United States offers nothing in exchange. Could it be that America is not interested in consolidating and preserving existing accords on strategic arms limitation? The White House has nothing sensible to say in justification of its course.

The nuclear arms race cannot continue indefinitely. The world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons today are so large that, were they to be used, they could destroy all living things on earth many times over. No matter from which side the problem is examined, there is only one option: The nuclear arms race must be halted, a way out of

confrontation must be sought. There is no alternative, because the alternative is a race into a nuclear catastrophe.

Despite the absence of overall positive decisions in Reykjavik, people in the Soviet Union hope that the U.S. side will carefully analyze the results of that meeting and our proposals. We expect that common sense and a new approach to the problem of war and peace will gain the upper hand in Washington.

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CSO: 5200/1035

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA REJECTS U.S. REYKJAVIK 'PROPAGANDA'

PM211000 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[K. Georgiyev article under the rubric "Echo of Reykjavik": "Back to the Question of Facts"]

[Text] The more people, including Americans, find out the truth about Reykjavik, the more indignation they feel about the fact that the accords which were practically achieved there on radical reductions followed by the elimination of nuclear arms -- both strategic and medium-range -- were left hanging in the air because of the notorious SDI, President Reagan's favorite child, which he has elevated to the rank of a "sacred cow" which nobody dares touch.

Seeking to save the President from criticism about the unique opportunity which he lost to achieve a change for the better in world history, the White House has launched a broad propaganda campaign. This is taking place in various spheres. There are attempts to prove what cannot be proved -- that all the work under the SDI program, including the conducting of tests of ABM space systems outside the laboratory, and even in space, is not contrary to the ABM Treaty. And there are the continuing attempts to misrepresent the course and content of the Reykjavik talks.

In recent days the following thesis has been particularly prominent among such attempts: Everything went well in Reykjavik, it is said, until, near the end of the meeting, after accords surpassing all expectations had been agreed on in relation to strategic arms and medium-range missiles, the Soviet side suddenly made its adoption conditional on the demand for restrictions on work under SDI, which supposedly brought the whole matter to a standstill.

Thus White House Chief of Staff Regan repeats day after day that the "package thesis was put forward at the last moment." "No, we did not suppose that everything would ultimately be linked to SDI," he claims. "No, no, no. We never suspected it, categorically not."

Regan is energetically echoed by the notorious Perle -- U.S. assistance defense secretary and one of the fiercest opponents in general of any U.S.-USSR agreements in the disarmament sphere. Repeating after Regan that the Soviet side put forward an "unexpected demand" on the limitation of work under the SDI program "at the last minute," Perle goes even further: Measuring others by his own standards, he starts talking about how this might have been done because the Soviet side had decided to go back on its word on the question of eliminating long-range ballistic missiles.

Let us leave such "pearls" of logic to Perle's conscience, and see whether there is an iota of truth in the basic claims of Regan, Perle, and certain other administration spokesmen to the effect that the USSR's position on questions concerning SDI in the context of the ABM Treaty was set forth at the very end of the Reykjavik meeting and that only then did it put forward the idea of "package" -- that is, the idea that the resolution of the questions of strategic arms, medium-range missiles, the strengthening and strict observance of the ABM Treaty, and also the banning of nuclear tests are interlinked.

The facts indicate something completely different. As M.S. Gorbachev told the world at the press conference held in Reykjavik literally an hour after the end of the meeting, the whole complex of new far-reaching Soviet proposals on the questions listed was presented to President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz in the course of the first talks on 11 October.

And it was said outright that these proposals are presented as a "package." And who knows or understands better than the Americans what is meant by a "package" in relation to particular proposals. They are very fond of including in a "package" proposals which may not even have anything to do with each other, and that certainly cannot be said of the Soviet "package" presented to President Reagan in Reykjavik.

The organic interconnection between the proposals it contains was revealed with the utmost clarity and persuasive force by M.S. Gorbachev at the Reykjavik press conference and in his speech on Soviet television.

But in this case it is a question of the basic fact: When did the American side learn that the Soviet proposals were a "package" -- at the beginning, or at the very end of the Reykjavik meeting, as the White House spokesmen are now trying to assure the world?

In their zeal of misrepresent the real course of events in Reykjavik, Regan and Perle have forgotten or are pretending to have forgotten (obviously hoping that other people have short memories, too) what was said on this matter the day after the meeting by their own colleague -- the President's national security adviser Poindexter.

At a White House press briefing on 13 October, answering questions from journalists, Poindexter said: "In my view, we always knew that they link progress in the sphere of strategic arms reduction to an accord on the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and to the adoption of their stance on questions of strategic defense." And: "I do not want to mislead you. From the very beginning -- as I have said, even before we arrived in Iceland -- the link (of the SDI question) with the strategic arms reduction process was absolutely clear. When we arrived in Iceland, in the course of discussions it became clear that they are linking progress in the sphere of strategic arms reduction, and not only strategic arms, but also an accord on intermediate (medium) range nuclear forces and on nuclear tests, to our agreement to their position on the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems."

The specific question by one journalist: "Did they immediately link the question of intermediate-range nuclear forces to SDI?" received from Poindexter a clear and unambiguous "Yes."

Those are the facts. And whatever efforts some people in Washington make now, repeating the word "no" five times in succession, the facts will still be facts and an untruth will not become the truth. Only the reputation of these people will suffer.

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CSO: 5200/1035

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW RADIO: NATO GENERALS REBUKE U.S. OVER REYKJAVIK MEETING

LD211933 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] [Announcer] A 2-day session of NATO's nuclear Planning Group opened today in the Scottish town of Gleneagles. The PRESS ASSOCIATION has reported that the NATO generals are resolved to express their indignation to Washington in connection with the fact that there was allegedly no consultation with them before the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. Here is a commentary by Viktor Levin.

[Levin] If the PRESS ASSOCIATION report is to be believed, the NATO generals are particularly displeased by the coming together of the positions of the United States and the USSR on the question of medium-range nuclear missiles. Of course, as you remember, in Reykjavik accord was reached in principle on the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. missiles of this class in Europe. Furthermore, the Soviet Union agreed not to count Britain's and France's nuclear missiles, to freeze missiles with a range under 1,000 km, and to immediately enter into talks on their future fate. In this connection, the problem of medium-range missiles in Asia was broached. And now the NATO generals are heaping reproaches upon Washington for allegedly leaving out missiles with a range under 1,000 km, having agreed to the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. This rebuke is absolutely groundless, as is clear from what was agreed in Reykjavik. But the generals, nevertheless, have not only voiced it but they have also attempted to bring it to public notice.

What is the issue here? The fact that NATO's uncommonly militant generals, among whom the tone is set by the men of the Pentagon, plainly do not want any agreement on a reduction of armaments is hardly news. Nor can one say that their position is unknown to official Washington, or ignored by it. After all, in Reykjavik it was necessary to remind the U.S. President that the zero option was his own brainchild. But now it seems that he would like to renounce it, for the U.S. side adamantly pressed for the maintenance in Europe of at least some of its missiles. So the generals have no reason to reproach the President, especially, I repeat, since the Soviet Union's constructive and flexible stance removed all the questions that NATO deems important.

In light of the facts, talk of dissatisfaction among the generals appears as part of a campaign to discredit the accord that the sides came very close to in the Icelandic capital. This campaign is being waged not only by NATO generals but also by certain politicians in the United States. Clearly they are totally incapable of grasping the fact that Reykjavik created a historic chance to strengthen peace, and to let this chance slip would be to place mankind on the brink of nuclear disaster.

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CSO: 5200/1035

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

UK'S CARRINGTON MEETS ITALIANS, HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE

Discusses U.S., European Stands

AU251921 Rome ANSA in English 0924 GMT 25 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Rome, October 25 — NATO secretary general, Lord Peter Carrington, has insisted here that there is no contradiction in the positions assumed by the United States and Europe on the subject of arms reduction.

At a press conference held here Friday night after two days of talks with top Italian leaders, Carrington said that both the United States and Europe agree on the need to flank any eventual understanding with the Soviet Union on eliminating medium-range Euromissiles, with accords regarding short-range missiles and the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

Americans and Europeans fully understand that a cutback in nuclear arms would leave the Soviet Union with an enormous advantage in the realm of conventional forces, he said.

He also spoke of the need to build a greater European awareness with regards to the problem of defense. [passage omitted]

In his second day of talks with Italian leaders, Carrington Friday met with head of state Francesco Cossiga, Premier Bettino Craxi, Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini.

Urges Coordinated Defense

AU242009 Paris AFP in English 1953 GMT 24 Oct 86

[Text] Rome, Oct 24 (AFP) — Western allies could face chronic inflexibility in war, lining up on the battlefield with the same limited ranges of weapons using incompatible ammunition, according to military overlord Lord Carrington.

Secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Lord Carrington expressed his fears at a press conference Friday after talking here to experts from the Italian International Conciliation Study Centre (CISCI).

He denounced "duplication and the lack of interoperability" as a "scandal". He said: "Five or six countries are leading research individually on weapon systems that will have the same use.

"We quite simply cannot afford to perpetuate a system which, to quote only one example, has resulted in three main battle tanks --- four if you include the Americans --- being lined up to fight the same battle in the same place on the same day and not even being able to use the same ammunition."

He added: "We need a joint political decision to avoid further such scandals...and we need firm political agreement on the concrete steps that will be necessary. If we had that, we would be well on the way to a European defence identity."

He called for the creation of research and development bodies that would each concentrate on a particular defence need and work out methods of co-operation, guarding against duplication.

Since his arrival Thursday Lord Carrington has met Italian President Francesco Cossiga, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and Defence Minister Giovanni Spadolini.

Issues Communique With Craxi

AU251807 Rome ANSA in English 0812 GMT 25 Oct 86

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, October 24 -- The NATO secretary general, Lord Peter Carrington, conferred in Rome Friday with Premier Bettino Craxi on major international issues of interest to the treaty organization and on the prospects for U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit, a communique issued by the Premier's Office reported.

Also discussed, the note said, were "the conclusions reached during the autumn session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group [NPG] held Monday and Tuesday in Glencagles, Scotland". With reference to developments following the Iceland meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, on October 11 and 12, "Craxi reiterated his opinion on the need for pursuing dialogue with a pragmatic and constructive spirit for enhancing the factors and prospects pointing to negotiations which emerged in Reykjavik, with respect for the security requirements of the two sides", the communique said.

Briefing the premier on the outcome of the NATO NPG session, which chiefly dealt with post-Reykjavik developments, Lord Carrington said that the group voiced substantial support for the line advanced by the American side. He also spoke of the affirmative assessment on "the hypothesis of an understanding which can apparently be defined in the area of intermediate nuclear weapons", the note said.

NATO is hoping that a settlement can be reached in this area to coincide with negotiations leading to the progressive elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, the secretary general told Craxi.

He and the Italian head of government agreed on the need "to maintain close consultations among the allies and to look for increased political solidarity so as to encourage developments leading to negotiations, with respect for the mutual interests of security" according to the communique.

In their discussion of the issues of security and the balance of forces in Europe, "the premier and the secretary general examined the trend of the work carried out by the high level group created during the NATO meeting in Halifax in May, given the job of studying issues connected to conventional disarmament and singling out possible responses to proposals contained in the appeal formulated by the Warsaw Pact nations meeting in Budapest in June", the note said.

The NATO study group will complete an interim report by the end of this month, in time for the opening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna on November 4, and will have a final report drafted for the Atlantic Council session in December, the communique added. In this connection, Lord Carrington and Craxi underscored the growing role of the conventional forces issue in global negotiations on disarmament, "especially now that plans for an agreement are taking shape which provide for the substantial reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe", the note concluded.

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CSO: 5200/2438

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRANCE'S LE FIGARO ON WITHDRAWAL OF EUROMISSILES

PM231500 Paris LE FIGARO in French 21 Oct 86 p 4

[Francois Puaux article: "Europe's Worrying Silence"]

[Text] Comforting is the word which, paradoxically, springs to mind when reading the passage in the speech delivered by Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond to the National Assembly on 15 October on the "frightening prospect of the withdrawal of all American nuclear weapons from Europe." At last we have a European minister who dare to say out loud what most of them are thinking!

I was in Bonn when the Reykjavik meeting was announced and I was able to assess the fear among those of our German friends who are informed about security problems of a new separation between U.S. and European defense. Moreover, at the time they thought that the Americans would maintain at least 100 warheads on their Euromissiles. Nobody imagined Georges Shultz, who bore most responsibility for the Reykjavik blunder, would agree, as he did during that feverish night in Iceland, to withdraw from the European theater all the batteries of cruise missiles and all the famous Pershing-2 missiles which it took so much effort to deploy in the FRG and whose comforting presence virtually halted the great neutralist tide of the early eighties. Is there any need to add that the Soviets would be entitled to keep 100 warheads on their SS-20 missiles in Asia and that it would take just one week to transfer them to this side of the Urals and target them on Western Europe. It must be remembered that, in any case, the latter is a target for the Soviets' heavy nuclear hardware which is certainly intercontinental but could well be continental should the need arise.

The Price of the 'Zero Option'

But what is worse is that once the SS-20 missiles had gone there would still be all the so-called "short-range" missiles (with a range of less than 1,000 km) — the SS-1, SS-22, and SS-23 missiles deployed over the past 3 years in the GDR and Czechoslovakia on highly mobile launching trucks. The term "short-range" makes you wonder when you know that the SS-20 missiles, for instance, can reach the whole of Western Europe from Denmark to the southern tip of the Loire with an accuracy of some 12 meters. These missiles, which are constantly being improved, are not covered by the draft agreement on the Euromissiles and their existence clearly upsets the calculations

of the American delegation at the Geneva negotiations.

The press has reported an open discussion within the FRG majority on the appropriateness of asking Washington to include these highly sophisticated missiles in the agreement on theater weapons. Chancellor Kohl and Mr Genscher did not dare to demand this link three months before elections for fear of being accused of preventing a "breakthrough" in the only sphere in which an arms control agreement seemed possible. Was it not the FRG, in the shape of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, which "whispered" the unfortunate "zero option" solution in Ronald Reagan's ear in 1981? So, in Reykjavik the two sides agreed to freeze so-called "short-range" missiles at their existing levels and only to consider reducing them after the conclusion of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles. This freeze relates to 72 American missiles (the old Pershing-1 missiles) and, on the Soviet side, between 595 and 740 missiles, according to different estimates!

It will be argued that this leaves the French and British missiles. But there is likely to be very strong pressure in this sphere too one day. According to *The Washington Post*, in the letter he sent Mikhail Gorbachev on 25 July, Ronald Reagan wanted to propose that the United States, the USSR, Britain, and France should participate in joint multilateral discussions on a reduction of over 50 percent in offensive nuclear weapons. The president apparently only abandoned the idea after strong protests from Margaret Thatcher.

The plans drawn up in Iceland only failed because it was in Gorbachev's interests to demand a "package deal" and isolate Reagan in his attachment to Star Wars which it is still Moscow's priority to halt or slow down. But, after the U.S. elections in November, the Euromissiles question will probably resurface. If there is a problem on which France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and all the Europeans — there are others (even Norway it seems) — who feel threatened, ought to speak with one voice in public, as Jean-Bernard Raimond has done — and not in the discreet framework of the Atlantic Council — it is this one.

But does Europe have a voice?

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

FRENCH PAPER VIEWS 'ZERO OPTION' FEARS IN EUROPE

PM231340 Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Oct 86 pp 1, 6

[Andre Fontaine article: "Europe and East-West Relations"]

[Text] No one in the Elysee, the Hotel Matignon, the Foreign Ministry, or the Defense Ministry shed real or even crocodile tears over the announcement of the Reykjavik summit failure. One of the elements of the agreement which Reagan and Gorbachev seemed near to concluding at one point was in fact the famous "zero option," in other words the simultaneous dismantling of the Soviet (SS-20) and American (Pershing and cruise) Euromissiles. Although France expressed approval of this attractive idea, as did all the NATO member countries, the fact is that it now frightens French leaders.

What do they fear? They fear the fact that such an option might undermine Europe's protection, in view of the Warsaw Pact's overwhelming superiority in conventional and chemical weapons. They fear that the United States, whose nuclear involvement is virtually automatic in the case of a limited attack on Europe while it has its own missiles in Europe, might be more reluctant to fire once they have been withdrawn from Europe. Finally, and more especially, they fear that the French and British deterrents might be called into question in the near future.

The Soviet Government has often said that, if there is agreement with Washington on the Euromissiles, it would raise the question of the two European nuclear arsenals. It is perfectly willing for these deterrents to be maintained in their present state but is opposed to their development, which Paris and London say is vital to their credibility.

The Reykjavik failure provides time for thinking about ways of finding an answer to the question raised in this way. It does not alter the need to find such an answer. Until there is evidence to the contrary, this failure must be seen as a temporary setback: You just have to see how anxious both sides were to play down the gravity of this failure to realize this. Although the progress made on other points was, according to George Shultz, "quite simply colossal," the main obstacle was the all too famous Strategic Defense Initiative, better known as "Star Wars."

Ronald Reagan, who is old, coming to the end of his term, and who naturally wants to provide his country with permanent protection against war, is known to be convinced that technologi-

cal progress would enable him to do so. All you have to do is launch masses of space stations and lasers to form a space shield which cannot be penetrated by enemy missiles. On this basis he had no hesitation in proposing in Reykjavik to destroy all nuclear missiles within 10 years. Why limit the agreement to nuclear weapons when many conventional weapons, not to mention chemical weapons, can kill as many people while providing much less of a deterrent? This is a mystery.

There is no doubt that "Ron's" space dream has some viable aspects. It goes without saying that various industries in the United States and in Europe see in it opportunities for extremely welcome orders. The whole of history makes us disbelieve that such a shield would succeed in rendering the enemy sword ineffectual once and for all.

What about the Soviets? As in the West, there are probably different analyses in the Soviet Union. The shrewdest people seem to be convinced that the SDI will prove to be a lot of fuss about nothing as soon as Reagan leaves the White House. But to divide the allied camp and secure the best conditions in any deal, they have every interest in supporting the argument that the only U.S. aim is to achieve decisive strategic superiority and according to them the space shield in practice gives the United States a means of launching a surprise attack or forcing the Soviet economy, which is already in rather a bad state, into a ruinous technological race.

But it is precisely because the arms race is already exhausting and the Soviet economy in a bad state that Gorbachev has tried since he came to power to revive detente with China as well as with the West. The resistance he seems to be encountering inside the system, as Khrushchev did in the past, must be very strong for this effort to be interrupted.

At all events this is the last thing we Europeans want. In addition to the fact that a resumption of the cold war would certainly further aggravate the numerous conflicts which are now shedding blood throughout the world and the effects of which we will continue to feel, particularly through terrorism, there is nothing to say that the West's cohesion will continue to withstand the

temptation of pacifism. In recent years the Euromissiles battle was only just won and for a time there was reason to think that the FRG might slide into neutralism. It is now Britain which seems threatened and in the coming months the Iron Lady's growing unpopularity could very well bring to power a Labor Party which has now been won over by the illusion of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

This risk should probably not be taken too seriously. Harold Wilson once campaigned for "unilateralism" but that did not prevent him from launching two nuclear submarines when he was in power. The shift by the French Socialists was no less spectacular. The fact remains that too many gestures have been made by both sides recently — and especially the acceptance by the Soviets, for the first time, of on-the-spot monitoring of arms limitation or reduction measures — for public opinion to be able to readily accept a return to the worrying rationale of escalation.

It is not enough to say that in the age of deterrence one nuclear power would not be able to attack another without being destroyed itself. We should learn from this obvious fact and thus find ways of halting what is the worst trend — the allocation of a huge share of the resources needed to halt decline in Europe and disaster in the Third World to preparations for a war which nobody wants and in which no one believes. The two superpowers which are confronting each other in the name of antiquated ideologies will one day have to sit down together — with us — to find a way to ensure that next century is not quite as bad as this one. In other words they will have to try and see a little further than the end of their noses....

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALY'S SPADOLINI, FANFANI, OTHERS COMMENT ON REYKJAVIK

AU141057 Rome ANSA in English 1028 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text](ANSA) Rome, October 14 — General disappointment in Italy that U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev failed to reach an agreement to reduce medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe was not untempered by hopes that a sense of realism will win out in the end.

The deployment of cruise missiles in this strategically located NATO country sparked extensive debate on the nuclear deterrent in the late 70's and early '80's. Political hopes for the Reykjavik summit were generally geared to the superpowers' arsenals of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe.

Senate Speaker Amintore Fanfani, a veteran of international affairs, said excessive disappointment over the results of the Iceland meeting paid no service to the cause of peace.

A "realistic vision" of what can and cannot be accomplished, argued Fanfani, whose career includes terms as prime minister, foreign minister and U.N. General Assembly chairman, will do much more to further peace.

According to Fanfani, both Reagan and Gorbachev knew before they went to the Icelandic capital that whatever they accomplished would have to be digested by the decision-making powers and grass-roots of their respective spheres.

With regard to the SDI star wars program, which was cited as the cause for the summit's failure to bring arms agreements, Fanfani urged that the "scientific and technological" aspects of the nuclear space shield be given more emphasis.

According to Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini, the "key point" for Europe was that the Euromissiles issue was not the cause of the breakdown in the talks.

He suggested taking the results of the summit as a cause for reflection about the power relationship between the two superpowers.

For the minister for EC affairs, Fabio Fabbri, the flop in Reykjavik went to show "the limits, risks and dangers of a dialogue entrusted solely to the two poles in the international political scheme".

Fabbri, a Socialist, said the weekend encounter brought out the need for "a united Europe which makes itself heard with a single voice and which is capable of determining its own destiny".

Several other Socialists issued calls Monday for Italy and Europe to take stands that would consent to progress in the detente process.

Communist Party veteran Giancarlo Pajetta said the summit was cause for "worry" and urged Europe and the Rome government to be "fully objective" in assessing the platforms and arguments of both sides and "courageously" seeking to remove the obstacles to a disarmament agreement.

A diametrically opposite approach to the summit process was taken by Mirko Tremaglia, deputy secretary of the neofascist MSI-DN [Italian Social Movement-National Right Wing] party, who claimed that the two superpowers "toyed with Europe's life" in Reykjavik. He insisted that Europe had to develop its own independent nuclear weapon strength.

Meanwhile in Comiso, Sicily where the first cruise missiles were installed in Italy, the city's Socialist mayor, Rosario La Perna, voiced disappointment over the failure of Reagan and Gorbachev to reach agreement in Iceland.

"We were hoping to find out that the missiles will be taken away from Comiso" said La Perna, while insisting that the "disappointment" should not remove hope for controlled disarmament between East and West.

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U.S.-NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALY'S BARBIERI WEIGHS REYKJAVIK RESULTS

PM171528 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 14 Oct 86 p 1-2

[Frane Barbieri article: "Indirect Routes"]

[Text] There were no winners or losers at Reykjavik. Nobody was more or less to blame for the failure. There is not even any contradiction between the positive course of the negotiations, which reached the threshold of an accord, and the final divergence. Gorbachev pronounced Reagan not entirely free to make decisions. The American could say the same of the Soviet. Not so much because they are both prisoners of their respective politicomilitary "structures." Nor because they are motivated by opposing ideologies. What happened between Reagan and Gorbachev was simply a clash of two different views of the same desire to ensure peace--so different as to obscure peace itself. The American President intends to open up a new era of strategic security, to seek the "ultimate" weapon capable of rendering all weapons obsolete. It is a concept that in turn reflects the new technological era that the United States has already entered. This is the philosophy behind SDI, which has caused Reagan to fall further behind than anyone forecast in all fields of existing weapons, confident of the guarantees promised by the new space defense system (irrespective of whether it is purely defensive or offensive as well).

Gorbachev could not follow him along this path. He could not convert to Reagan's new philosophy, not because it is so distant from Leninism but simply because the USSR has by no means entered the new technological era from which the American SDI's conceptual and material origins stem. Gorbachev went to Reykjavik to gain the strategic breathing space he needs to rebuild the wrecked Soviet economy. For his purposes it was important to achieve a cut in existing forces, created to the detriment of balanced economic growth. But the crucial thing for Gorbachev was to avoid the need for new expenditure and efforts in a sector that was paralyzing Soviet development.

From the American viewpoint, Reagan has valid arguments for maintaining that in the future spending on SDI will permit major strategic savings. Under the space shield all weapons could theoretically be abolished and destroyed. From Gorbachev's viewpoint, however, not only is the USSR unable to build a space shield of its own--even if it did ensure the abolition of the future arms race--but if it now found itself forced to create one it would have to

postpone still further the attainment of its own technological mirage. So Gorbachev went to Reykjavik ready to offer the maximum disarmament in exchange for what Reagan considers the guarantee of disarmament, that is, SDI. In other words, Gorbachev aimed to secure from Reagan an American relinquishment of translating the U.S. technological superiority into strategic mechanisms, at least pending the USSR's entry into the realm of super-technologies too--that is, help in allowing it to catch up with the United States in the new postindustrial era. When it came to that, Reagan did not feel like being coopted into the CPSU Politburo.

Gorbachev is returning to Moscow without having secured the breathing space needed for his reforms. His problems with the conservatives will increase. However, before following in Brezhnev's footsteps he is certainly counting on being able to restrict Reagan's freedom or maneuver. From what we have managed to infer not only from his style but also now from the Gorbachev doctrine, we must expect that, before shutting himself up in his eastern stronghold and its crises, the general secretary will try to obtain by indirect routes what he failed to obtain in a direct encounter. There is every likelihood that he is about to launch his new European strategy, already hinted at on several occasions by Moscow's envoys.

The philosophy of SDI has not encountered very enthusiastic followers in Europe, even among the United States' closest allies. The new Soviet diplomacy will seek to show that the Europeans were closer to Gorbachev at Reykjavik in the demand for a freeze on SDI in exchange for a number of nuclear weapons agreements. Now that the Washington summit has faded into the distance, we will see Gorbachev stealing a march on Reagan with a tour of the European capitals. Gorbachev's calculations also take account of imminent elections in a number of key countries: [British Labor Party leader] Kinnock and [SPD leader] Rau could draw strength from the failure at Reykjavik. In any case Europe was already reflected in Gorbachev's reformism.

By insisting on the Reykjavik meeting the Soviet leader planned to force the pace and reach his own destination via a shortcut. Now the road ahead of him is growing longer, but he seems to be maintaining the same goal. Reagan's United States definitely emerged from the improvised summit with the image of the strongest of the strong. Gorbachev, risking more and perhaps losing more, is now aiming to isolate Reagan precisely in his excessive might.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALIAN SOCIALIST OFFICIAL VIEWS REYKJAVIK RESULTS

PM201044 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 14 Oct 86 pp 1, 13

[PSI Foreign Affairs Department Chief Valdo Spini commentary: "Hope of Understanding Remains"]

[Text] Many people have reminded us in the past few days that nuclear deterrence has probably averted the threat of conventional conflicts in Europe since the war. Giorgio La Pira, mayor of Florence, used to say in the fifties that war is impossible in the atomic era and that East and West must therefore make peace. War has proved impossible, at least so far, but peace, or at least real peace, has proved very difficult to achieve.

The peace that the major powers have hitherto ensured is based on the accumulation of increasingly huge nuclear arsenals that are therefore also potentially increasingly dangerous, as recent nuclear incidents have reminded the world.

The further technological development advances, the more difficult it becomes to monitor and even count the nuclear forces deployed. As far as intercontinental missiles are concerned, each side is reckoned to have 30,000 nuclear warheads — more than enough to destroy the world many times over. Of course we cannot go on this way. The world public realizes this, as do political forces at home and abroad, and it is this fact, which bears upon the superpowers themselves, that brought them to the dialogue in Reykjavik.

The results of the Reykjavik summit were entirely different from what was expected, at least until the two statesmen's penultimate meeting. Briefings are at present taking place within NATO, not to mention the leaders' public statements, from which it will be possible to form analyses based on more detailed information on which it will be necessary to deliberate very carefully in order to adopt a proper political stance.

What can be said now is that during the days prior to the summit the idea seemed to emerge that the Iceland meeting would, if successful, produce a partial agreement. There was talk of an interim agreement on Euromissiles — a proposal put forward by Craxi in April 1985 in his conversations with Gorbachev, and one which Soviet leaders in their statements appeared to consider possible without the attainment of an immediate agreement on SDI. According to these forecasts negotiations would then have

continued, the grand finale being reserved for the summit to be held in the United States at the end of the year, which could have ratified a comprehensive agreement.

Instead the opposite happened. In Reykjavik wide-ranging and varied aspects of genuine and significant disarmament were put on the table, but deadlock was reached over the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] problem, as it became clear that the Soviets were demanding a relinquishment not only of its deployment (on which the Americans had offered a 10 year moratorium) but also of its realization.

So the political nub of the negotiations, SDI, which may perhaps have helped induce the Soviets to return to the negotiating table in Geneva, was thus sharply highlighted, even before the summit in the United States, which now seems less imminent than before. Now each side will blame the other for the failure to seize a historic opportunity for disarmament. The Soviet Union accuses the United States of having subordinated such an accord to the desire to pursue its space defense initiative, while the United States will say that the position adopted by the Soviets was too rigid and that it constituted a "take it or leave it" stance.

Now it is necessary to examine the issue of working on the thread of hope that still remains, partly in the light of certain observations. Is it really possible that the Soviet side wanted to secure a purely propagandist result against the United States, that is, to show the world that it is the American strategic defense initiative project that is preventing a substantive nuclear disarmament agreement? Or is there any validity in the many recent analyses of the need to modernize the Soviet economy and society which supposedly forced Gorbachev to seek a negotiational method of diminishing the commitment to the arms race? And as for the United States, can Reagan really relinquish prospects of concluding his term with a peace accord setting the seal on a presidency that has succeeded in eliciting so much support from the American people? Or does he intend in practice to leave such a prospect to his successor? It is on these questions that remaining hopes that the work nevertheless done in Reykjavik will not be wasted are pinned.

Of course, with negotiations that always have and still do involve more than two parties, Italy and Europe must manage to make their voice heard on issues that concern us directly, this being a geographical area particularly affected by the theater nuclear missiles agreement — the accord that could transform Europe from the area where the first crisis of detente occurred to the area where the first beneficial effects of the resumption of a policy of dialogue and agreement could be felt.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALIAN DAILY CITES BESSMERTNYKH-CRAXI TALKS

PM200916 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 16 Oct 86 pp 1, 12

[Unattributed report: "Gorbachev Envoy's Talks With Craxi"]

[Text] Yesterday at the Chigi Palace Prime Minister Bettino Craxi received the CPSU general secretary's envoy, Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, who briefed him on the Soviet assessments of the American-Soviet summit meeting a few days ago in Reykjavik.

The Soviet envoy conveyed to Craxi Gorbachev's greetings and his keen hope to make his intended visit to Italy soon. Bessmertnykh then said that the CPSU general secretary's decision to send him to Rome to report on the Reykjavik talks showed the importance that the USSR attaches to its political dialogue with Italy and to a continuing process of consultations on the major issues of shared and most direct concern, especially peace and disarmament. In this connection he recalled the exchange of messages between Craxi and Gorbachev and the appreciation with which Prime Minister Craxi's statement following the cabinet council meeting [AVANTI! report] was received in Moscow.

Next Bessmertnykh presented the stances adopted by Gorbachev in Reykjavik and the proposals put forward by the USSR in the various fields, with special reference to strategic systems, intermediate nuclear forces, and space weapons.

Bessmertnykh presented the proposals put forward by Gorbachev in Iceland and pointed to the evolution of Moscow's stance and the offers made with a view to advancing the negotiations. This evolution, Gorbachev's envoy said, was evinced in the implicit acceptance of the concept of negotiations at varying speeds (a concept supported by Craxi himself in his May 1985 conversations with Gorbachev).

But as far as Moscow is concerned an insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of varying degrees of progress in the various areas is constituted by the interdependence between the three negotiation baskets, and the Soviet envoy recalled in this connection "the American failure to accept Gorbachev's proposal to limit the Strategic Defense Initiative simply to the laboratory research phase." "Disappointment at the failure to reach an agreement in Reykjavik," Bessmertnykh concluded, "must not, however, cause us to close the doors to dialogue."

In Craxi's opinion as well the failure to reach a comprehensive framework agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev must not diminish the commitment to negotiations. On the contrary, the very fact that such significant progress was made at Reykjavik on disarmament and the safeguarding of human rights means that there are still major possibilities of agreement to be exploited. The experience of Reykjavik demonstrates the validity of the path of dialogue. It is now necessary to work, without hasty expectations but without unfounded pessimism, to consolidate the points of understanding already reached and to rebuild the conditions for an accord guaranteeing peace and international security for future generations. The Italian Government, Craxi promised, will continue to make its contribution to ensuring that there is soon another opportunity to meet to resume a constructive dialogue, including in the space weapons sector: The attenuation of preconceptions about SDI in recent months is the clearest demonstration that even in this delicate sector there is scope for negotiation to be explored for the sake of an understanding based on rational political control of technologies and compatible with the arms reduction and limitation that is the ultimate objective in Geneva.

Before being received at the Chigi Palace Gorbachev's envoy had a meeting with Foreign Minister Andreotti.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALY RECEIVES U.S. WEINBERGER ON OFFICIAL VISIT

Meets With Craxi, Note Issued

AU181613 Rome ANSA in English 0920 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, October 18 — Arms control negotiations and prospects in these areas in the aftermath of the Iceland summit last weekend between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev were discussed here Friday by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Premier Bettino Craxi. The American defense secretary arrived here from Pakistan in the early afternoon to open two days of consultations with Italian authorities scheduled for his round-the-world tour which has included China and India.

Craxi and Weinberger examined the course of the talks held in Reykjavik by the two leaders, the terms contained in the offers advanced by the two sides and a range of issues including international terrorism and developments in the Middle East, a note issued in the evening by the premier's office said.

The Italian head of government reiterated that government's positive assessment of all efforts aimed at furthering the prospects for negotiations glimpsed at Reykjavik, the note said.

For his part, the defense secretary said that the U.S. is totally prepared to welcome all occasions for contact and dialogue with

the Soviets to consolidate and further the hypothesis of a framework agreement outlined in the Icelandic capital.

Weinberger, the note continued, also said that the American Administration intends to maintain close contact with the allies for a search for a solid negotiating stance. In this connection, he cited the decision of the White House to send the American chief negotiator in Geneva, Max Kampelman, to Europe for further consultations aimed at continuing the negotiating momentum which emerged at the summit. Also discussed by the defense secretary and the premier were developments in the Arab-Israeli crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, security in the Mediterranean region and the problem of international terrorism. On the bilateral front, the two sides examined cooperation in the area of leading-edge technologies, work in this sector in the research phase of the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative and the application of the results of this research to the civilian industrial sector.

Earlier in the day, Weinberger met the Italian defense minister, Giovanni Spadolini, for a discussion of the post-Reykjavik phase, international terrorism, and the general issues of East-West relations and nuclear disarmament.

Meets Cossiga, Andreotti

LD182016 Rome International Service in Italian 1830 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] The prospects following the Reykjavik summit have been the main subject at the second day of talks in Rome for U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger. The meeting with Cossiga lasted about 1 hour and the president took advantage of it to renew, through Weinberger, the invitation to Reagan to visit Italy. The U.S. Administration representative delivered a message from Reagan, which stresses the very good state of relations with Italy. During the meeting the two sides stressed the importance of the "double decision" made by NATO in 1979, that is to say the choice of the so-called zero option and the contemporary deployment of Euromissiles, which, as it was said, contributed to bringing the USSR to the negotiating table.

In the subsequent meeting with Andreotti some aspects of the Reykjavik summit were discussed at length and the Italian defense minister [as heard] stressed the need to work to reach a clarification to overcome the existing obstacles to reach even partial agreements. Weinberger expressed his appreciation for Italy's role both within the Atlantic alliance and the international community, stressing the importance attached by the U.S. administration to the consultation and cohesion of the alliance, in particular in the most difficult phase opened by the Reykjavik summit.

Today, however, the papers reported on protests by NATO military chiefs who complained, among other things, of not having been sufficiently consulted before and after the summit in Iceland.

At the press conference jointly held with his Italian counterpart Spadolini, Weinberger clearly said that there had been scheduled consultations with NATO.

AVANTI! on Talks With Craxi

PM210946 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 18 Oct 86 pp 1, 12

[Unattributed report: "Weinberger Conveys Message to Craxi From President Reagan"]

[Excerpt] Yesterday at the Chigi Palace Prime Minister Craxi received U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who conveyed to him a message from President Reagan.

During the meeting there was an exchange of assessments on disarmament issues with special reference to foreseeable "post-Reykjavik" developments. In this connection an examination was made of the course of the discussions in the Icelandic capital and of the substance of the proposals put forward by both the American and the Soviet sides.

The prime minister reasserted the position of the Italian Government, which welcomes and encourages all efforts to consolidate the negotiating prospects that emerged in Reykjavik. For his part, the secretary of defense stressed America's absolute willingness to take every opportunity for contacts and dialogue with the Soviets to consolidate and extend the possibility of a framework agreement that emerged in Reykjavik.

The prime minister said that the most significant indication emerging from Reykjavik is the potential for understanding that exists when negotiations are undertaken with determination in a climate of trust and respect for mutual security requirements. Special attention, Craxi added, must be paid to an in-depth examination of the relationship between offensive weapons and defensive systems, with a view to ensuring the interrelationship between the three baskets embodied in the American-Soviet communique of January 1985.

In this connection the secretary of defense recalled President Reagan's latest proposals, which have taken account of the

anxieties expressed by the Soviet side regarding ABM and which are an indication of the American will to negotiate. He stressed, however, the need for a realistic and balanced approach. The prime minister and the secretary of defense agreed on the need to impart a new thrust to the negotiations on conventional weapons by accelerating the work of the special group established by the Atlantic Council meeting in Halifax.

Next Weinberger said that the U.S. Administration intends to maintain close coordination with its allies to seek a joint negotiating stance. In this connection he cited the White House decision to send Max Kampelman, the head of the American negotiators in Geneva, to Rome in the next few days to further extend the political dialogue with the Italian Government with a view to maintaining the negotiating impetus that emerged from Reykjavik.

During the conversation an examination was also made of the Arab-Israeli crisis, the Gulf conflict, security in the Mediterranean, and the problems of international terrorism. There was also discussion of Italian-U.S. cooperation in the sector of the high technologies included in the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] research phase open to more immediate developments in the industrial field.

Meets With Pope

AU191715 Paris AFP in English 1708 GMT 19 Oct 86

[Text] Florence, Italy, Oct 19 (AFP) — Pope John Paul II and U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger met here for an unscheduled 10-minute talk Sunday, as both continued Italian visits to promote their opposing views on space weaponry.

The pope set aside time on the second day of a busy pastoral trip to Florence to meet Mr Weinberger, who is on a European tour to brief allied leaders on the Reykjavik summit and defend the U.S. insistence on pursuing the "star wars" programme.

Mr Weinberger was invited to lunch Sunday at the Florence country home of Italian Defence Minister Giovanni Spadolini, who arranged the meeting with the pope at Mr Weinberger's request, officials said.

The U.S. official declined to comment on the nature of his talks with the pontiff, who had earlier sharply criticised expenditure on space militarisation in a speech to 15,000 young Italians gathered at the city's 13th-century Santa Croce Church.

"One cannot remain indifferent in the face of the figures revealing the waste" of the armaments race, the pope had said.

Reiterating a plea he made here Saturday that machines should serve mankind, he added: "Humanity today surely cannot be proud of the satellites orbiting the heavens while millions of people die of hunger on earth."

"Nor can humanity feel at peace when the world's nuclear arsenals can extinguish human life on the planet for ever."

Before leaving the church, the pope prayed for several minutes before the tomb of Galileo, the Renaissance scientist who was persecuted under the Inquisition for his advanced thinking, including his declaration that the sun rather than the earth was the centre of the universe.

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CSO: 5200/2431

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SPANISH PAPER VIEWS SUMMIT RESULTS IN POSITIVE LIGHT

PM220835 Madrid ABC in Spanish 14 Oct 86 p 15

[Editorial: "Fortunately a Failure"]

[Text] For several European and U.S. sectors, quite free from the mentality of the "hawks," the lack of agreement in the Reykjavik talks could be good news. It is a matter of defending the consistency of the Western stances before a fearsome negotiator. The Soviet Union is a fearsome negotiator as long as it lacks the moral and political constraints which influence Westerners at the negotiating table. The Soviet Union follows to the letter Machiavelli's ethical proposition that "the end justifies the means." On the other hand, the Western allies must conduct their policy in open societies, in which it is not possible to repeatedly deceive public opinion. When there is no public opinion, as in the case of the Soviet Union, you go to negotiate with the other superpower on the basis of hypotheses based on secrecy and double accounting. This seems to have occurred in Reykjavik, where any beginning of agreement proved impossible. Gorbachev was hoping that Reagan would seek at all costs an electoral trump card (on the eve of next month's U.S. elections); a trump card advantageous for an interlocutor who under no circumstances has to face free elections. Gorbachev was hoping to force Reagan into an agreement by pressing him also with respect to the political account which he will have to render in 2 years' time, at the end of his term (Soviet leaders do not have to render accounts to majorities, nor are they forced to observe constitutional documents with preset terms of office). Reagan was emphatic in declaring his intention "not to commit future U.S. presidents," and this is the line of clarity and firmness which various governments in Europe and in America are welcoming today. That is why the Eastern bloc terminals [terminales del Este] are talking in the Western newspapers about failure of the Reykjavik summit.

There was no summit — both sides officially undertook to speak of a "preparatory meeting" — nor was there possibly a failure. The Soviets maintained their admirable consistency, and this time the Westerners did so, too. And so the advocates of a consistent foreign policy uncorked several bottles of champagne last night in Paris, London, Washington, and Ottawa. It is not true, as people have attempted to put about, that the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program — misnamed "star wars" — is responsible for the lack of agreement. There were two other

decisive factors: On the one hand, U.S. receptiveness to European pressures, when at the last moment Mitterrand, Thatcher, and Kohl put to Reagan their rejection of a premature reduction of Euromissiles. On the other hand, there was the U.S. refusal to talk solely about disarmament without also including the issue of human rights and Soviet encouragement of local wars. Gorbachev leads a nation which is experiencing critical economic difficulties. Russia's impoverishment and its technological backwardness will soon make him return to the negotiating table.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PORTUGUESE DAILY CALLS REYKJAVIK SUMMIT 'RESOUNDING FAILURE'

PM221047 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Oct 86 p 6

[Editorial: "The Final Disagreement"]

[Text] The 2 days of talks between Reagan and Gorbachev, during which, so it is said, agreements of "historic importance" in the area of disarmament were in sight, have resulted in a resounding failure which will perhaps encumber the already slow Geneva negotiations for several more months. And all this, if the two leaders are to be believed, is because of "Star Wars."

There is something surprising in this explanation for those who recall the more or less inflexible stances which both sides have always maintained with respect to this notorious bone of contention. Was Reagan really convinced that the Soviets would concede even that point? And did Gorbachev believe that the Americans would confine to laboratory research a project on which the current President has staked his reputation? However strange it may seem, there are grounds for believing that both men, although not expecting complete success, set out for Reykjavik with some optimism.

The Soviet leader did not have much to lose. On the contrary, the potential agreements themselves which came to be envisaged constituted an immense advantage for his foreign and domestic policy. On the one hand, the halving of long-range missiles represented a significant relief for an economy such as the Soviet economy, contending with grave difficulties; on the other, the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, although accompanied by a considerable reduction of warheads in Asia, meant defeat for Reagan and several European leaders who insisted on the nuclearization of the continent, in addition to dealing the Atlantic alliance's unity a severe blow. Despite that, Gorbachev believed that the moratorium which Reagan proposed with respect to the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] was insufficient, and thus the outcome of the negotiations was jeopardized. In fact, however important the steps announced, the most decisive step remained to be taken. The Soviets are aware of their indisputable superiority in conventional weapons, not to mention the degree of social and political cohesion in the Eastern bloc, and they also know that only a project such as "Star Wars" could reverse this situation. Hence the immense skill in giving way on incidentals and being intransigent on essentials which they displayed at this summit.

For his part, Reagan seems to need a success, such as came to be foreseen in Reykjavik, in order to turn what was hitherto just an attitude toward the Soviets into a tangible result which would be viewed as a decisive advance toward peace. In fact the turnabout in foreign policy which was effected after his arrival in the White House is in danger of reaching the end of his second term without achieving significant changes. The philosophy which characterized it until recently was that the West, and the United States in particular, in addition to consistency in stances, would have to display firmness in condemnations of their opponent in any part of the world it might be and the consequent military capability. This was the principle which prompted the deployment of missiles in Europe and the current policy with respect to Afghanistan and Nicaragua. For some time success seemed to be in sight.

The Soviets were forced to return to the negotiating table after announcing that they were withdrawing not to return until the Pershing-2s left European territory; the main European allies, despite disagreements on details, supported the stance adopted toward the Kremlin, thus strengthening NATO's structures; the USSR at last seemed interested in reducing arms and forced by the economic crisis to do so, if only until the introduction into the system of the changes planned by the Gorbachev administration. However, the failures were no less great. Nicaragua remains a thorny problem for the White House and a source of constant friction with Congress; the same could be said of South Africa. The crusade against Al-Qadhafi is in danger of turning against its instigator, following the scandal of the "disinformation project" recently revealed by the press; and, above all, the very rationale for this policy, wholly based on the defense of freedoms and the affirmation of the free enterprise economic system's superiority, is beginning to give way at unforeseeable levels, in such a way that it seems to have played only a subsidiary role in Reykjavik, and was certainly very far from dictating sine qua non terms for the progress of the dialogue. So much so is this that, just before Reagan's departure for the summit, Republican leaders conveyed to the press several appeals intimating that there was a danger of a return to the views on detente predominant in the Carter administration.

Under these conditions, if the summit's success was really wanted by both sides, its feasibility seemed no less problematic on that account. Reagan perhaps overestimated his opponent's interest in securing an agreement, gambling everything to present at the end of his term a result which would undoubtedly have been noteworthy, especially since mid-term elections will be held 4 November from which the Republicans' position in Congress will result. As for Gorbachev, although knowing the limitations which the U.S. President was bringing to the negotiating table, as he himself admitted in the end, he lost nothing in making a further effort with respect to what is his main strategic aim --- to delay or eliminate the SDI. His major advantage lies in negotiating with a President who will only be so for another 2 years and who has recently sustained grave damage to his image and to his leadership ability. It is not by chance that it was Gorbachev who spoke immediately afterward about the need for another summit, while the utmost silence on that score reigns on the U.S. side.

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CSO: 5200/2432

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CHINESE COMMENTARY: DEPLOYMENT OF USSR MISSILES IN AFGHANISTAN

HK270138 Hong Kong HSIN WAN PAO in Chinese 26 Oct 86 p 1

["News Talk" column: "Soviet Military Deployment in 'Wakhan Corridor'"]

[Text] According to the foreign press, the Soviet Union has reached a secret agreement with Afghanistan on taking over jurisdiction of Wakhan. After years of management and the stationing of massive forces, the Soviet Union possibly has an intermediate-range nuclear missile base there.

If this is true, it would be contradictory to the withdrawal of 6,000 soldiers as publicized by the Soviet Union. It was reported long ago that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was but a smoke screen. It was actually the relief of troops because the Soviet Union had dispatched new troops there previously.

If you want to know the strategic position of Wakhan in Afghanistan, you should unfold a map and carefully observe its relations with the neighboring countries because a slight change there may produce an impact on China, Pakistan, and India.

Afghanistan has a special topography. In the northeast, it has a long, narrow zone stretching eastward which is around 300 kilometers in length and 13 to 65 kilometers in width. This is Wakhan, an area named after Wakhan City.

Only one edge of the Wakhan area is adjacent to China. Moreover, the Wakhan corridor, which is only scores of kilometers wide from north to south, separates the Soviet Union from Pakistan. Thus, this tiny region is adjacent to three countries. Without the permission of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union cannot go southward and enter Pakistan.

Now, after taking jurisdiction over Wakhan from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has secured two military benefits. First, it can cast its greedy eyes on China's Xinjiang at the eastern end of the Wakhan area and extend its influence to Kashmir, which is a disputed land between India and Pakistan. Second, with the Wakhan corridor in Soviet hands, the Soviet Union is now contiguous to Pakistan. The military pressure on Pakistan is greater from this area than from Afghanistan, where there is a Soviet garrison.

Some foreign newspapers suggest that the Soviet Union has at least built some basic facilities for a medium-range guided nuclear missile base in that area and that this base is to specially deal with China and Pakistan.

Both China and Pakistan have some reservations on what the Soviet Union calls the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In addition, they have also urged the Soviet

Union to withdraw all its troops from that country. This is related to the changes in the Wakhan area.

In recent years, China and Pakistan have been developing land transportation by building highways on the Pamir Plateau. Although the task is formidable, it has significance. With these highways, traders and travelers can directly go from one place to another. In addition, these highways are multi-purpose highways. In May this year, Port (Kunjirap), which is situated on the highway along the border between the two countries, was opened to the world. Since then, a bus service has been operating from it. (Kunjcap) is just about 100 km south of Afghanistan's Wakhan area. The purpose of this could be to counteract the Soviet garrison in Wakhan.

The Soviet Union has so far annexed Afghanistan's Wakhan, secured the right to enter Korea's Nampo Port, which is directly opposite of China's Dalian Port, and turned Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay into Soviet naval and air base. All this has inevitably made the East Asian countries and their peoples more vigilant.

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CSO: 5200/4013

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW TV COMMENTARIES ON REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

International Situation: Questions and Answers

LD180608 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 17 Oct 86

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" Program, presented by Vladimir Pasko, foreign policy commentator for All-Union radio; with Vitaliy Yakovlevich Chukseyev, TASS editor in chief of foreign information; Kim Gerasimov, radio commentator; Sergey Aleksandrovich Ugarov, CEMA adviser; and Sergey Pravdin, radio commentator]

[Excerpt] [Pasko] I want to start the program with an event that has only just taken place -- the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. That meeting has come to be an important event in international affairs in the struggle against the arms race, for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, and for the removal of the nuclear threat. The position of the Soviet side at it was honorable and open. It was based on the principles of equality and equal security, and took into account the interests of both countries, their allies and the peoples of all states. This position has come to be the concrete expression of a new approach and new thinking, the need for which is dictated by the realities of the nuclear and missile age. Displaying a sincere desire to reach an accord, the Soviet side, as you know, tabled a new, compromise proposal, which took full account of the U.S. side's concern, making it possible to agree on such vital issues as the reduction, and ultimately the complete elimination, of strategic offensive weapons, and the distribution of intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

However, it proved impossible to embody the agreement that had been virtually reached in accords binding on both sides. The sole reason for this was the reluctance of the American Administration to create the conditions for the realization of these accords. The whole world is discussing the results of the meeting.

[Chukseyev] [passage omitted on survey of foreign comment on U.S. stance at the talks] This unfavorable response obliged the American Administration to launch a propaganda counteroffensive urgently, so as to make some attempt to calm world opinion. According to U.S. journalists, White House representatives dispersed throughout Washington, giving interviews to various news programs, holding press conferences, speaking on international television and paying personal visits to congressmen. The President intends to send his emissaries to a number of European and Asian states, while Secretary of State Shultz has already flown to Brussels, where he addressed representatives of the NATO countries. An attempt is being made to depict the situation as though the administration were still attached to the cause of disarmament.

However, these peace-making words do not match up with the deeds. On 16 October, the latest test of a nuclear weapon, codenamed "Belmont" was conducted in sector 20 of the Nevada test range. During these tests, components of the weapons in the star wars program are tried out.

Nevertheless, when assessing the summit meeting, observers in various countries note that it was useful and necessary. It was a step in a complicated and hard dialogue in search of difficult solutions. What is needed now is decisive and responsible action by all states -- large and small, irrespective of their social system -- so as to put an end to the arms race on earth and prevent its extension into space.

The world press is now widely quoting the words of Comrade Gorbachev about the fact that the preparations for Reykjavik helped us to formulate a new platform -- a new, bold platform that increases the chances of eventual success. It accords with the interests of our people and, at the same time, this platform is in accord with the interests of all other states and is worthy of trust.

[Pasko] Thank you, Vitaliy Yakovlevich. [passage omitted: Pasko outlines the history of the nuclear-free zone movement, concluding with the declaration made at the recent Perugia conference of nuclear-free zones]

'Studio 9' Program

OW181049 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0710 GMT 18 Oct 86

["Studio 9" program, presented by Professor Valentine Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio, with Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the APN Board]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades. In our previous discussion here in 'Studio 9' of the Ostankino Television Center, we agreed that the next discussion would be devoted to the results of the Reykjavik meeting. For this reason, I asked Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the APN Board, who went to the Icelandic capital as experts, to take part in our discussion today. At the meeting held in the Icelandic capital, the large-scale proposals submitted by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev have now been evaluated by the world as the most important event, an event of world significance, not only today, but having along-term influence on the course of the political process in the world arena.

In the past, few days, the Reykjavik meeting has naturally been the main topic both in the world press and in the statements of state and political leaders, and for this reason I would like to begin our discussion by asking you, Valentin Mikhaylovich, to make an assessment of these comments.

[Falin] If we began to analyze the comments, we would probably take up all the broadcasting time. Therefore, I shall be very brief. The comments can be divided into three groups. The first and the main group of comments voiced, irrespective of the social, political, and even military borders now dividing the world, are disappointing on the one hand in the fact that, in Reykjavik, despite existing objective and favorable prerequisites for achieving agreement, agreement did not occur at the last

moment. The U.S. side did not find it possible in Reykjavik to give preference to important considerations, long-term interests, interests which will determine the face of the future world for decades ahead, and the security of the United States itself, over hackneyed considerations.

This disappointment is not just that of bitterness over unfulfilled hopes. No, people are making a balanced assessment. They perfectly understand, and this is felt in their comments, that Reykjavik is a huge part, you could say a whole block, of international relations, which will be the foundation for the development of positive international development for a long time to come. The disappointment is accompanied by an understanding that it was possible in Reykjavik to cover in a few days a road which took many years in the past.

The second group of comments depends on political and ideological sympathies, on allies' commitments. I am talking first of all about comments in Western Europe and some other countries close to the United States. The principle is as follows: It does not matter what the United States does, the main point is that it is precisely the United States doing it, and for this reason it is clear beforehand that the laurels will go to Washington whatever it does. They ignore the material aspects of the issue in their comments. Apparently, they are also little interested in the possibility of achievement or nonachievement of an agreement.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich, some even assert that the Soviet proposals there were almost impromptu.

[Falin] These are convenient statements, because they justify this kind of reaction, this kind of comment, this kind of assessment of what has happened.

Finally, there are comments arising from certain military considerations. For instance, Rogers made a formal protest to the U.S. Government, the U.S. Administration.

[Arbatov] On behalf of the NATO bureaucracy.

[Falin] On behalf of the NATO bureaucracy. It is also part of the military-industrial complex. It is a transnational military-industrial complex. This protest is connected with the United States allegedly almost condemning Europe to a nuclear-free existence. Nuclear-free in our view is strong security in the military-political aspect. For a certain group of this type of leader, that is a life full of worry and danger. That is a different scale of thinking, a different scale of assessment, which explains many things to us concerning the hidden trends and events in Western countries.

[Arbatov] I think this is most probably a general assessment that, during the entire Reagan administration -- and Reagan's administration has been, without doubt, a record one in the field of propaganda among all the U.S. Administrations -- a Hollywood-type propaganda machine has conducted the greatest propaganda campaign in the history of the administration, aimed precisely at convincing everyone of correctness of the United States. Here they constantly rush about, they shift daily; it has to be said they shift skillfully. At first, it was said that everything had failed, and failed through the fault of the Soviet Union. Then it was said that everything was in order. Why? Because U.S. elections were approaching.

[Zorin interrupts] Two weeks...

[Arbatov] They reasoned and decided that it would be better if it were said that everything was in order. Now an effort is being made in the very opposite direction; they pretend that everything is almost in order, that a great forward step has been made, that a little bit more pressure, and everything would be in order.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, I would like you to continue commentary in the following aspect. There are different kinds of commentaries; there are malicious ones, there are some honestly failing to understand matters. What do you think it is necessary to do, in light of the campaign of reactions, the wave of comments these days -- what do you think requires additional explanation and commentary on our positions?

[Arbatov] You see, the trouble is that much does not reach America. So, from that point of view, everything needs to be explained. We cannot do that, and it is hardly possible that many will watch our 'Studio 9' there. Everything is in doubt, beginning with how the talks began and ending with how they closed. Who submitted the proposals for instance? The Americans say that Reagan submitted them all. While we, who have been in Reykjavik, know especially well that he actually came with empty pockets, empty hands as Mikhail Sergeyevich said. How did they end?

At first, Poindexter announced that Reagan slammed the door, and then, on noting that the public did not like that, Larry Speakes corrected him, saying it was not so, that it was Gorbachev who stood up and ended the talks. If we talk about more serious matters, I would say the following. First, about the proposals. Reagan said that agreement was reached only about destroying all ballistic missiles by the year 1990. Shultz was more accurate. He said all strategic arms. More accurately, the talk was about nuclear arms. Concerning intermediate-range weapons, is it possible to remove from our package of proposals, which included three large parts -- strategic arms, intermediate-range weapons the ABM treaty and ending nuclear testing -- something suitable for the Americans. It was said all the time that was a package and not a menu from which you could select what you liked and let others eat what you could not swallow; that you have to accept it as such, as this package covers all aspects of equal security. Now speculations have begun on intermediate-range weapons; whether it is possible to pull them out. We are even criticized for linking this with star wars. I think that all understand our logic. If we agreed to far-reaching measures on intermediate-range weapons, we could not overlook what would happen with strategic arms, where we have given up counting U.S. forward-based forces and some other systems.

Then, an interesting thing has happened now which requires not so much explanation as comment. The Americans have stopped talking about verification. Yes, the Soviet Union has gone all the way here. Moreover, with Valentin Mikhaylovich, we saw something very astonishing when Marshal Akhromeyev tried to convince Perle about the need for on-the-spot inspection. Perle said: No, a simple statement is sufficient; you have to believe us.

[Falin interrupts] No, he said something more sophisticated; that in free U.S. society, arms spending is determined by Congress, and anything that interests you in the field of verification you can read in the Congressional Record. This is sufficient to be assured that the American side is observing the agreement.

[Arbatov] On the other hand, they tried to present things to us as follows, and of course to their advantage, that we had supposedly forgotten some things, that we had given up in particular or retreated from nuclear test ban provisions. That is not true.

We spoke very firmly about our desire to achieve a total ban of nuclear testing. It is another matter that, in Reykjavik during this discussion, steps were taken to prevent the first stages of the process from turning into a controversial issue for all our far-reaching proposals.

[Falin] There is a fundamental difference here, Georgiy Arkadyevich. With what did the exchange of opinions on ending tests begin? The U.S. delegation came out for an agreement which would regulate the continuation of tests.

[Arbatov interrupts] Talks on nuclear tests.

[Falin] Talks on nuclear tests. The position of the Soviet side lay in -- and this position could not be otherwise -- achieving agreement on a complete and final ban all nuclear tests. Discussion centered accordingly on how to achieve this second aim, which, as a matter of fact, corresponds with two treaties -- the 1963 treaty on banning nuclear tests in three spheres, and the 1968 treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. They stipulate the obligation of the signatories to strive for a complete ban on nuclear tests.

If the United States were to join the unilateral Soviet moratorium and simultaneously talks were to begin to conclude the corresponding agreement, then the problem for the two countries of ending tests would be practically solved. Essentially, there are no obstacles to joining the Soviet moratorium, and it should be an act of goodwill on the part of the American side.

Here, I am returning to the topic of verification. The United States currently does not want to discuss the problem of verification very much as it pertains to nuclear tests. It wants to raise the question of verification, not as it concerns adherence to the obligation to end tests, but turning the question to how reliable, to what degree is verification reliable, in adherence to limited nuclear tests, in particular the ceiling on yields. This too is a very different, a fundamentally different, postulation of the issues. At any rate, the talks in Reykjavik have thrown light on a lot of things.

[Arbatov interrupts] Now, you have recalled the extemporizing. You know there was an element of the unexpected for the Americans. Only I think it was their own fault. In this case, they could have fallen victim to their own propaganda. They said so much about opposing the policies of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, about contradictions existing inside, that they were completely unprepared for the fact that the Soviet Union would come to Reykjavik with serious and very far-reaching proposals on disarmament. Moreover, this was accompanied by speculation about the position of our military officials and their... [changes thought] Marshal Akhromeyev arrived with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and headed the group of experts conducting the talks, and so forth.

[Zorin] Mikhail Sergeyevich stressed in his television speech that this was preceded by extensive work, in which the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scientists, and specialists took part. In other words, it was preceded by extremely extensive and detailed work.

[Arbatov] Now do you understand how much they were surprised? There was this element of surprise. First of all because -- and it is my guess of course -- they became victims of their own propaganda, and secondly they did not take into consideration the

fact that what we were saying was being said in all seriousness, a new political thinking, that we are trying to assess the entire situation in a new way, and so forth.

There is another thing mentioned, and it may be worth noting that, supposedly, we had set a trap for the Americans, we set a snare to catch Reagan. Of course, this is not true. If you look at our proposals closely, you can see that they are quite generous. They even include certain things taking American interests into consideration, because we know that if they do not guarantee the lawful interests and security of the other side, we shall never get an agreement, nor can we ensure our own security. This has become our traditional policy.

There is another thing. In some questions, these things were prepared as face-saving devices, so that Reagan would not have to back off, and so forth. We were, after all, ready to act quite generously here. So this too is not true. But the great number of issues requiring the need for comment attests to the intensity of the campaign launched after Reykjavik. It is an array, not only a long propaganda array, but a political one as well...

[Falin interrupts] Like the tail of Halley's Comet.

I should say that the tone of the campaign, of the elucidation for world public opinion, so to speak, of what happened in Reykjavik, is being set by President Reagan himself. In his address after returning from the Icelandic capital, the President declared that progress at the talks was a result of the fact that the United States acted from a position of strength, that this position supposedly bore fruit, and that Reykjavik was an example of this. The Russians, you see, are retreating before the firm U.S. position. I think this kind of statement from the White House boss cannot remain without comment.

[Falin] I think it is a relic of that old moss-covered thinking which caused an exacerbation of the international situation and forced politicians, serious and responsible politicians, to talk about the danger, the increasing danger of war. What does a policy from a position of strength mean? What does it mean when one state enters into talks from a position of strength? It presumes that the other state, its partner, must proceed from a position of weakness. This cannot be, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said responsibly that this would never be. We shall proceed from a position of equality at talks, and defend the principle of equality as the basis of any agreement. If there is no equality, there can be no agreement.

[Arbatov] Behind these arguments on strength, of course there were also some concrete ideas. Here too, the Americans fell victim to their propaganda to some extent. This was that, economically, the Soviet Union was in such a situation that it had no way out, and Reagan repeatedly mentioned this. They expected that we would all come out with white flags aloft, and surrender, almost within weeks.

I would like to say in connection with this that, if they were to rely on this politically then long before what they dream of happened, the United States would be ruined. The budget deficit this year, caused primarily by enormous military spending, will surpass \$200 billion...

[Zorin interrupts] The state debt of the United States is the biggest in history. Reagan has accumulated a debt greater than all previous U.S. presidents put together.

[Arbatov] Yes. Now what does this debt mean? There is not just an obligation to pay it off. The deficit is \$200 billion, but the operation of the debt, that is paying interest, amounts to \$140 billion. That means that the debt is a clear \$60 billion. Now this money is not available, and the whole matter today lies in the fact that all this talk of strength -- you put it correctly -- becomes insane relative to the new realities of the world. This is an example of old thinking which gives no key, no answer to an understanding of the present moment.

[Zorin] In connection with this, let us talk about the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) -- the U.S. space arms program -- insofar as this program served as the stumbling block in Reykjavik. Currently, many people in the West are asking -- besides this question is being asked not only by our enemies, even people who regard us quite benevolently ask it -- why the Soviet Union, after going so far, did not make the last step in Reykjavik to meet the American position and agree to the American formula?

[Falin] The topic under discussion in Reykjavik was the destruction of nuclear weapons. Practically speaking, the main parameters for movement in this direction were determined -- the destruction over a 10-year period of all strategic and nonstrategic nuclear systems of the United States and the Soviet Union.

A question arises: If you are approaching a nuclear-free world, and at this time the other side -- to words about defense against certain madmen who may make use of nuclear weapons, about the possibility that this agreement may be secretly violated -- is deploying a system of new strategic arms, then how can the first be reconciled with the second? We shall also agree to reject weapons replacing nuclear weapons, or we agree to nothing.

[Arbatov] Of course.

[Falin] In this context, in the context of deep fundamental reductions, any new military effort in a new sphere acquires a qualitative meaning.

[Arbatov] I think that the argument here was more than about SDI. The argument was about whether or not there was to be an arms race, because what is done through SDI research is actually a new round of the arms race in many fields -- antimissile, conventional, offensive and all other types. But, I think it would be interesting today to see what arguments were presented at the talks themselves in support of SDI, and after the talks.

You have already mentioned the madman. This is precisely what Comrade Gorbachev spoke about. He asked: Why, Mr. President...[changes thought] Yes, first the President spoke: After all, can't you make me a concession on this issue too? It has to be said that we were asked to make concessions all the time. Comrade Gorbachev told him: Why do you insist so much on this, Mr. President? I have the right to ask for the opposite -- well, I am paraphrasing the conversation -- ask you why do you insist? Why are you not ready to make a concession in this issue?

This forces me to think that the matter is not just about the wording: only laboratory testing and research. You are asking to across out the word laboratory. The talk is about something much greater. It started with something else: You are a Russian and cannot be trusted, you can deceive us, and preserve some nuclear arms, despite the agreement.

I think this is the most fundamental issue. If they think that we cannot be trusted, that we may conceal [arms] despite all methods of verification, that means that the President is not serious about concluding an agreement with us. That means that he is playing a game. He had to solve this issue before Reykjavik -- maybe even before Geneva: whether or not he was ready to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union.

[Zorin interrupts] There arises the question of why we must trust the United States more than it trusts us.

[Arbatov] Valentin Sergeyevich, here we just have an unbelievable accumulation of mythology, deceptions, lies, half-truths, and so forth. All that leads to the conclusion that it is not just a matter of SDI. The matter was not with SDI but in whether or not the Americans were ready to conclude an agreement. After all, they resisted -- and we were witnesses to this during the night-time meetings, the conferences of experts, where they offered opposition in actually every issue. If they were not ready it has to end somewhere. So it ended with SDI.

[Falin] I shall clarify this. It is not a matter of SDI or the declared aims of SDI. The matter is that SDI is just a name.

In point of fact it is a huge strategic program, the tip of which is shown to the public, while the main part is hidden, and hidden fairly deeply. What is SDI? It is an attempt to use new physical principles for military purposes. They say that these physical principles will be used only for defense, and Reagan says: Believe me, I shall not deceive you; they are only for defense! First of all Reagan, like everyone else, is not immortal. A new President will come and say: It does not matter what Reagan said about defense, I shall use it for offense, that is what I want. Secondly, if it turns out that this physical principle is more effective for offense than all those known so far, then of course, as happened with the nuclear bomb in 1945-46, these physical principles will overturn all military as well as political thinking. There could not be anything else.

[Arbatov interrupts] Even if you think about the shield, the shield was also often used by soldiers who went into attack with spears, as well as by the soldiers who defended themselves with it from the attackers.

[Falin] No doubt. In this sense, you can only confirm that on the one hand what is being done within the framework of so-called defensive initiatives is part of the first-strike doctrine, and for additional insurance for the United States after the delivery of the first strike. Many in the United States treat the entire SDI program in this manner. In Western Europe, naturally, we are the first to understand this. On the other hand, now, fresh in the tracks of the Reykjavik meeting, comments in the United States begin to raise the question of what was actually discussed there. If some say that in Reykjavik the sides almost came to an agreement on the elimination of all strategic nuclear arms and nuclear arms as such, and within specified terms, then the administration, for the benefit of the rightists or ultrarightists, begins to say: No, we came to an agreement only on the elimination of ballistic missiles, so consequently the cruise missiles, aircraft, and many other things are outside the agreement. With such interpretations and reading, it is now possible to expect many other interpretations and reinterpretations in the future.

Thirdly, what is SDI from the point of view of the international situation, from the point of view of the world political map? Let us suppose that theoretically the United States creates SDI. Let us suppose that the Soviet Union creates a response -- an asymmetrical answer, but nevertheless an answer to this system.

What about the other states? Neither financially, nor technically, and not even from the point of view of their areas and territories, are they in a position to defend themselves from these new types of weapons. That means that the world will be even more divided and dismembered by this force on domestic and foreign policy of every state and on international relations as a whole.

[Arbatov] If we played this game, then the apprehension some voice about the collusion of the two superpowers would be justified.

[Falin] There are such apprehensions. We know about them. Most probably, Valentin Sergeyevich witnessed this kind of talk in journalist circles in Reykjavik...

[Zorin interrupts] Yes, there was talk that generally the matter was about the creation of some kind of Soviet-American condominium, about joint possessions, particularly in Europe...

[Arbatov interrupts] I think that it was the Americans who circulated this in order to spoil the mood of the Europeans.

[Falin] To disclaim the influence of military technology today and military potential on the policy of states would be to disclaim reality. In this regard, SDI is a claim, wrapped in a technological cover, to world leadership and hegemony. In this connection, the United States is trying to challenge us to do something similar. I can repeat what has just been said, the Soviet Union has not played, and does not intend to play, such games.

[Zorin] So, as far as I have understood you, the matter is not about what Western propaganda and some Western statesmen are now trying to convince the world public opinion of, that actually the matter was just about one word, that the Soviet Union did not make a concession over this word, and that this was the reason for no agreement being reached. But the matter was about most important principles, from which the Soviet Union...

[Arbatov interrupts]...in different aspects.

[Zorin]... could not give up, in various aspects. I would like to touch on another aspect of the topic. Most of the commentators, one way or another, but generally, either admit or are forced to admit that the progress made in Reykjavik was ensured through Soviet proposals and efforts. In connection with this -- our mail already includes letters and we have even received telegrams these days on this question -- Soviet people raise the question of whether this is not dangerous, whether we are conducting matters in too gentle a manner. Do we not make too many concessions? Georgiy Arkadyevich, please answer this.

[Arbatov] First all, I think that we are conducting affairs very firmly, with all flexibility in our position; we showed that in Reykjavik. We have clearly defined the limit beyond which we cannot proceed, because that would have meant sacrificing

security interests, and we did not go beyond it. At the same time, we have made any concessions. No talks or agreements can be achieved without concessions, and here we thought on a large scale, so to speak, again without threatening security interests. It has to be borne in mind that the large quantity of arms accumulated creates possibilities for great flexibility, because the matter here is not about concessions, even large ones, immediately leading to a change in the balance of power. The balance of power is fairly firm. In addition, you have to differentiate between concessions; there are concessions and concessions. We have made some concessions to the Americans. Yes, we went to meet them. At the same time, I would like to say that there was another type of concession. Well, I would call them concessions to common sense. The transition to the new position within the framework of new political thinking, when we very courageously and resolutely rejected outmoded stereotypes, dogmas, and obsolete positions...

[Zorin interrupts] Georgiy Arkadyevich, apparently this is precisely what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had in mind when he appeared on television, and I would like to quote a part of this statement: The work done before the meeting and there in Reykjavik will not be wasted, said Mikhail Sergeyevich. We ourselves have thought out many things in connection with this meeting, and reviewed many. We have now better cleared the way for development of the further struggle for peace and disarmament, freed ourselves from existing obstructions, details, small things, stereotypes which fettered new approaches in this most important sphere of our policy.

[Arbatov] Yes, and you know that this is very important, because I shall tell from my experiences, I had many discussions about Soviet foreign policy on Western and U.S. television, and in various auditoriums. Which was always the most difficult question? It turns out that the Americans and the West were always guilty in everything, and the Soviet Union had always had an ideal position in everything. And could you tell us: you now admit that certain things inside [the USSR] need review, you criticize yourselves, you are seeking innovation, and so forth. But what about foreign policy?

Now we have shown an absolutely healthy approach, identical in spirit to the entire new policy that we are pursuing, to foreign policy as well.

Comrade Gorbachev in fact promised this both to the Soviet people and the world a year ago in Paris when he addressed the parliament. He spoke about the sad characteristic of human reason to lag behind rapidly changing realities, and that in this connection we are undertaking serious work to bring our perceptions and our policy in line with new realities of the nuclear age. This promise, as we can see, was not in vain. In fact we are now proposing to the world a new policy. Colossal work has been done this year, comrades.

If we consider everything -- our proposals and their dynamism; what was said in Paris and after Geneva; the January proposals on complete liquidation of nuclear weapons by the end of the century; clarification of our position on many matters; and then the entire concept of our policy that was proposed at the 27th party congress, the new concept of security -- we are indeed talking about things that the best minds of man -- of Einstein and Niels Bohr -- dreamed about when they said that after the advent of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy everything had changed except for one thing -- human thinking.

[Falin] Since you mentioned Einstein, Georgiy Arkadyevich, I would like to cite a very interesting quotation of his: Your ability to observe a certain phenomenon depends on the theory that you are using. Theory determines precisely what you can observe. If

in your inner disposition you proceed from the possibility that an agreement can be reached, then this is one situation. If, however, you proceed from the feeling that the other side cannot be trusted, that it is never right even when it is right, then agreement is excluded in advance.

[Zorin] There is one question which, honestly speaking, I wanted to ask you back in Reykjavik, but then knowing that we would meet here in Studio 9 I decided to delay it until today. I saw how both of you, after the first day of talks between Mikhail Sergeyevich and President Reagan -- it was somewhere around 1930 in the evening -- left to meet representatives of the American delegation.

You talked with them all night. In the morning when I was going to breakfast -- it was about 0630 in the morning -- I saw you returning from this meeting. Could you tell us today about what happened during these nighttime vigils?

[Arbatov, laughing] I think that Valentin Mikhaylovich and I will never forget that. It was a meeting full of drama as well as comedy -- there was quite a few episodes of that nature as well -- but primarily I would begin -- Valentin Mikhaylovich, you can add to what I say later -- by saying that first of all we saw clearly how empty-handed the American delegation was.

They had absolutely nothing to say.

We brought a document with us -- as a matter of fact, I have it with me, here it is -- which is entitled: Directive to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and United States on preparing an agreement in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. It says that it is a draft. Everything is here, including the date for the Washington visit. Only three dots have been typed in after the date where President Reagan and Comrade Gorbachev could sign the corresponding agreement. This is followed clearly by the categories: Strategic Arms; Intermediate-Range Missiles; On Limiting Antimissile Defense Systems; and On Banning Nuclear Tests.

Comrade Akhromeyev, who headed our group of experts, read this to the Americans. There was absolute silence. Then talk began in a remote way and always around something old, about that very naphthalene-smelling rubbish which Mikhail Sergeyevich spoke about. Then the Americans took a time out [taym-aut]. They were gone for 40 minutes. Then they returned and the whole fuss began again. Then they started passing notes back and forth. Notes from Perle, notes from Linhard, notes from someone else to poor old Nitze, who got so flustered by this time that he began reading aloud notes that were addressed to him: You should tell them this and that. Then he would stop and say: Excuse me, this is the wrong one. [laughter]

Then they took the second time out. This time they were absent for 1 hour and 40 minutes.

[Falin] As a result of the second time out an American paper appeared entitled...

[Arbatov] Directives, not to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, but to the delegations that are conducting talks in Geneva. After reading this paper Marshal Akhromeyev asked: Can you tell us briefly, is there anything new in the American position? Do you not think that it repeats what the American delegation introduced in Geneva on 18 September and to which the Soviet side has already provided a clear, precise, and concrete response? Again a pause. Then: Yes, it is a repeat of our position...

[Arbatov interrupts] A 5-minute pause. A MKHAT [Moscow Academic Art Theater] pause.

[Falin] Yes.

[Arbatov] I can hardly remember such an uncomfortable and embarrassing situation, when a question is asked, then 1 minute, 2, 3, 4, 5 minutes a person sits in silence, then squeezes out what you have said.

[Falin] Against this background, against a background of an absence of readiness on the part of one side even to consider the proposals made by the other; against a background of a certain confusion, I would say, that attested to the fact that there was no clear and precise idea as to where to lead the matter, another pause developed when both groups of experts decided to report on the situation to their leaders.

[Arbatov] It should be added that the Americans were afraid. There was another side to this.

On the one hand they could not say anything, but when they were asked: Well, we will have to report that we could not reach agreement. Then, further confusion set in. Not only because of a lack of unity -- which probably did exist -- among the group of U.S. experts, but I also think because they understood -- they were experienced people -- the new situation in which they were put by the Soviet proposals. It was hard for them to simply reject everything and present this to the President.

[Falin] They could not say no. But they did not want to say yes, or even half yes. After reporting to our leaders, and the Americans apparently to their leaders, we met once again, and it should be said that this second meeting, this second act of the nighttime drama, passed in a more constructive way, particularly as far as strategic weapons were concerned.

[Arbatov interrupts] In fact, just about only in this part.

[Falin] Yes. But when the matter came to this SDI, or more precisely to antimissile defense; and when the Soviet side showed that it cannot take part in burying the antimissile defense treaty, that it will not play up to the United States in this by any means, and that our steps can only be taken towards them within the framework of this treaty and never outside of its bounds, then it was discovered that the position of the United States included those submerged rocks that would either have to overcome at a meeting of the leaders or which would become a stumbling block for the entire meeting.

[Arbatov] You know, I wanted to add that now, in retrospect, Perle, in justifying the policy -- well, he never did like the truth very much...

[Zorin] Excuse me, Georgiy Arkadyevich. I would like to remind those who do not know that Perle is one of the most influential Pentagon officials and Weinberger's right-hand man.

[Arbatov] Yes, and he stands out as a super hawk, so to speak. Of course he always puts things mildly, he is mild-mannered. He has a sincere gaze and speaks quietly, but behind this lies an absolute readiness to torpedo any talks, as well as a desire to do so. But now he is trying to prove something else. He says that the Russians have changed their position on the antimissile defense treaty. He says that previously, before it was decided to eliminate all nuclear weapons over a 10-year period (and only the question of 5 years was under consideration, during which it was required to reduce offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent), there was no mention then that all elements of

antimissile defense in space were forbidden with the exception of research and tests carried out in laboratories. He claims that talk about laboratories was raised later, after Reagan posed certain questions.

I simply want to say that this is an absolute and simple lie, a completely indecent lie, and doubly so insofar as Perle knows that it is a lie, because our proposals that Comrade Gorbachev presented to Reagan in the first hours of the talks, before they responded...

[Falín interrupts] In Russian and in English.

[Arbatov] In Russian and in English -- contain the very same wording concerning laboratory tests and research that were later used by the Americans to torpedo the talks, to sink them.

[Zorin interrupts] This shows their methods. Georgiy Arkadyevich, was the issue of conventional arms raised?

[Arbatov] The issue of conventional arms has arisen and still stands. It is very important issue. It is good that you have raised it because this issue has now acquired a very important role in the discussion. We understood this perfectly. They were mentioned in the proposals outlined by Mikhail Sergeyevich in the 15 January statement on the total elimination of nuclear arms. Of course they proceeded from the clear understanding that if we do away with all nuclear arms, it would not be for the purpose of moving the arms race into other spheres. For this reason, the issue of chemical weapons and conventional arms and armed forces was mentioned. After this, Comrade Gorbachev dealt with this issue in more detail in Berlin. After that, in summer, came the official Warsaw pact proposal on radical measures in this field.

[Falín interrupts] The so-called Budapest Initiative.

[Arbatov] The Budapest Initiative, to which we actually have not yet received a reply. All that is on the table. We understand the significance of this question.

In America now they ask Shultz -- which is an interesting thing -- How could you agree to the total elimination of nuclear arms when the Soviet Union and its allies have such a superiority in conventional arms? Here Shultz told the truth for the first time. He said that NATO conventional forces are sufficiently strong to deal with this threat. This aroused a storm of indignation in Europe and everywhere else. Well, the man made a slip and told the truth.

For our part, we do not close the issue on that. I understand our position otherwise, we insist on it. There is now a struggle around this issue, to finally find a forum where we can discuss it. What is very interesting is that it is precisely NATO that is against this. You know recently, not long before Reykjavik, I visited Denmark and had a conversation with the Danish foreign minister. He told me: You know, in Stockholm we made many concessions to you -- I do not know what they gave us: I thought they were mutual concessions which finally led to a good agreement -- well, we have given you much and now you are in our debt. So in Vienna we shall raise the question of further discussions, not of the issues of disarmament -- their conventional forces, which they shout about most of all -- but only about the third basket, about human rights.

So you see, all the ambiguity of the position lies in this: When they do not want in agreement, they shout: It is not possible to come to agreement because of the existence of conventional arms. We offer: Let us talk about conventional arms. No, we do not want to talk about conventional arms. What is being done at the talks in Vienna is even worse naphthalene-smelling rubbish, because the talks have been going on there for 13 years. There are agreements on the table which they will not sign, and what is being discussed, comrades? The discussion is about the reduction of armed forces which amount to less than 1 percent of the arms and armed forces of the two blocs located in Central Europe. If we proceed at this pace we shall finally finish these talks by the year 3000 and not the year 2000.

[Falin interrupts] There is one clarification on the Vienna talks concerning Central Europe: The Western side does not want to talk even about a 1 percent reduction in arms. It wants to talk only about a 1 percent reduction in personnel.

[Zorin] I would still like -- our time is coming to a close -- to ask you a question which one way or another we have dealt with. I would like to return to it again. Valentin Mikhaylovich, what finally prevented the conclusion of an agreement in Reykjavik?

[Falin] I would put it as follows: It was prevented first of all by the principled philosophy, if you wish, principled approaches and the differences that exist between the approaches of the two sides. What did the Soviet Union come out with? With a proposal to solve security problems with the understanding that today this problem is first of all a political one; that security in our age must be universal, and only mutual as far as the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned. We are ready for mutual security. What more can one side offer to the other than mutual security, a security recognizing that everything happening on one side concerns the other?

Unfortunately, the U.S. side came to these talks from the position of strength that President Reagan spoke about after Reykjavik. That remains the operating policy of the United States. That is the stone that upsets everything.

[Arbatov] I think that it was not just a confrontation of two types of thinking. I think it was two types of thinking reflecting the realities of two centuries -- the 19th and the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st.

One of them, the 19th, is now finding expression in America, in that unilateralism we have talked about, which rejects all agreements. If this is what Reagan came with, then it is possible to understand why no agreement was reached -- because they do not want an agreement, they just want talks. By the way, Reagan has greatly exposed himself in this aspect, willingly or not -- it may have been the work of his speech writers -- I do not know -- but after the agreement when he said that he regards the ABM treaty, to which Mr Gorbachev constantly returned as if it were sacred scripture, I asked him once: What is there so grandiose in that treaty that forces our government to announce to the people that we will not protect them from a nuclear strike? First of all, a treaty is holy scripture, if you wish. If you do not consider the treaty as a holy scripture your honesty and your dependability as a partner in international relations is not worth a penny.

[Zorin interrupts] And normal international relations are not possible.

[Arbatov] Of course: It is a mandatory norm in international relations that you have a serious attitude toward your agreements.

[Falin interrupts] This is one of the choices -- either legality or arbitrariness.

[Arbatov] Yes, chaos. Secondly, you see it is such a lie that our government now turns out to be (in their power) as to whether or not to protect the people from a nuclear strike. Here Reagan departs from the main agreement, which creates the ground for some kind of talks. The agreement is that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war. Here he revealed himself...

[Falin interrupts] ...Fully.

[Arbatov] Fully. His dream is to find protection for himself. If he believes in that, whether it is utopia or illusion does not matter, but what kind of a platform is it for talks?

In Geneva clearly the very first thing with which an agreement began, the first agreement recorded in the communique, was the two sides recognizing that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war and come out victor. If the man has come up with a different idea -- that it may be possible to wage a nuclear war and it may be possible to come out victor -- then it is really difficult to come to an agreement.

[Zorin] In this connection, in conclusion I would like to ask the shortest, but I would say not the simplest, question: What next?

[Falin] If you will allow me. The question is made up of several elements. Of course, Reykjavik showed not only how difficult it is to reach an agreement, but also that it is nevertheless possible and necessary to conduct serious talks, that it is possible to bring the positions closer -- and there has been a real rapprochement of positions. Reykjavik has shown that it is necessary to conduct affairs with this administration, too -- that if he wishes, Reagan can talk seriously, but when he does not want to talk seriously an insurmountable obstacle arises.

[Arbatov] I think that in order to give a brief answer to the question of what next, I shall say the struggle will continue -- a struggle that has begun and is in progress -- and that it will not be possible to do anything without a struggle. Actually, I think that our leadership had no illusions when they went to Reykjavik. There was hope, and this is the reason much was done for an agreement, but there were no illusions. There was an understanding that, even if no agreement is signed, all the discussions on the subject, perceptions on the questions of security and disarmament would have been raised to a new level at Reykjavik.

[Falin interrupts] A new qualitative level.

[Arbatov] A new qualitative level. A return to the pre-Reykjavik thinking, so to speak, is no longer possible. Completely new points of reference have emerged. Reykjavik is a great success in this aspect. Of course, this success is still a half-success, and for security we need full success -- for us, and for the Americans and all in the world as well. In order to achieve a complete guarantee of security it is necessary that this struggle, which has now been elevated to a new level and will be conducted around new problems -- around the agenda that Reykjavik presented to the world -- end in a victory of reason. In this respect I think, whatever happens to

Reagan -- whatever Reagan thinks -- he can think within the limits of definite frameworks given by history and the political situation and realities in the world. This is what we link and must link our hopes and beliefs with -- that our efforts to ensure a stable peace will not be in vain and there will be no doubt that in this struggle -- I cannot even say that we will win: Everyone will win. It will not be somebody's victory. Reason will win in this struggle.

[Zorin] The Soviet program announced in Reykjavik is now one of the determining factors in world politics. It exists, it operates, and it will have an effect on everything that will happen in the world. That is evident.

Well, our time on the air has elapsed and so it remains for me to thank you for taking part in this program -- of course, we shall return to these problems again -- and to thank our television viewers for their attention. And so, until we meet again, here in our Studio 9.

International Observers' Roundtable

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["International Observers Roundtable" program with Spartak Beglov, political observer of NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY; Yuriy Kornilov, TASS Political observer; and Nikolay Agayants, moderator]

[Excerpt] [Agayants] Hello, comrades. Just a week has passed since the memorable day when the Soviet-U.S. summit talks ended in Reykjavik: the summit on which people of goodwill, wherever they live and whatever their views, pinned their aspirations and innermost hopes, and which they awaited with impatience. Today, those talks remain the focus of world public attention. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's meeting with Ronald Reagan is the subject of comment in newspapers, magazines, radio and television; prominent political and public figures in various countries are giving their assessments of its results. Generalizing, one can sum up the opinion of the overwhelming majority of those who have spoken on the subject in this way: Though the last barrier did not fall in the Icelandic capital, nonetheless a better chance remains now than ever before of accords being reached on the most important problems of our time, and of a start being made at last on nuclear disarmament. The negotiations in Reykjavik were laborious; there was much discussion of various kinds. Spartak Ivanovich, you were in Reykjavik, accredited there: Tell us in a bit more detail how the talks themselves went, and what the press reactions have been like.

[Beglov] Yes, Nikolay Ivanovich, as you've stated with precision, a whole week has already elapsed. The main results of the meeting have now been summed up; all the main things that needed to be said have been said. Yet we return again and again to that moment that every journalist covering the meeting was waiting for: the doors of the Hofdi residence would open; the two leaders would emerge and, together, announce the good news to the world. The time in Reykjavik, I remember, was 1850 -- 6 hours later, in fact, than scheduled. That's how much extra time it took to discuss the vital matters on the agenda. Let me stress that these questions were brought to the negotiating table on the initiative of the Soviet side, and that's something we'll be returning to later.

On Sunday, 12 October, then, at 1850, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the President of the United States came out of the Hofdi residence; and we can see from the expressions on their faces that they failed to reach agreement. I hardly think it's necessary to describe what we all felt there, in Reykjavik, and in our own country, and throughout the world. But listeners may be asking themselves the question whether those who were in Reykjavik could have had reason to expect something more. Though the talks between the two sides were held behind closed doors -- under a news blackout, to use the English expression, a press eclipse, if you like -- still, it wasn't difficult for experienced observers to pick up, from many indirect signs, that the talks had to navigate a channel in which very difficult questions had to be breached, and that what they were working toward was to pin down certain accords. There was, for instance, the fact that after the first day, two working groups of experts were set up, which were in session all night. Then, finally, also the fact that the two leaders did not take leave of each other at noon, as had been planned, but decided to spend a further half-day exchanging views. It was only after the meeting was over, and an hour after it ended, that Comrade Gorbachev's press conference began. Only then were the large-scale proposals fully addressed that were part of the package, submitted for discussion.

We now know that those proposals were: a 50 percent reduction of strategic armaments, over a 5-year period, to be followed by their total abolition in the course of 5 more years; abolition of the medium-range missiles of the USSR and the U.S. in Europe; and the strengthening of the regime of the ABM treaty and the banning of nuclear tests. All that we now know. But the truth demands that we should put the record straight in this respect also: the fact is that the U.S. side, having, essentially, said no, and given preference to its program for the militarization of space, then tried, in the spirit of the publicity stunts that are typical of the United States, to attribute to itself the initiative in raising, at Reykjavik, these same central questions of disarmament.

[Kornilov] Yes, Spartak Ivanovich, let's face it: the politicians and propagandists in Washington have recently been performing an amazing somersault. Only yesterday, it seems the U.S. mass media were noting, in their commentaries on the meeting in Reykjavik, that as a result of that meeting Washington found itself in a situation of serious political defeat; THE WASHINGTON POST remarked that when the U.S. secretary of state announced the outcome of the meeting, highly-placed U.S. representatives greeted the announcement with long, gloomy faces. Now, just a few days later, we see the faces of those same highly-placed representatives wreathed in obviously programmed official smiles; and the upshot of the meeting in the Icelandic capital is being characterized by the U.S. press as a splendid and even stunning success for the United States.

So what has happened? All that has happened is that the political and public figures of various countries, and the press, are quite rightly noting that the ceaseless attempts by the United States to take their weapons into space and break the established military-strategic parity constitute an irresponsible and dangerous policy. It is precisely this appraisal of Washington's negative, obstructionist stance at the talks that is not to the liking of the architects of U.S. policy.

Then the U.S. President, proceeding obviously on the principle that, if the facts do not present U.S. policy in a favorable light, so much the worse for the facts, and, taking account of the enormous attractiveness of the Soviet proposals, took the proposals and, without a second's hesitation, ascribed them to himself. Scarcely had the stunned readers and viewers had time to digest all these surprising discoveries than a whole avalanche of other statements, speeches and interviews descended upon

them. The authors of these statements, speeches and interviews have been endeavoring to prove that allegedly in Reykjavik the United States had no thought of anything else except peace and arms control. Representatives of the Washington uppercrust, such as Poindexter, Regan, Buchanan, Perle, and others of that ilk, have, as though competing with each other, by carefully hushing up or turning inside out the real facts, been attempting to instill in people the view that, if real progress was not achieved at the Icelandic meeting in disarmament, Washington is, they claim, not to blame. In this respect particular zeal is being displayed with regard to influencing the public in Western Europe. I must say that propaganda stunts have long since become an inseparable, an integral part of U.S. foreign policy, but they have never yet produced any political dividends for their initiators. This will, doubtlessly, be so on this occasion too. One cannot expect a crooked tree to cast a straight shadow.

[Beglov] The need for this somersault did not arise from everything in the garden being fine. It was glaringly obvious to us journalists in Reykjavik that on the very eve of the meeting the U.S. side was attempting to completely switch, I rather think, attention and interest on to other issues and instill the public with the idea that the U.S. leadership saw no sense in engaging itself with the solution of specific matters regarding disarmament.

The following episode remains in my mind: Rozanne Ridgway, U.S. assistant secretary of state, came to the press center to meet journalists on the eve of the opening of the Reykjavik meeting. The journalists immediately attacked her with questions: on what disarmament problem did the U.S. side see prospects for a solution? What had the U.S. delegation brought along by way of drafts? Here, incidentally, I have a shorthand account of the press conference in front of me, and it documents the words of, well, let us say, the third-ranking person in the President's team. Here then are those words. She said: I have nothing in my pocket apart from the hotel room key. It is considered that language has been given to diplomacy in order to conceal meaning. However, this joke by Madame Ridgway contained the naked truth, and the truth was that the U.S. delegation had come to the meeting empty-handed.

[Agayants] In fact in Reykjavik our country once again proved that it has a sincere and responsible approach to negotiations on which the fate of mankind depends. We shall never deviate from our line of pursuing peace, combating the armaments race and striving to remove the threat of a nuclear catastrophe from the whole globe. May I remind you, comrades, that at its meeting on 14 October [date as heard] the CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted that the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik was an important event in international life. The position of the USSR at the meeting had been honest and open [otkrytaga]. It was based, and this should be emphasized yet again, on the principles of equality and equal security, took account of the interests of both countries -- their allies and the peoples of all states, and was a concrete expression of a new approach and new thinking, whose need is dictated by the realities of the nuclear space age.

As Comrade Gorbachev stressed in his conversation with Raul Ricardo Alfonsin, president of the Argentine Republic, the meeting at Reykjavik had been useful since it had shown that it is possible to arrive at an agreement that would make a start to eliminating lethal nuclear weapons. Indeed, the efforts of the Soviet Union and all peace-loving forces have not gone to waste. They have made it possible to reach a step higher in the struggle for disarmament and detente. The platform of new proposals that were put forward by the Soviet Union in the Icelandic capital, which are inseparable from each other, and not one of which we are removing from the agenda, makes it possible to step up the quest for mutually acceptable solutions. The situation after the summit meeting

in Reykjavik, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed, has not deteriorated. On the contrary it opens up fresh opportunities. At the same time, it is a signal to all who can and should play a part for the benefit of detente and disarmament. I think that we ought to dwell in more detail on how this signal was received in the various capitals of the world.

[Beglov] Yes, the official position of the Washington administration, and certain of the United States military bloc allies, cannot fail to arouse perplexity and disappointment, the more so since it runs completely counter to the demands of the peoples and the demands of all who cherish world peace. These demands are being heard at the present time in the Third World countries, what are often referred to as the nonaligned states, and in the West, including the United States itself. What then is Washington doing? Well, just as in the verse of Kozma Prutkov about the valiant knight Baron von Gruenwaldus, it continues to sit in the same position on the rock. Our opponents were plainly not prepared for negotiations of substance and for availing themselves of the historic opportunity that was presented to them. Reykjavik, it is obvious, confirmed the Reagan administration's deep dependence on the military-industrial complex and its striving at any price and by hook or by crook to break through via the star wars program to achieving military superiority. Is that not so, Yuriy Emmanuilovich?

[Kornilov] Nuclear militarism, similar to the process of metastasis, is now making its way literally into all spheres of the United States life, and the weapon-manufacturing monopolies, the generals, the state bureaucracy, the ideological machine and militarized science, which have merged into the military-industrial complex, continue to act the part of the most zealous agents and organizers of the policy of adventurism and aggression. Of the 500 major corporations in the United States, over 300 are directly connected with military business. Pentagon orders at present time are being fulfilled by 30,000 main contractors alone, and by more than 50,000 subcontractors, while 41 of the 45 U.S. branches of industry are militarily oriented. Special efforts on the part of the manufacturers of death are directed at the production of new weapons and, what is termed, super-modern weapons, first and foremost within the framework of precisely the program of preparations for star wars that has been drawn up by Washington.

In one of the reports by the Pentagon, the following data is cited, for example: Tens of powerful military corporations have been involved in the development of space-strike installations, and in 1985 alone about a thousand contracts were allocated among them. Seventy-five percent of the productive capacities of such supergiants as Boeing and Lockheed, Rockwell International and General Dynamics, and others is tied up in fulfilling military orders for super modern weapons.

Now that the contracts for such grandiose military programs as the construction of the B-1 bombers and the invisible Stealth aircraft have basically been placed, the military-industrial corporations have turned their gaze toward SDI as the last gold seam of the Pentagon in the twentieth century. Here I quote the newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: It is typical that the greater part of military-industrial concerns making millions of profits in the preparations for star wars were founded in California, where almost half of all Pentagon orders within the framework of SDI are being fulfilled, and where, in its time, as is well-known, a significant portion of that military-political elite made its start in politics which is at present at the helm of the U.S. ship of state.

[Agayants] In this connection, Yuriy Emmanuilovich, I should like to recall, what is in my view a very interesting and important comment by the well-known U.S. economist, Viktor Perlo. He writes: The President of the United States, the defense secretary, and the secretary of state come from California. The extreme aggressiveness of the present administration and the stubborn struggle by Reagan for the complete satisfaction, down to the last dollar, of the Pentagon's requests cannot fail to be linked with the fact that precisely in California in 1984 military orders worth \$40 billion were placed -- almost three times more than in any other state. Texas stands in second place, the birthplace of the vice president of the United States, George Bush, where, according to existing evaluations, the value of military orders has reached \$14.3 billion. Not one of the previous U.S. Administrations had such evident and profound links with the military-industrial complex, Perlo attests.

[Kornilov] Well, Nikolay Ivanovich, since you have gone on to quotations I shall continue this line. So here are few more expressive comments on this same theme: Here is a statement from the book "Missile Envy" which belongs to the pen of the prominent female public figure of the United States, the honorary president of the organization Physicians for Social Responsibility, Caldicott: The corporations, she writes, act under the influence of their own dynamic power. Their sole stimulus is profit, and for its sake they will start to dodge this way and that, and will do everything, literally everything. The true stimulus of the military corporations is greed -- the desire to make money by any possible means.

Two further comments on the same theme: This time from the West German journal DER SPIEGEL. In its 2 June edition, this journal stated that, as one of the high-ranking officials of the Pentagon exultingly proclaimed, the bosses of the leading U.S. military concerns consider SDI to be their future. The Pentagon, the same DER SPIEGEL comments in another article published on 27 March, intends, before the end of the Reagan era, to turn SDI into an irreversible phenomenon, a fait accompli, and irrespective of the usefulness of this undertaking, end of quote.

Well, I have to say that what induces the exultation, as DER SPIEGEL puts it of the bosses of the U.S. military-industrial complex and of the Pentagon hawks and arms kings, induces a directly contrary international reaction, including that of the U.S. public itself. After all, the world knows and we have already spoken of this today that the so-called SDI is by no means a defensive shield as is hypocritically asserted in Washington as it implements this program. The ruling circles of the United States are seeking, having broken through with space weapons, to attain the unattainable -- to ensure U.S. military superiority. The most zealous organizer and inspirer of this policy is precisely the military-industrial complex of the United States, that most evil union of the bomb, the dollar and state power.

[Agayants] For the sake of these most dubious ideas, the U.S. side in Reykjavik went so far as even to bury the accord that had almost been struck during the difficult talks in the Icelandic capital. While literally within a few steps of making historical decisions, the participants of the Soviet-U.S. meeting were unable to overcome this distance.

The U.S. delegation, as we know, lacked political will, boldness and responsibility for this. But perhaps it was not worth traveling to Reykjavik at all. What do you think, Spartak Ivanovich?

[Beglov] Well, as for the question of whether it was worth traveling to Reykjavik, Comrade Gorbachev immediately answered this in the affirmative when this question was asked by journalists at the press conference literally 30 minutes after the end of the

meeting. It is understandable, and strictly speaking all the rest of the world is now approaching the conclusion one way or another, that Reykjavik became a certain landmark because positions there were drawn up from which it is possible to proceed toward agreements, to accords. The positions were very carefully prepared. Reykjavik provided experience which may be used for subsequent talks.

Without a doubt, all these positions were carefully prepared by the Soviet side; but on the American side, in general a seriousness of approach, I would say, on the eve of the meeting in any case, to a certain extent, was lacking. All the same, on the example of such a hard and difficult event, I repeat, that not a little experience was acquired, and it has become more evident that now it is impossible to live with the old way of thinking and that it is necessary to overcome all stereotypes and prejudices of previous years. We are, the course, right to expect U.S. politicians to penetrate through to the essence of the Soviet proposals in a more profound way than was the case in Reykjavik. After all, these are major, truly large-scale proposals. Clearly, compromise steps have been taken. In many ways we went out to meet the concerns of the United States and of its allies. Well -- and one has to say that in parallel and simultaneously -- we freed ourselves, in particular, from the trivialities and stereotypes which sometimes fettered new approaches to disarmament issues in our country also. It is this which one can not yet perceive on the U.S. side, that is the political will to overcome, to step over what is old, to adopt new approaches.

But of course the age will issue the orders and will dictate to U.S. figures also, and they will have to renounce these illusions, including the illusion about the possibility of the United States reviving the position of strategic diktat which, strictly speaking, so permeates the SDI program. Thus, ahead -- if one may put it like that -- is a continuation of the Reykjavik process.

[Agayants] This is what I would like to add to that, Spartak Ivanovich: As is well known, a routine session of the Committee of Warsaw Pact foreign affairs ministers took place in Bucharest on 14-15 October. The ministers exchanged opinions and information on the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole, devoting the main attention in their work to the issues of halting the arms race and disarmament -- primarily nuclear -- and tasks relating to improving the present-day international situation. At this session support was expressed for the USSR's position at the Reykjavik meeting, and the far-reaching Soviet proposals on a radical reduction in strategic offensive armaments; the scrapping of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, alongside a simultaneous reduction in such missiles in Asia; on freezing the number of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km; strengthening the conditions of the ABM treaty; and the complete and final banning of nuclear explosions. The Warsaw Pact member, as the communique adopted at the Bucharest session states, call upon the United States and other NATO countries to realize the gravity of the present world situation, and constructively approach from a position of realism -- what we were just talking about -- from a position of realism and responsibility the proposals of the Soviet Union, which remain the main topic of Soviet-U.S. dialogue. This is the precise, clear, principled course being pursued on the international arena by the fraternal countries of the socialist community. By the way, the 10th anniversary congress of the International Organization of Journalists is opening on Monday in Sofia, Spartak Ivanovich, as far as I know. You are going to this meeting and I think you yourself will be witness to speeches in which the Reykjavik talks will be reflected.

[Beglov] Yes, Reykjavik has now become a kind of landmark for all of the world's public, both in the sense of assessing what went on there, and mainly in the sense of

the public's demand that the United States find a common language with the Soviet Union on the central problems relating to disarmament. Let us take the world congress going on in Copenhagen at the moment. There the fundamental discussions, as a matter of fact, went right along in the same directions that were marked out by the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik, and this is not because they emanate from the Soviet Union, but because these proposals from the USSR reflect what has become urgent in the hearts and minds of all people, and become a demand from the whole of mankind.

Vremya Newscast

LD212121 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 21 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; commentary by political observer Aleksandr Bovin]

[Text] Hello comrades! With every day that passes, Reykjavik increasingly becomes history and the past, but the kind of past which determines the present and the future. Now, after Reykjavik, the main question that alarms everyone could perhaps be formulated in the following way: To what extent, to what degree will what was agreed in the Hofdi Palace affect the rate and nature of the Geneva talks. For the time being, it is difficult to answer this question in any definite manner, but nevertheless, let us think about it a bit, guided by the material the propaganda campaign in the United States is providing us with now, and the way the Americans view what took place in Reykjavik.

You recall that during the first few hours, Washington had virtually lost its political orientation. A formal scholastic logic came into play: They got together to agree on a meeting in Washington, they did not reach an agreement, and so it was a failure. This is what Shultz said not long before the press conference by Comrade Gorbachev.

But one must give the U.S. team their due: Even in the plane, they understood that one should not appear in the states or go out before world public opinion with this kind of result, both from the point of view of big-time politics -- because in Reykjavik a noticeable drawing-together of positions really did take place -- and from the point of view of U.S. political intrigues, because congressional elections are imminent and in general, it does not do for a president to appear empty-handed. That is when the victory drums sounded. This is what is very interesting, comrades: The self-same United States that elected Reagan as president twice and welcomed the seizure of Grenada and the bombing of Libya, saw victory not in the fact that Reagan said yes to many of Gorbachev's proposals, but in that Reagan said a definite no, which in fact did not allow for any agreement.

Of course, this very no, like the whole star wars program, is criticized by certain sections of the U.S. population. This is paradoxical because as a result of his devotion to weapons which do not yet exist, Reagan is turning down the proposals and has blocked the reduction of weapons which already exist.

But on the whole, I repeat, they praise Reagan for his hardness and because with this no he saved his defense initiative. At the same time, in that same environment these same people...words of alarm are being sounded: Did the President not go too far out to meet the Russians? Was he not too hasty in agreeing to a radical reduction of nuclear missile weapons? Politics and propaganda are different, though linked, phenomena. If we are to judge the political course from the nature of the present propaganda campaign in the states, perhaps it could be put the following way: In

Geneva the United States will be in no hurry to realize what was agreed in Iceland. I would like very much to be wrong, but I think the White House will now start to maneuver and search for all kinds of ways to retreat from the Iceland accords.

And last, no one is writing anywhere about the spirit of Reykjavik. Perhaps this is understandable. Spirit appears in journalistic descriptions when against some kind of positive background there remains much that is indefinite, unclear, and even abortive, but in Reykjavik, everything was absolutely clear.

The problems were revealed: Two approaches, two choices, two positions. There simply remains no room for spirit here. One should not speak about the spirit of Reykjavik but the Reykjavik plan, the Reykjavik program. The question whether the present U.S. Administration will fulfill its part of the work planned in Iceland still gives rise to great doubts, great doubts.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

FRG PAPER SAYS USSR EXTENDED TEST BAN TO PRESSURE U.S. ON SDI

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 29 Aug 86 p 3

[Article by Christoph Bertram: "World Power Chess Before the Summit"]

[Text] The whole thing almost looks like the chess match between Garry Kasparov and Anatoliy Karpov that is being fought in a high-class hotel of London's West End. But the game presently staged by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on the board of world politics is not played for another kind of world championship: They are preparing for the next superpower summit.

Gorbachev is playing the white pieces; he has taken the initiative. In the disarmament chess played by the world powers, this is unusual. So far, the Russians have tended to wait for the Americans to make the first move. But Reagan is holding back. He does not feel pressed for time. Not so Gorbachev: If the Kremlin leader wants to safeguard the economic basis of the Soviet defense industry and at the same time curb the American rival's dynamic armament efforts, he has to confront his opponent with proposals of his own, if only because this might restrict the choices of the man in the White House. And precisely this is the point of the fourth extension (to the end of the year) of the nuclear test freeze Gorbachev has just announced. On 19 August, he stated on television that "the Soviet Union is convinced that an agreement on a nuclear test ban is readily attainable and that it can be signed this very year at a Soviet-American summit meeting. It would be a kind of prelude to further advances."

In 1981, when Ronald Reagan took over the administration, it was the Americans, not the Soviets, who enjoyed the greatest latitude in the field of disarmament diplomacy. This was not only because of the fact that under the aegis of Gromyko Moscow had turned stubborn and--once counterarming had started--had quit all negotiations. Reagan and his advisers had come up with an arms control "philosophy" whose maximum demands were tailored to be acclaimed by public opinion and rejected by Moscow.

Verification for Its Own Sake?

First: Reagan declared the previous efforts toward arms control to have been "fundamentally ill-conceived." Mere arms limitation--such as the SALT II

Agreement of 1979--was to be replaced by substantial cuts in the two powers' arsenals (measures the USSR had always rejected).

Second: In the dispute over intermediate-range weapons, the president adopted a formula that, promising though it seemed, was unlikely to yield realistic results: The global zero-solution. As to the objection the Soviets would not be prepared to scrap the SS-20 missiles deployed in large numbers, Reagan brushed it off, jovially instructing his negotiator, Paul Nitze: "Well, Paul, tell the Soviets their boss is a damn hard guy."

Third: Reagan raised the conditions for effective arms control to a level unlikely to be attained in the foreseeable future: Any agreement with the Communist superpower was to be contingent upon total verifiability of the mutual obligations--a demand that in view of modern observation and armament technologies was both impracticable and unnecessary. Verification, the monitoring of the arrangements made, was made an end in itself. Moreover, with the support of the White House, the Pentagon started a campaign designed to show--less than satisfactory evidence notwithstanding--that the Soviets had violated almost all of the preceding agreements. According to this campaign, America and the world should settle for nothing but the best--either perfect arms control or none at all.

Fourth: With his SDI version of a world made secure through antimissile defense, Reagan turned the concept of arms control upside down: He claimed the objective now was to attain invulnerability to an attack rather than to reach an agreement on arms limitation or to regulate the military competition between the two powers. The new space systems were to make nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete." This, Reagan kept pointing out in his Geneva firelight chats with a skeptical Gorbachev, was the best way to ensure peace and disarmament.

Fifth: The Reagan administration systematically began to unshackle its own armament drive. The (nonratified) SALT II Treaty was initially respected, but in May 1986 Reagan revoked it. He stated that in future the United States would orient its armament policy exclusively toward its security needs rather than toward any maximum limits. And when it became increasingly obvious that Reagan's star wars plans were bound sooner or later to clash with the ABM treaty that had been concluded in 1972 for an indefinite period, the treaty was simply watered down. Contrary to an interpretation of the treaty that had been undisputed in Washington for 13 years, the White House stated that actually development and testing of space weapons was permissible; in token of its good intentions, the government would for the present follow the old interpretation, but would not make any commitment.

Surprisingly, Reagan's strategy was successful. Public opinion, Congress, and the allies did not oppose him. Apparently, the wizard in the White House had pulled off what most power politicians fail to accomplish: He was able to present himself as a staunch advocate of "genuine" disarmament and, at the same time, freely to pursue his armament plans.

For Gorbachev, who had taken over in Moscow in 1985, the question was how to thwart the American strategy. He realized that to accomplish this the Soviets

would have to stop refusing to engage in dialog; they would have to put an end to their constant obstructionism. For incessant nyets from Moscow only served to obscure the inconsistency of Reagan's position. So Gorbachev started to change course--hesitantly at first and then more and more self-confidently--and to take Reagan at his word.

Against the American vision of a world secure under an impenetrable missile screen, he set the Russian vision of a world free from nuclear weapons--a vision which, he stated boldly, could be realized by the year 2000. He took up the American demand for a substantial reduction of strategic weapons and proposed radical, 50-percent cuts. Now Gorbachev, too, advocated the zero-solution (albeit with significant modifications) in regard to intermediate-range missiles. After decades of rejection, the principle of comprehensive verification of disarmament agreements, including on-site inspection, was accepted as a matter of course. As for the Western objection to the effect that without parity in regard to conventional weapons renunciation of nuclear weapons in Europe would be unacceptable, Moscow countered by declaring its readiness to negotiate substantial force reductions from the "Atlantic to the Ural Mountains", including adequate verification.

In the past, when the disarmament talks had been deadlocked for many years, when each side defended its position with quasi-religious zeal, there sometimes arose the question what would happen, should Moscow or Washington all of a sudden accept the proposals of the other side. And precisely this was the course the new man in the Kremlin was now pursuing. Slowly, but steadily he maneuvered Ronald Reagan into the uncomfortable position the president had wanted to avoid: To be forced publicly to admit that his armament plans, above all his star wars vision, were more important to him than arms control.

In the attempt to make it quite plain that the president had no clothes on, the Kremlin gave priority to the campaign for a nuclear test ban. Here Gorbachev again took up and adopted an old Western proposal. And here he has succeeded--more effectively than in other areas--in exposing many of the American objections as excuses--until in the end there remains just one objection: A test ban would undo the SDI program.

Since July of last year, Gorbachev has been pushing this campaign, and Washington's reactions are still marked by helplessness. The Reagan administration calls the Soviet test moratorium a propaganda trick, claiming that shortly before the first announcement the Soviets had completed an intensive test series, whereas the United States was still lagging behind. This is certainly correct insofar as from 1978 until 1984 the Soviets--having set off 170 nuclear blasts on their testing grounds (near Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and on the arctic island of Novaya Zemlya)--exceeded by one-third the total number of U.S. tests (113); not until 1985 did the Soviets reduce the number of tests. Probably the test series was connected with the new strategic missiles that are being introduced by the Soviet military. But why has the United States balked at declaring its readiness to consent to a test ban, once its own test series is completed?

According to Washington, a bilateral test ban is not verifiable. But most experts now take a different view. Seismographs have been refined continuously. Except for very small detonations--below 1 kiloton of TNT, less than 10 percent of the Hiroshima bomb--nuclear blasts today can be detected even over great distances. The Soviets are prepared to clear up the remaining uncertainties by means of on-site inspection. To demonstrate publicly that this was no insurmountable obstacle, the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Natural Resources Defense Council, a private group of U.S. scientists, arranged in April for the Americans to set up three seismographic stations around the Semipalatinsk testing grounds. The stations started operating in July. Even though the agreement was concluded for an indefinite period, both sides assume it will remain in effect for 1 year--exceeding the Soviet test moratorium by about 6 months.

Little Progress

All of a sudden, however, Washington regards verification as less important. Kenneth Adelman, head of the disarmament agency, still shows some restraint: "The verification problem is not the only or even crucial obstacle to an agreement." But Richard Perle, presently the most influential figure in matters pertaining to Washington's arms control policy, states flatly: "I am against a test ban treaty, even if it were totally verifiable."

Reporters of the NEW YORK TIMES found out that all the talk about verification notwithstanding, the administration in the last few years has never seriously examined the question of how to effectively verify a comprehensive test stop. To be sure, in late July American and Soviet government representatives met in Geneva to discuss the verification problem and they want to meet again in September. There has not been much progress, however. The Americans only want to discuss the question of how to verify the (as yet unratified) underground test restriction to 150 kilotons of TNT that had been agreed upon in 1974; the Soviet delegation, on the other hand, is concerned with verification of a total ban.

Then what is the main reason for the Americans' refusal? The official formula circulated in Washington reads as follows: "We have to keep testing to ensure the reliability, viability and efficacy of our nuclear deterrence." At first glance, this seems convincing.

But there is not much substance in the much-cited argument that nuclear tests are necessary for checking the reliability of present arsenals. A year ago, one-time British foreign minister David Owen, surely no dreamer in regard to matters of security policy, publicly stated that this argument tended to come up whenever there was the prospect of a comprehensive test stop--as was the case in 1977/78, when Owen was a Cabinet member: "Previously, there was not a single American or British reliability test. The whole thing was nothing but a deliberate diversionary maneuver designed to protect the interests of the test laboratories in Los Alamos, Livermore and Aldermaston." Respected experts such as Richard Garwin, who in the last 30 years has been closely involved in the American nuclear program, considers periodical nonnuclear checkups fully sufficient for ensuring that even highly sensitive warheads are in working order. And the latest test series undertaken by the Reagan

administration confirms: Only 1 of the approximately 15 tests per year represents a checkup of present arsenals.

Would a test ban prevent refinement of the weapons? Probably not. For by now the conventional technology of nuclear warheads has been thoroughly researched. On their testing grounds the Americans have so far carried out over 800 tests, and the Soviets, over 600; incidentally, most of these tests were carried out after 1963, when the first test ban agreement banished all blasts underground. As early as 1977, Wolfgang Panofsky, Stanford physicist and presidential adviser, stated: "Nuclear weapons technology is fully developed now; further development cannot produce any substantial quantitative changes." Moreover, the big laboratories have now recorded on computer tape the test results of the last few years. Only very few of the innovations need to be subjected to testing. American experts think that in a few years processes of simulating nuclear explosions in the laboratory will be so advanced as to render tests superfluous; microscopically small detonations--set off by laser beams and incorporated in computer models--will accomplish what today is being produced at great cost beneath the Nevada desert. Those who want to modernize conventional nuclear weapons can do so in spite of a test ban--only the technologically less advanced nuclear club candidates in the Third World may possibly lack this capability.

For this reason, Kenneth Adelman is quite right in pointing out that "a comprehensive test ban would not reduce the nuclear weapons in the world by a single unit." at least not in the arsenals of the superpowers. The idea--fostered by the propagandists in Moscow as well as in Washington--that a test ban would halt the arms race is persistently upheld by public opinion, but unfortunately it is not valid.

A test ban can prevent one thing, however: The development of totally novel weapons that are based not so much on the explosive force as on the side effects of nuclear blasts. This goes above all for the projects envisaged by the Reagan administration in its SDI program: Nuclear explosions triggering X-ray lasers designed to pierce--at the speed of light and over thousands of kilometers--Soviet missiles in space; and nuclear explosions producing nuclear-powered particle-beam weapons and generating electronic impulses capable of incapacitating enemy reconnaissance. These are the weapons of the "third generation"--following the atom and hydrogen bombs. As yet, nobody knows whether they will work.

The big American nuclear research laboratories estimate that each of these systems will require between 100 and 200 tests. According to a scientist of the Los Alamos laboratory, the new test requirements differ as much from the conventional nuclear tests as does the development of a "cure for cancer from that of an electric toaster."

What the men advising Reagan may consider a cure for missiles Gorbachev and his team are bound to regard as a dangerous technological challenge. This is why the White House remains unyielding, why the Kremlin keeps insisting on a test ban agreement and why the Soviet military have consented to another extension of the unilateral moratorium. For unlike the Soviet frontal attacks on Reagan's SDI plans, the detour via the test ban could possibly halt the development feared by Moscow.

The Russian Reckons Differently

To be sure, the Kremlin does not cherish the illusion that Ronald Reagan and his team could be swayed by Soviet appeals alone. Reagan's latest letter to Gorbachev has again underscored the hard SDI line: The president is not prepared to give up his star wars program. Gorbachev reckons differently, however. He has been informed by Dobrynin, his new chief adviser on foreign policy and the Soviet Union's top expert on America, that the U.S. Government consists not only of the White House and the ministries, but that the Congress, too, has a say in matters pertaining to foreign and security policy. Shortly before the latest Moscow announcement, a vast majority of the House of Representatives had voted for a 1-year moratorium on all nuclear tests of over 1 kiloton of explosive force; if the Soviet Union accedes to it and permits on-site inspection, the moratorium is to come into effect in January 1987. Reagan now has to fight his own country's representatives, and they--unlike the men in the Kremlin--may not only threaten to take countermeasures, but may block the funds for his plans.

The last word has not yet been said. There have been other occasions when Reagan made Congress come around, especially when he impressed the representatives with the importance of national security. Already Reagan has stated he would veto the budgetary bill.

His tone is lacking in the old confidence, though. To some extent, the president's present difficulties are attributable to the skillful tactics of his Moscow opponent. With Gorbachev's help, Reagan has maneuvered himself into a tight corner. The contradiction between armament and disarmament in the president's policy has now become obvious. Is America going to permit its president to gamble away a chance of arms control just so he can keep on indulging a technically, politically and financially more and more questionable SDI dream?

According to Washington sources, the summit meeting will probably take place in late November or early December. Gorbachev and Reagan have now gone on vacation. The chess players are taking a rest. Black's reaction to White's latest move was marked by helplessness. Certainly, this was not the last move in this game by which the Kremlin embarrassed the White House. At any rate, for the time being Ronald Reagan--caught up in the dream world of star wars--has lost the initiative to Moscow and the Congress. Karpov and Kasparov, the opponents in London, have known for a long time that even a beginner at chess should try hard to avoid such a situation.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET GENERAL LARIONOV WRITES ON U. S. ARMS CATEGORIZING

Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 37, 12 Sep 86 pp 6-7

[Article by Maj Gen V. Larionov: "And They Call This Restraint..."]

[Text] The right-wing grouping representing the U. S. military-industrial complex does not lessen its pressure on the White House. Its purposes are to prevent a reduction in profits on arms production, to achieve U. S. military superiority and to exhaust the USSR economically. One of the targets of destructive attacks by this group are Soviet-American agreements in the field of arms limitations. From the Pentagon the war-cry sounds: "Two (SALT agreements) are knocked out and one (ABM Limitation Agreement) is knocked down!"

The strategic arms limitation process began in the late 1960's. It was a part of the turn toward detente which replaced the long-lasting Western policy of "cold war" against the USSR and the other socialist countries. At that moment it became clear to the organizers of the "cold war" that the arms race unleashed by the U. S. and its NATO partners was not gaining them military superiority. The American leaders were forced to acknowledge equality in the military sphere and, most importantly, in strategic offensive weapons.

The first specific agreements between the USSR and the U. S., the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Area of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (SALT-1) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Limitation Treaty, were achieved in May 1972. In this same period, the early 1970's, Soviet-American agreements were concluded on preventing nuclear war and on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war arising. By 1979 the SALT-2 Treaty was worked out.

In developing its text, the sides succeeded in finding solutions which, despite differences in the composition and characteristics of strategic weapons on both sides and in geographical and other factors, met the principle of equality and equal security, took into account the aggregate of existing weapons, placed significant limitations on them, and were long-term in nature. A main value of the treaty is that it carefully weighed and consolidated the balance of USSR and U. S. strategic forces. The significance of the

agreements on strategic offensive arms limitations goes far beyond the framework of bilateral relations; it affect the interests of the whole world, for these agreements are aimed at strengthening strategic stability and, therefore, also international security as a whole.

A real basis appeared for a constructive solution to problems of halting the nuclear arms race, and paths were opened for achieving new agreements in this field. This is how the Soviet Union approached the assessment of the agreements of the 1970's. However, as it turned out, Washington looked at the matter differently.

A Programmed Finale

The U. S. wrecked ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty signed in June 1979. Coming to power a little over a year later, the present administration from its first days declared it "faulty." It is true that subsequently the U. S. joined with the USSR in recognizing the need to observe the signed, but not yet ratified agreement. An understanding was reached that the two sides would observe the SALT agreements on a mutual basis. However, in practice the American side stubbornly worked to undermine them.

Why did Washington wreck ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty? It did so largely because the agreement affirmed strategic parity. Had the U. S. ratified SALT-2 it could not have broadcast to the world about the supposed strategic superiority of the USSR. Ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty would have interfered with the White House conducting a policy of forceful pressure, fettered the actions of the military-industrial complex and knocked the ground out from under assertions about the mythical "U. S. strategic lag," "windows of vulnerability," and the like. The administration said all of this over and over again to Congress and the American public.

Already then, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the U. S. did not want to tie itself to commitments about limitations on strategic offensive weapons. It was enamored of the possibility of attempting, just the same, to realize its claims to nuclear superiority. At the concluding stage of preparing the SALT-2 Treaty, the U. S. was already laying the base for a new spiral in the strategic arms race. A program was planned to develop new strategic missiles, including the "MX" ICBM, studying along the way how, with the aid of a basing system, to conceal these missiles somewhat better from Soviet technical means of verification. Orders were made for new strategic bombers, including the "Stealth," which could operate concealed from means of observation. The development of new intermediate range missiles for Europe was planned, which planted a mine in advance under agreements strengthening strategic parity.

Immediately after its refusal to ratify the SALT-2 Treaty, Washington threw out the Protocol to the Treaty which provided for working out mutually acceptable solutions with respect to certain strategic weapons, most importantly long range sea and land-based cruise missiles. Then Washington began to deploy Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and land-based cruise missiles in Western Europe -- weapons which, given their place of deployment, are strategic weapons with respect to the USSR -- and in violation of provisions

of SALT-2 began to undermine the strategic balance between the USSR and U. S. through third countries.

In 1981 the all-encompassing program for "modernization" of U. S. strategic nuclear forces came to light, which the framework of agreements on strategic arms limitations openly cramped.

They interfere with the modernization of U. S. sea-based nuclear forces. As the new Ohio class submarines with 24 Trident-1 SLBM launchers, and subsequently Trident-2 launchers, enter the inventory, the U. S., according to

the provisions of the SALT-2 Treaty, must dismantle existing submarines armed with Poseidon missiles.

These agreements interfere with equipping heavy bombers with long range cruise missiles and with introducing the new B-1 bombers with such missiles. In order not to exceed the limit on multiple warhead strategic launch vehicles, the U. S. must remove from inventory a corresponding number of MIRVed ICBMs or SLBMs.

Development of a second new type of ICBM, the Midgetman missile, which the Pentagon has in full swing, will conflict with the SALT-2 Treaty.

Thus, as a result of the "modernization" being carried out, by the mid-1980's the US was faced with the necessity to move beyond the limits set by SALT-2. That is why in May of this year the White House announced its intention to cease to observe in the future the agreements on strategic offensive arms limitations and, in fact, break the Interim SALT-1 Agreement and the SALT-2 Treaty. Matters had come to a previously programmed finale: The SALT agreements were sacrificed to the desire for military superiority.

The decision of the U. S. Government cannot be justified, just as in our day there can be no justification for cranking up the arms race. It is even more ridiculous to justify it by references to imagined violations of strategic arms limitations by the Soviet Union. No matter how the U. S. administration wanted to convince the world about the "machinations of the Russians," there were and are no such violations. The Soviet Union strictly fulfills all the obligations of its international treaties and agreements. And strategic arms limitation agreements are no exception in this sense. By accusing the USSR of non-existent sins, Washington wishes to deflect public attention from its own violations of agreements and from its policy of undermining agreements. More than this. Everything indicates that the U. S. has embarked upon the dangerous path of destroying the foundations of the treaty system which has thus far restrained the nuclear arms race. Washington's current policy can be summarized in this way: If the Pentagon's military programs enter into conflict with existing treaty commitments, the U. S. administration renounces these commitments. Now the U. S. is conducting this very policy with respect to the ABM Treaty, the only foundation on which strategic offensive arms limitation agreements can be structured. Its provisions interfere with implementing the SDI Program. You see, SDI signifies the development and deployment of space-based anti-missile systems and space strike weapons, which are prohibited by the ABM Treaty. And, since Washington declares that there cannot even be any discussion about rejecting the SDI Program, consequently,

the ABM Treaty must be reexamined, changed or abrogated.

According to press reports, the U. S. administration advanced a proposal about not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty for the next 5-7 years. The Soviet Union, as is known, proposes that it be agreed not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for at least 15 years, and that all of its provisions be strictly observed, most of all the prohibition on the development and deployment of space-based ABM weapons. The American proposal, however, implies that over the next 5-7 years work will be carried out to develop and test space-based ABM means, and at the end of this period their deployment will be organized. In other words, the U. S. would like to obtain the consent of the Soviet Union for such deployment; i.e., essentially bring matters to the point of already now rejecting the ABM Treaty in fact, and in the early 1990's doing away with it legally as well.

What is Outside the Framework?

The dangerous consequences of such maneuvers by Washington are obvious. The conditions are being created for an uncontrolled and unpredictable buildup of nuclear weapons, and strategic stability is being undermined. Attempting to conceal these consequences, American authorities have recently circulated the thesis about the need to establish some sort of a "regime of temporary restraint."

What is included in this concept? They talk about the U. S. intention to deploy no more strategic launchers and warhead on ballistic missiles than the USSR. But do these two quantitative parameters encompass the correlation of strategic forces of the two sides? Not at all. Calling for "restraint" in these two parameters, representatives of the administration are silent about the nuclear weapons on heavy bombers. The U. S. intends to have substantial superiority in them. They say nothing about long range sea-based cruise missiles (the U. S. plans to deploy several thousand such missiles on submarines and surface ships). Nor do they recall the many hundreds of American forward based nuclear weapons placed on the USSR borders (The USSR, by the way, does not deploy such weapons near U. S. borders). It turns out that the U. S. would like to "restrain" only the development of ballistic missiles; precisely that avenue which, in the structure of Soviet strategic weapons and within the framework of present strategic equality, occupies the primary place, and which the USSR could use to compensate for U. S. attempts to undermine the balance. Those avenues which are advantageous to the U. S. would remain outside the framework of the proposed "restraint."

Thus, Washington wishes to divide strategic arms into destabilizing and non-destabilizing. The former include rapidly flying weapons, most of all ICBMs; the latter include slow flying bombers and cruise missiles. They believe that to strengthen strategic stability it is primarily necessary to reduce ICBMs. And there is no need to hurry to reduce the weapons on which the U. S. relies.

The Soviet Union does not need to be convinced about the need to strengthen stability. It invariably favors true restraint, which leads to a reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation. The USSR buttresses its position in practice by broad arms limitation initiatives, and even takes unilateral

steps, such as extending the moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987.

To what restraint do they refer in Washington, however, when there is not a single sign that the U. S. intends to reduce, or even adjust toward limitation even one of its military programs? And is their stubbornness in continuing nuclear testing not worthy of better application? Does this not remind world public opinion that it must not be slow to respond? If Moscow's new appeal does not receive a response in Washington, such sophisticated weapons systems will appear on the planet that, very likely, it will be impossible to reach agreements on controlling them. So far the White House has ignored our appeal. Opening the floodgates to an unrestrained arms race, it takes responsibility for pushing mankind toward a nuclear catastrophe.

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CSO: 5200/1033

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: U.S. CONGRESS WITHDRAWS ARMS CONTROL AMENDMENTS

O'Neill News Conference

LD111137 Moscow TASS in English GMT 11 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 11 TASS - By TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev

The House of Representatives has bowed to White House pressure and struck off four of the five amendments on arms control it earlier included in a bill on federal spending in fiscal 1987, House Speaker Thomas O'Neill told a news conference here Friday.

The Democrats in the House dropped their demands for a ban on nuclear tests involving explosive devices with an yield of more than one kiloton and for mandatory compliance with the SALT-2 limits.

The congressmen also withdrew their objections to the start of the full-scale manufacture of a new kind of chemical weapons, binary munitions, and sanctioned the production of 155-millimeter artillery shells staffed with the deadly mix.

Besides, they agreed to increase appropriations for "star wars" to 3.2 billion dollars.

The only amendment left intact prohibits testing anti-satellite weapons against a real target in outer space but does not limit the scale of work under this program.

White House Pressure

LD190925 Moscow TASS in English 0725 GMT 19 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 19 TASS --- The session of the 99th U.S. Congress is over.

Despite all the efforts by the senators and congressmen to wind up the debates as soon as possible and to go to their districts where electioneering is now in full progress on the eve of the November 4 elections, the session was two weeks longer than planned.

Protracted fierce debates both inside Congress and between the law-makers and the White House over the problems under discussion and, first of all, over the question of the U.S. budget for the 1987 fiscal year, were the main cause of the prolongation of the session.

The new budget envisages the allocation of 291,800 million dollars as military expenditures.

Under the pressure of the White House, the Congress excluded the amendments which had been earlier introduced to the law on the budget by the House of Representatives.

The amendments had stipulated that the SALT-2 Treaty limits on strategic arms should be observed, that nuclear tests with a yield of over one kiloton in the Nevada desert should be suspended for a year, and that the allocation of any funds to the Department of Defence for the production of binary rounds should be banned for a year.

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CSO: 5200/1046

RELATED ISSUES

USSR TV SPECIAL ON DISARMAMENT, SUMMIT, ABM, TESTING, SDI

LD192159 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 19 Oct 86

["Special edition" of "International Panorama" program entitled "Disarmament: Time for Action"; "recorded highlights" of roundtable discussion held in Moscow and organized jointly by the NOVOSTI news agency and the FRG weekly DIE ZEIT; discussion is chaired by Theo Sommer, editor in chief of DIE ZEIT; and Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer, with Lothar Ruehl, state secretary at the FRG Defense Ministry; Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction; Christoph Betram, DIE ZEIT diplomatic correspondent; Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the Board at NOVOSTI news agency; Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States and Canada Institute at the USSR Academy of Sciences; Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, chief of a Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; FRG participants speak in German with superimposed Russian translation; special edition introduced by political observer Georgiy Zubkov]

[Text] [Zubkov] This meeting was held in Moscow, at the NOVOSTI news agency. It was just one of the discussions now going all around the world after the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. Meeting at the table where the dialogue took place were representatives of West Germany and the Soviet Union. At the center of the discussion were matters of disarmament, banning nuclear weapons, and, of course, the results of the Reykjavik meeting.

[Sommer] Gentlemen, allow me to thank you for making it possible for us to gather here and carry out the idea of holding this forum of senior representatives. After the meeting in Reykjavik it is all the more important and necessary for us to exchange opinions in order to satisfy ourselves as to the viewpoints to which we all adhere.

[Arbatov] I want to move directly to the Reykjavik meeting. As a matter of fact, quite detailed evaluations have already been given. You saw them at the press conference by Gorbachev and in his address. I simply want to add a few things to that.

I want to tell you that Falin and I, as well as all the other participants, had a very keen sense that the Americans had really come completely empty-handed. So the proposals put forward by Gorbachev simply shook and disarmed them. Then this meeting of experts was called at which we were in the minority. Marshal Akhromeyev [first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces] was in charge of us, and the U.S. side had their whole team there -- Nitze, Adelman, Linhard, Perle, of course, and Kampelman and many others. There were about twice as many of

them. Let me tell you that this was a stupendous meeting. We sat talking for 10 and 1/2 hours -- all night long. They called time-out twice, once for 40 minutes and once for 1 hour and 40 minutes because they had nothing to say. When Akhromeyev told them: We have given you a draft, please let us have your proposals, there was about 5 minutes of painful silence.

I think that the Americans were not at all ready for agreement. I think that on their side the talks proceeded along two lines at once. There were the talks with us and then the talks among themselves which were no less difficult.

We have a clear and precise aim. We are ready to give a lot to achieve it, to have it implemented. But what we are asking for here is a clear and precise response. There has been enough playing with very important questions, playing with fire. On this level the proposals remain, but they remain as a package. The Americans -- and this came to light at the meeting -- would not be opposed to swallowing down all the concessions they can get now, leaving the rest until better times. But that is not happening we won't do it; these proposals are on the table as a package.

[Sommer] It would be useful if you could just explain again in detail the contents of your package.

[Chervov] We made it clear to the American side that we are ready for radical reductions in heavy intercontinental missiles. The U.S. experts were told that as regards the medium-range problem, the matter of Britain and France is dropped. Thus, at the meeting of experts the U.S. side saw that the Soviet Union is making earnest moves forward. At the same time we told the U.S. side quite firmly that space tests of ABM components must be banned under any circumstances.

[Falin] It came to light quite quickly that the U.S. position remains somewhat different. This is reflected in the President's review statement which you and anybody can read, that in Reykjavik the United States was trying to pursue its policy from a position of strength. I think that it is here, in the incompatibility as it was displayed between the two philosophies -- the philosophy of a policy of force put forward at the present stage by the U.S. Administration, and the philosophy of good-neighbor cooperation and of universal not unilateral security put forward by the Soviet side -- that one can find the main reason for the fact that, in the final analysis, the meeting failed to reach a common denominator, to find one and lay the basis for all the development to follow.

[Ruehe] This could not be the deciding meeting. It was a preliminary meeting, a preliminary meeting prior to a summit meeting. I think what we need is a policy by steps, a step-by-step policy. I would be in favor of such a policy of consistent steps, to avoid getting stuck. I would like to repeat the question: What does it mean when you talk of a package? That is, is the Soviet Union going back on its position? That would contradict what you are saying, namely that you are making a new policy, a new philosophy.

[Sommer] Perhaps, Mr Falin, we must try to gain from your side a precise response to the main question. Is what you proposed in Reykjavik a package which cannot be undone. General Secretary Gorbachev said in his speech that if SDI is not given up then all the rest, everything we have tried to do here, all of this will fail. Is that really the case?

[Falin] If what the United States said in Reykjavik, if the lock which with the help of SDI they put on the process or tried to put on the process of real arms reduction, is a general NATO position, then to me personally the future looks more gloomy than it has hitherto. Specifically, this is why: Agreements and treaties are concluded not to be interpreted as people see fit but to be fulfilled -- at least that is how I understand it.

If Article 5 of the 1972 treaty speaks directly of a ban on the development of components for systems and testing them -- that is, all systems apart from ground-based systems, stationary ground-based systems are specially stipulated -- and there is a ban on the testing and development of space-based components while NATO, as you say, on the whole, considers that this is only a wish and not a pledge, a question arises: Why conclude agreements and treaties in general?

[Ruehe] We consider the U.S. research to be justified within the framework of the ABM Treaty which was concluded in 1972 between the USSR and the United States, and with the precise interpretation of the U.S. side up to this time with regard to its allies.

[Falin] If you agree with this U.S. interpretation, then together with the United States you are destroying the 1972 treaty. I can say one thing: Although SDI has not yet been built as an operational system, it is already collecting its victims, and the first victim of this SDI program is the opportunity to achieve radical reductions -- you understand how important they are -- in strategic weapons, or to be more precise, central strategic systems.

[Ruehl] We understand your argument and your reasoning; we also refuse to accept your philosophy and your psychological reaction just as we ask you to understand our European reactions which stem from a position of strategic weakness.

[Bertram] I know how many Europeans I am speaking for. We Europeans are very skeptical about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons because we consider that parity in the field of conventional weapons is not tantamount to equal security. I think that nuclear weapons, as before, are necessary for the security of Western Europe. Of course, that does not necessarily mean medium-range missiles. But what is at issue are system that guarantee real deterrence in the nuclear sphere and in the field of conventional weapons -- that guarantee that there is no point in attack.

[Chervov] As far as I know the FRG Government has always favored and supported the Soviet initiative on stopping nuclear tests. In any case, in January this year Chancellor Kohl spoke out directly in favor of stopping nuclear tests. But now, suddenly, the FRG Government has gone through a complete about-face and is now expressing a completely different viewpoint. In particular my esteemed colleague, Mr Kuehl has stated it straight out and repeated the U.S. position: While nuclear weaponry exists there must be nuclear tests. I have a question: What has caused the change in your position on nuclear tests?

[Ruehe] The FRG's position has not changed; the aim remains as before: It is a question of a treaty on banning tests. But it is necessary to agree on the path that leads there. We think it is necessary to agree on new limitations on the strength of blasts and on the number of nuclear tests. I mean, achieving an all-embracing ban on tests. The aim is clear, but it is not a question of all or nothing -- it is a matter of a gradual movement, of the further development of the process, the method of verification. There are concrete proposals on that issue on the German side, and there is a readiness for participation in the development and setting up of the corresponding equipment.

[Chervov] Is it really not possible now to ban nuclear tests immediately? Why is such a long-term objective being set; why is it that this position, this problem is being postponed to some later date, till kingdom come? Why can't nuclear tests be stopped now, immediately?

[Ruehl] The question of ending nuclear tests must not be considered wholly isolated from a reduction of existing nuclear arms. The FRG's policy consists of pointing out that connection, and in not forgetting demands for a considerable reduction in nuclear arms, in its appeals for a refusal to carry out nuclear tests. I expressed doubt that the nuclear powers -- not the Soviet Union and the United States, although these are the leading nuclear powers, but all nuclear powers -- as long as they have arsenals of nuclear weapons, in fact, over a long period of time, will refuse to carry out nuclear tests.

I still doubt this today, but these doubts do not include the FRG's policy, which is entirely clear, and which I represent.

[Bertram] Another question: I was surprised that the Soviet Union is advocating a complete end to nuclear tests so definitely, and explains that the arms race can be halted in that way. I think that no such relation exists.

[Chervov] You say that nuclear tests will not end the arms race. No, stopping them will end it. The question arises: Who needs nuclear tests? You analyze the U.S. nuclear tests. Only the Department of Energy is carrying out tests, which is developing new types of weapons. If there are no nuclear tests, there will be no new types of weapons. Will that end this arms race? Of course it will. Therefore, I cannot agree with you at all, that nuclear tests do not have any significance for the arms race. There is a difference between the U.S. position and yours, on this problem. You say it is necessary to ratify treaties; we are ready for that, please let us ratify them. You say monitoring -- there is no problem of monitoring. You have been told that we are prepared even to allow any representatives onto our test range, and let them live there, and let them monitor. There is no monitoring problem. What is the problem then? It is a problem of a reluctance to stop nuclear blasts. You say you don't have any nuclear weapons. But we know the role and place of the FRG. We know the role, place and influence of the FRG on the United States. Therefore, to stand aside on this issue would be -- at least, I think it would be -- to underestimate the role and status of the FRG.

[Ruehe] Now for the first time I have the feeling that we are not talking to each other, but trying to persuade each other.

[Falin] This isn't persuasion, this is only a description of the situation. Now you have, we have given you, as we say, such a chance -- that is, we have given you an opportunity to resolve all your internal arguments at a time when nobody can accuse the Soviet Union of making some kind of special efforts in the field of armaments. But you, for reasons which are not altogether clear to us, are not making use of that opportunity.

[Chervov] One more remark on what Valentin Mikhaylovich has said: Ratification of treaties, reducing capabilities, a quota on nuclear tests -- all this is good. But we have declared to the U.S. side: How can this be resolved? Let's start talks now, immediately. Let's sit down at the discussion table, and conduct talks under the heading of a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests -- that is, where we will determine

a time limit, and will resolve all these issues. But after all, if one simply does not go to the talks, that is a declaration which is of no use to anyone. That will really be persuasion.

[Falin] According to U.S. data, 86 percent of the blasts were designed for new weapons.

[Arbatov] Of course. I should like to say this on that score: By ending nuclear blasts, the most dangerous course of the arms race ends: the development of new types of weapons. It is much easier to deal with quantities in this case, as everyone knows, than with new qualities, which make the old equations meaningless, and force one to run around in circles with talks. In other words, we are discussing yesterday's problems all the time, while new types of weapons are appearing.

[Ruehe] I need half a minute to return to Mr Arbatov's statements again. If someone were to listen to us now, from Mars, for example, who didn't know the situation on Earth, he would probably think that you are representatives of a small state which does not have nuclear weapons. He would not think that you are a representatives of a major state that has a huge number of nuclear weapons. But after all, your state has tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, and my state has no nuclear weapons.

[Falin] You do not possess nuclear weapons, indeed. But I don't know what is better or worse. There are thousands of nuclear warheads on your territory which are not at your disposal. Their fate was enscribed in Omaha long ago, without you -- where they are to fly, how, and why. That is an issue which cannot be put aside so easily -- you don't have them, they are not at your disposal, and therefore you cannot say a single word about such problems as nuclear weapons. Life is more complicated than that; life is more complicated. Let's see it in all its various aspects.

A second point: In spite of numerous attempts, we haven't understood what the United States is carrying out nuclear weapons tests for, and why you are so keen on the U.S. tests. I want to recall that in the 1970's we made progress, there was an advance, after we and the United States agreed that there is no rational alternative to peaceful coexistence, that it is the duty of both sides to be concerned with preventing nuclear war, that all the problems of disarmament must be resolved on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual security. At the meeting in Reykjavik, we were told of the following principle: equality and fairness. Mutual security vanished. Fairness, according to the U.S. definition, and according to ours, means things which are far from compatible. What is fair for the United States -- siting weapons in the Eastern Hemisphere -- seems unfair to them if somebody's weapons appear in the Western Hemisphere. I want to formulate one idea, precisely and clearly, in an unorthodox form, perhaps: There cannot be Soviet truth and U.S. truth. There is one single truth which exists, which we must find by joint efforts, and with which we must implement our treaties.

[Ruehl] It is of course essential to think, too, about the political will of those who are designing strategy, and not only about technical capabilities. The political thinking behind both the U.S. and the Atlantic strategy as a whole is not aimed at preparing for an aggressive war, and even less at an initial disarming strike against the Soviet Union. It is a strategy aimed at preserving stability -- to prevent war. This system of coordinates also includes such experiments as the Strategic Defense Initiative. We have heard here that you perceive in this an attempt to establish U.S. world domination. I must tell you that I cannot see the logic in those thoughts.

[Falin] During a recent hearing in the U.S. Congress -- the issue concerning the state of development of military technology in the United States and in the Soviet Union -- the Pentagon reported the following: Of 12 main forms of military technology, the U.S. is ahead of the Soviet Union in 10; there is equality in 2 of them. The Soviet Union does not lead the United States in any one of the important systems, according to the Pentagon's information. I repeat, this is a U.S. assessment, which is a confirmation, in particular, of the efficiency of the expenditure of money allocated by the Pentagon, and of the organization of the corresponding work. So there cannot be two kinds of truth; there must be a single truth: Either the United States is ahead of us, as they maintain, or something else is going on, attempts to convince the public that the Soviet Union has overtaken the United States, and the United States must catch up. They say one thing to the public, another to their senators. There is a proverb for that: Your previous lie threatens, harms, your present truth.

[Chervov] One cannot make declarations about peace and about disarmament and at the same time defend star wars and undermine the ABM Treaty. The SDI and the ABM Treaty are incompatible -- they are antipodes. The ABM Treaty is the basis of Soviet-U.S. relations, the basis for stability in the international situation. Jumping ahead, I will tell you my viewpoint: that it is not SDI which represents stability, but the ABM Treaty which represents a strengthening of the stability of the international situation. If the ABM Treaty falls through, a game without rules will begin. We will not establish another treaty like it, and the task, in my opinion, of all diplomats, politicians, and soldiers, is to fight for the preservation of the ABM Treaty, whatever camp, whatever society we live or find ourselves in. If the United States, at the moment, has in fact, because of SDI, wrecked ready nuclear arms accords, then apparently it is doubtful whether in the future it will take the ABM Treaty into account.

[Ruehl] I don't represent the U.S. viewpoint here, that is not my business. I can only talk about our own assessments of the strategic situation, and to present these assessments, and I will talk from this point of view. You know that the FRG Government supports the U.S. SDI program; this political support applies to the defense initiative, but it does not apply to any offensive strategy whatsoever aimed at achieving strategic superiority, or to an offensive threat against the Soviet Union or other states with the aid of nuclear or postnuclear weapons systems, i.e., weapons systems developed through the revolution in technology.

The Federal Government supports President Reagan's project, the SDI project, as a means of maintaining strategic stability with other weapons systems and other technologies -- in other words, against nuclear weapons.

[Chervov] This is not a revelation for us, we know this very well. I only want to say once again that there is not even a whiff of the defensive here. It is a play on words. It is just like, as in his time one great person said, entering a shoe brush in the order of the mammals -- that doesn't mean that it will grow mammary teats. [laughter] This is just as absolutely accurate. The Federal Government is blindly following the United States on this issue, and does not want to examine the essence of the issue. Well, that is very sad.

Recently in Bel Air, on 8 October, Mr Reagan said: We will develop [sozdavat] SDI, and develop [sozdavat] space-strike weapons, and we will fulfill all the programs for strategic offensive weapons and build up our nuclear potential. You say that SDI is technology, that it is a harmless device; we say that it is a weapon. So there is a

need for our colleagues to examine once again what SDI is, what sort of military program it is, and when you tell us here that the U.S. strategy is aimed at strengthening stability, and that SDI is aimed at this, then believe us too that, on the contrary, SDI leads precisely to the destabilization of the international situation....

[Falin, interrupting] That is the aim of SDI, it doesn't simply lead.

[Chervov] Yes, and if SDI components are taken outside the confines of the laboratory, then we will approach a limit beyond which unpredictable events will begin, and there will be no going back. I can tell you with confidence that the security of the United States, and your security, will not be increased by this.

[Sommer] Mr General, you have again returned to the issue of SDI. We have understood your message, and I think that -- I can say this frankly on my own behalf, and on behalf of Mr Christoph Bertram at any rate -- that we share many of your doubts, and we would have liked the U.S. President not to have allowed possible agreements in Reykjavik to collapse, but we think that not all is lost.

[Bertram] In the United States, even among the supporters of SDI, there is concern over the fact that the transience of strategic fashion in the United States will lead to the United States abandoning SDI at some point. Nevertheless, in the meantime, the Soviet Union will become convinced that SDI is the best thing that exists in this world, that the Soviet Union's huge military-bureaucratic machine will reorganize itself towards SDI -- that is, the time may possibly come when we will be calling on you to adhere to the ABM Treaty, and you will tell us: Why? It is all clear.

[Chervov] It is very tempting for you to convince yourselves that the Soviet Union is developing [sozdayet] an SDI like the U.S. one. I will tell you that we don't have such programs; we are not developing [sozdayem] an SDI. We have offered to the U.S. side to ban everything that is being done in this field, and we are ready to open our laboratories. What more do you need? What other proofs do you still need? We are opening all our laboratories, and are placing everything under monitoring, so that here there are not only our assurances, but also our practical actions. Why does the U.S. side not go for this?

[Sommer] I am convinced that on both sides, of course, there are still questions, but I am afraid at the moment we will not be able to reply to these questions, and there is not time to ask them. It may yet be possible to do this in private conversation, maybe. I now propose that every participant say a few words in conclusion for 3 to 5 minutes, and in doing so, look more to the future, although we could of course return to a theme which we have already talked about, or to assess the emphasis. My proposal is: Mr Ruehl, General Chervov, Lothar Ruehe, Mr Falin, and then Christoph Bertram.

[Ruehl] I would like to draw up the results, or the interim results. It is with great satisfaction that I, as a German politician, ascertain the noticeable improvement in relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union which has begun to show in recent months. I would like to stress once again our readiness to develop relations constantly on the basis of the Moscow treaty. One should not be bound by rhetorical statements in relations between West and East, but one should use political dialogue to a greater extent, a dialogue in which all European states should be taking part, and to which they should all be making their contribution. In this sense the forthcoming Vienna conference of countries participatory to the Helsinki treaty is being given very

great significance, and we are full of the resolve to use this process. I would like to say that we will continue to treat Soviet initiatives with great regard and all seriousness, and we attach great significance to the continuation of the exchange of opinions. The Federal chancellor has emphasized this in his address to the general secretary, and I can say on behalf of my faction in the Bundestag that I am pleased that on 23 November I will be here with a delegation of the CSD/CSU faction. We will be holding conversations here on economic problems as well; we look forward to these talks. I thank you.

[Sommer] I am confident that General Chervov, unlike you, will be militarily brief.

[Chervov] I thank our colleagues for the frank conversation. It has gone very properly. We have not hidden anything from each other, we have spoken frankly. Briefly, I would like to say the following: At the moment, you yourselves all feel that, on the part of the Soviet Union, on issues of war and peace, issues of disarmament, there is a new approach, and new thinking. Not only that, there's also a new practical policy.

We not only put forward initiatives, we also confirm them by practical acts. That's the first thing. The second thing is that we must advance a specific attitude to the ABM treaty, and understand that it is the only foundation on which strategic stability is being maintained, as well as Soviet-U.S. relations, and normal international relations in general.

[Ruehl] We see in the negotiations on control of conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals an important political prospect, a prospect for security. Whether this chance is used, and whether it can be used, will depend in the first instance on how we make use of the results of the Stockholm conference, how successful we will be in translating them from the language on paper to the language of action. To conclude, I would like to express my thanks for the way in which these conversations were conducted here, for your frankness, and for your willingness to hear us out. I am also grateful for the amicable tone of this discussion to our Soviet partners.

[Bertram] I am doubtful as to whether there are premises for both world powers going for arms control. I think they are acting according to the principle of all or nothing.

[Falin] Inasmuch as there's no time left, I'll begin with the English statement that, if I do not reply to some arguments or questions which have been raised on the West German side, it does not mean that I agree with everything that was said. I think that this roundtable has shown the great opportunities for an honest, frank, and business-like discussion of very difficult issues which are on the agenda and awaiting a solution. At the same time, our exchange of opinions has shown that, on a number of issues, there is a great misunderstanding of one another's real positions; there are, at the same time, great divergences as well in approach, which include a fundamental approach to a number of issues. The famous, esteemed, and honored Niels Bohr once said: Maybe opposites do not contradict, but complement each other? This was talking about opinions, world views, and so on. Maybe. On one condition: If these same differences, these same opposites are not negated by the weapons already available, and even worse already being developed [sozdayetsya]. Whether we are going to live as neighbors with each other peacefully, in good fashion, depends on us together, with all our differences.

[Sommer] Cordial thanks, and goodbye until the next time, I hope, in the Federal Republic of Germany. [end video recording]

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: KOHL TO DISCUSS REYKJAVIK, SDI ON U.S. VISIT

Kohl Arrival in Washington

LD210708 Moscow TASS in English 0701 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 21 TASS -- West German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has arrived in the United States for a four-day visit to include talks with President Reagan and other senior officials in the administration.

According to American officials, the talks will focus on political problems, above all the outcome of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

It is being recalled here that the Bonn government backs Ronald Reagan's "Strategic Defence Initiative" and has signed with Washington an official agreement allowing West German firms to take part in the work on developing a large-scale anti-missile defence system partially based in outer space.

Bilateral economic relations will feature prominently at the talks. Lately, Washington has been pressing West Germany into adopting measures for expanding its import from the United States.

Kohl pointed out in this connection in an interview with West German television before departure that his country was a friend and ally of the United States, but not its vassal.

Comment Prior to Talks

LD211613 Moscow TASS in English 1552 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 21 TASS -- Talks were started in the White House today between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Helmut Kohl, federal chancellor of West Germany, who had arrived in the U.S. for an official visit.

Speaking in the White House before the beginning of the Meeting, the head of the U.S. Administration pointed out that he would inform the West German leader of the content of his discussions in Reykjavik with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In his turn, the federal chancellor laid special emphasis on the positive moments of the meeting in the capital of Iceland. Kohl urged to take advantage of the opportunities opened by the Reykjavik meeting.

Discussions Not 'Easy'

LD212135 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Commentary by political observer Eduard Mnatsakanov]

[Excerpt] Official negotiations have begun in Washington between FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and leaders of the U.S. Administration. Here is a commentary on the recent news. Over to Eduard Mnatskanov, our political observer:

[Mnatsakanov] The interest shown in the FRG chancellor's Washington visit has, I believe, been generated by two points. It is the first visit to Washington by the leader of a major West European country since the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. And, of course, its outcome will be at the center of attention during the talks. In addition, British Prime Minister Thatcher has, so it has become known, empowered Kohl to speak on her behalf in the U.S. capital. Thus, we are talking about a serious discussion of the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. meeting between the governments of the United States and its closest NATO allies. It is to be supposed that this discussion will not be an easy one. Neither in Bonn, nor in London, nor in the capitals of other West European countries is the disillusionment with the Washington administration's position on the cardinal issues of modern times hidden. Particular irritation is caused by the fact that a solution to these problems was blocked by Reagan's Star Wars program, a program with which, as the British OBSERVER delicately put it, the Europeans have never been in total sympathy. [passage omitted]

White House Meeting

LD221502 Moscow TASS in English 1431 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 22 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan received Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, who is here on an official visit, at the White House Tuesday. A high-ranking administration spokesman said that the Reykjavik meeting had been, of course, the first and dominant theme of the discussion. Judging by statements by American officials, during the White House talks Kohl supported the position the U.S. Administration had taken in Reykjavik. He also voiced his government's backing once again for the "Star Wars" program and did not call on the U.S. President to change the administration's attitude to the SDI. At the same time, ABC television reported, he had privately urged the President to limit SDI-related work in keeping with the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

A high-ranking White House official said after the talks that the West German side had voiced the opinion that the treaty was important and should be observed. This position taken by Bonn is explained, among other things, by the need for political maneuvering ahead of the forthcoming parliamentary elections in West Germany next January.

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CSO: 5200/1046

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: DENMARK'S SCHLUTER TALKS IN MOSCOW ON SUMMIT, ABM, SDI

Gromyko-Schluter Talks

LD211610 Moscow TASS in English 1550 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Excerpt] Moscow, 21 October (TASS)--The reality of the nuclear missile age necessitates not only new thinking but also a new level of responsibility in the questions of saving life on earth. Politicians are obliged to really show the readiness to practical steps, to the quests of arrangements on questions of ridding humanity of the threat of nuclear catastrophe. This was said by member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Andrey Gromyko during his conversation in the Kremlin today with head of the Danish Government Poul Schluter.

The Soviet leadership, Andrey Gromyko said, showed precisely such a level of responsibility at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and President of the United States Ronald Reagan.

It was declared by the Soviet side that the USSR and the USA bear, as before, special responsibility for the state of affairs in the world. If agreement on the elimination of nuclear arms is reached, it will be a triumph for entire humanity.

Poul Schluter expressed the opinion that if the arrangement on the elimination of nuclear weapon is reached, the question of reduction of conventional armaments will also arise.

Andrey Gromyko said that the Soviet Union is ready, as ever, to discuss this question, too. From the Soviet viewpoint, the solution of the problem of conventional armaments would be a hundred times easier, if the problem of the elimination of nuclear arms were resolved.

Talks With Gorbachev

LD211617 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 21 TASS -- Mikhail Gorbachev today had a meeting in the Kremlin with the Prime Minister of Denmark Poul Schluter. The conversation was of the nature of a free, at times acute [Moscow TASS in Russian at 1512 GMT on 21 October in an identical report renders this term as "oftruu"] discussion of the biggest problems of our time.

The results of Reykjavik were in the centre of the discussion. In connection with the unprecedented distortion in the United States of the picture of the meeting there, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the view that it was desirable to give up the strict confidentiality of the talks with the Americans, on which the latter insist.

Mikhail Gorbachev, informed the prime minister of the development of the events, said that the three major Soviet proposals, including the question of strengthening the ABM treaty, were made at the very beginning of the meeting, that all were presented in a package, in interconnection, and also substantiated the logic of this approach: If nuclear arms are eliminated one must have full guarantee against attempts to gain military superiority by way of outer space.

The Soviet proposals contained an unprecedented readiness for compromise, for concessions on an equal basis. But they were confronted with the old Geneva positions and it became clear that the American delegation had not brought with it a single new idea, nothing that could be described as serious. So it was necessary to overcome a very strong resistance before it became possible to advance in the question of reducing and eliminating nuclear arms although here too the discussion was conducted not without attempts to "outplay the Russians."

The question of the SDI was a point at issue throughout the meeting. It did not surface somewhere in the end as they in the United States are now trying to say. And it was exactly the desire of the American leadership to achieve military superiority on the basis of the SDI that was the reason why accords of truly historical importance, a breakthrough were not achieved.

Yet never before and nowhere has so much ground been covered in questions of disarmament. Reykjavik yielded a wealth of experience, our common experience. Now everybody can see better the situation in which the world has found itself, to visualise the real contours of the new situation from which there is no return. And problems of war and peace can be solved only proceeding from a correct understanding of this new situation.

This was received with tremendous satisfaction throughout the world. But there is already concern in some NATO quarters: "How are we going to live without nuclear arms, can't we return to the old positions?"

The meeting in Reykjavik, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed, was not only a success but also an event which highlighted the existence of stubborn resistance, and not only of the United States, to the cause of real disarmament.

Poul Schluter raised the question of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. In reply Mikhail Gorbachev said that the elimination of nuclear arms is viewed as a part of the overall process of disarmament, including also conventional and chemical weapons. The West European governments continue to "voice concern" and this despite the fact that for so many months already we are waiting for their response to the major Budapest initiative of the Warsaw Treaty countries. It is not time, he went on, to form working groups of NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries that could tackle this concretely.

Much attention was given to principled questions of the competition of the two systems, to regional problems and humanitarian aspects of international life. Mikhail Gorbachev called in question the confidence of the West in the capitalist system since its

exponents, contrary to the Helsinki accords, try to use the modern possibilities of mutual exchange for interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries, for undermining the values created by their peoples on the basis of their own choice.

The attempts to explain regional conflicts by references to the "hand of Moscow" are a result, just as in questions of disarmament, of the old thinking which prevents one from understanding the new realities and, consequently, from formulating a policy worthy of this term.

The mistakes of historical scope made by mankind in the past were rectifiable, Mikhail Gorbachev said. Now, in the nuclear-space age, there will be nobody around to do that. Herein lies the fundamental novelty of the situation. Many things are still in short supply in the world but what is especially lacking and what is vitally necessary is the ability to think and act in a new way.

On recalling the plan of influential circles in the United States to exhaust the USSR economically by means of the arms race Mikhail Gorbachev told Poul Schluter about the major programmes of modernizing the Soviet economy, about the social transformations and the restructuring in the political and spiritual sphere which have already been started and which will be accomplished. A most powerful breakthrough along the main directions of the scientific and technological revolution is in the making. The Soviet people have the gifted minds, talents, the youthful energy and enthusiasm to make full use of the socialist society's potential.

In conclusion the interlocutors wished the two countries success in their development along the roads chosen by their peoples and declared for the deepening of the goodneighbourly, mutually advantageous and traditionally peaceful relations between the USSR and Denmark.

Schluter Kremlin Dinner Speech

LD202055 Moscow TASS in English 2032 GMT 20 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS --- "Our countries have proved their ability to coexist in the atmosphere of goodneighbourliness and mutual respect, despite the different places they occupy on the political and ideological map of the world", Danish prime minister Poul Schluter said at a dinner in the Kremlin given by the Soviet Government for him and his wife.

"Our current visit", the guest of the Soviet Government went on, "passes in the shadow of certain disappointment which, in my opinion, is felt above all in Europe, the disappointment over the fact that the meeting between President of the United States Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev apparently has not led to any concrete, direct results. There is no agreement even about the date of the summit meeting on whose holding the two leaders agreed in the current year. That meeting was to be followed by a new one in 1987. I will make no secret of the fact that the Danish side shares the present disappointment and strongly urges the two great powers to continue the dialogue they have started. It is the destinies of the whole world and not just relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that are the point of the matter. I do not think, however, that the verdict of history will describe the Reykjavik meeting as a failure".

"The expectations raised by the meeting in Reykjavik have not been justified. What is needed now is that we should not yield to disappointment and should continue an open dialogue through all the existing channels. We proceed from the premise that the Geneva talks will be continued. We also count on the continuation and further development of what we describe as the Helsinki process in the period ahead. This process proved its value and importance, creating the framework for a very candid exchange of opinions. We should not pretend that there are no fundamental differences between countries and peoples in world outlook and ideas about aims of development. This is why it is absolutely necessary to hold a dialogue and strive to achieve mutual understanding and mutual respect by talks".

Schluter on Reykjavik Talks

LD221106 Moscow TASS in English 1052 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 22 TASS -- "We see our visit to the Soviet Union as part of the continuing dialogue between Denmark and the USSR and between countries of West and East, a dialogue which is ever more essential in this complicated international situation," Prime Minister Poul Schluter of Denmark told a news conference at the Press Center of the Soviet Foreign Ministry here today.

"I have the impression that disappointment with the absence of concrete accords in Reykjavik is not the final reaction of the Soviet side," he said.

"The Soviet side has reaffirmed that its proposals made both before Reykjavik and during the summit meeting there remain on the negotiating table and the Geneva process is continuing," he added.

"The Reykjavik meeting has been more likely a success than a failure. The Reykjavik meeting has not been in vain," Schluter said. "In the future this could be a useful overture to further talks."

"I find it very constructive that the Soviet side made its proposals early during the talks and then explained them to the broad public. I am firmly convinced it is this that has helped conduct positive talks in Reykjavik," he said.

"It was the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to hold that meeting and I think it was a wise idea," the Danish prime minister said.

"Representing a nuclear-free country, I voiced my admiration of the prospect of a nuclear-free world. In it we should live on a new security basis," Schluter said.

"I believe that this visit has helped improve the understanding of our positions and the further development of relations between the two countries. We are neighbors and are only divided by the Baltic Sea," he said.

The Danish prime minister said five Northern European countries did not have nuclear weapons in their territories and that was a stabilizing factor for peace.

He said that his government was opposed to outer space militarization.

'Sharp' Talks on Human Rights

AU221252 Paris AFP in English 1246 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 22 Oct (AFP)--Danish Prime Minister Poul Schluter said here Wednesday he had raised the cases of divided Danish-Soviet families during talks at the Kremlin this week, and described his talks on human rights issues with the Soviet leadership as "sharp."

Mr. Schluter, who arrived on Monday and whose talks included a meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on Tuesday, told a press conference that his meetings had covered "the various conceptions of human rights in East and West." He had raised the question of "five unresolved Danish-Soviet cases of family reunification and family visits," and had made a "strong appeal for the solution of these."

The Danish premier, briefed by Mr Gorbachev on the Reykjavik summit, said he believed the superpowers had not had enough time to "analyse all philosophical and technical and strategic issues involved in the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) project".

Soviet insistence that the United States restrict SDI research to the laboratory led to the breakdown of the talks as far reaching accords on reducing intermediate and strategic missiles were on the verge of being agreed.

Mr. Schluter, the first West European leader to meet Mr. Gorbachev since the summit, said he had the impression that the "obvious disappointment at the lack of concrete negotiated result in Reykjavik is not the final reaction by the Soviet side."

"They reaffirmed that their proposals before and in Reykjavik remained on the negotiating table," and that the Geneva process was continuing, he said.

On other issues, Mr. Schluter had told the Soviet leadership that its proposals for a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe would have to be "recognized and guaranteed by both superpowers," had pointed out the need for a "political solution" in Afghanistan, and hoped there would be new cooperation between the European Economic Community (EEC) and its communist equivalent, COMECON.

TASS Cites Danish Press Agency

LD221506 Moscow TASS in English 1439 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Excerpt] Copenhagen, 22 October (TASS)--Reporting yesterday's conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Poul Schluter, the Danish news agency RITZAUS BUREAU quoted the Danish head of government as saying that it had been "most informal and candid".

The news agency said Mikhail Gorbachev had briefed Poul Schluter in detail about the results of his meeting with U.S. President in Reykjavik. RITZAUS BUREAU added that the briefing had showed no signal of any change in the Soviet approaches to disarmament issues.

It quoted Poul Schluter as saying that the conversation had begun with a heated ideological debate and that had livened up the conversation significantly.

By its nature it had clearly been non-diplomatic but Mikhail Gorbachev, RITZAUS BUREAU said further, had made a strong impression on Poul Schluter who had described him as "an energetic and dynamic leader of great ability and personal charisma".

RITZAUS BUREAU quoted excerpts from the TASS account of Mikhail Gorbachev's conversation with Poul Schluter, citing the Soviet leader's denial of the claim that the SDI issue had only been raised towards the end of the Reykjavik meeting.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: DEMICHEV DELEGATION, SFRY DISCUSS SUMMIT, ARMS RACE

Holds Talks With Hasani

PM221003 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Excerpts] A meeting was held between S. Hasani, president of the SFRY Presidency and Petr Demichev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, who is heading a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Yugoslavia on an official visit.

It was pointed out during discussion of international problems that the main task that now faces mankind is the removal of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. The new compromise proposals proposed by the Soviet Union at the Reykjavik meeting are of fundamental significance. They carry the struggle for nuclear disarmament to a higher level and open up the possibility for a major breakthrough in international relations.

Hasani reported on the results of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries in Harare. The sides agreed that the Nonaligned Movement, which also includes Socialist Yugoslavia, is an authoritative progressive force of the present time. It make a weighty and increasing contribution to world politics. V.F. Maltsev, USSR ambassador to the SFRY, took part in the conversation, which was held in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

Talks With Parliamentarians

PM221051 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 21 October--The delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Petr Demichev, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and first vice-president of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which arrived here for an official visit, held talks with the delegation of the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

During the discussion of the international situation the sides confirmed that the USSR and Yugoslavia held identical or close stands on cardinal problems of our time, expressed concern over the persisting tensions in the world, the build-up of the nuclear arms race and the danger of its spread to outer space, and emphasized the role which parliaments are expected to play in the struggle for peace.

The head of the Soviet delegation drew the attention of the Yugoslav parliamentarians to the package of large-scale and far-reaching proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev and opening the way to the removal of the nuclear threat.

These Soviet proposals, once implemented, would make it possible to quickly secure a radical turn for the better in international affairs, to ensure a change in all directions of the work for disarmament, and begin the movement towards non-nuclear world.

The talks stressed that the Eight Conference of Nonaligned Countries' Heads of State and Government held in Harare made a major contribution to the struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism, and racism and for the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, the curbing of the arms race, and the development of equitable international cooperation.

The sides expressed their determination to carry on active struggle for peace and for the establishment of an all embracing system of international security.

Meets Gacic, Zemljarić

LD212226 Moscow TASS in English 2202 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 21 October (TASS)--Petr Demichev, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and first vice-president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met Radisa Gacic, secretary of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Central Committee, in Belgrade today.

Radisa Gacic stated that the LCY approved of and supported the constructive proposals which were put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. These proposals, if implemented, would make it possible to bridle the arms race and divert the nuclear threat from mankind, he said.

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CSO: 5200/1046

RELATED ISSUES

USSR PAPER HITS U.S. POLICY ON TESTING, WEAPONS REDUCTION, SDI

PM071557 Moscow KRASNAYA AVEZDA in Russian 28 Sep 86 Second Edition p 3

[A. Golts review: "Responsibility Versus Total License"]

[Text] The subject of a novel by the well-known American writer Kurt Vonnegut recently published in the USSR is based on the following story. A gun falls into the hands of a teenager. Firing a shot in broad daylight for no particular reason, he kills a man. The main hero, whose life is ruined by this tragedy, subsequently witnesses another tragedy, far more terrible. Whether as the result of an accident or as part of a monstrous Pentagon experiment, a neutron bomb explodes in a small American town, killing all its inhabitants. Sooner or later guns go off, sooner or later bombs explode, taking human life. The buildup of weapons in the world must be ended--this, so it seems to me, is the moral of this novel-parable. The writer uses all the force of his talent to point out the most serious problem of the present day--so many nuclear and other weapons have been accumulated that they threaten to overwhelm the world. Indeed, with the existence of 50,000 nuclear charges in the world, we are all living on borrowed time and no one knows when the credit will run out.

But if the writer's task is to warn mankind of the danger which threatens it, it is the duty of statesmen and government figures to find a way out of the nuclear impasse. And this indisputably complex task is not beyond the power of the world community, which is the only sovereign master of its destiny. It is precisely for this reason that representatives of the overwhelming majority of countries at the UN General Assembly session now in progress are mainly concentrating on seeking an answer to what must be done to preserve world peace.

The socialist states have presented for UN discussion the integral concept of a comprehensive international peace and security system. This concept covers the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres. Its essence was expressed in the speech made at the session by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze. "The idea of comprehensive security," the head of the Soviet delegation pointed out, "primarily entails material guarantees of peace, political and international legal guarantees, and confirmation of the principles of civilized, correct interstate contact. A safe world is a world of law, order, and legality, a world of strict observance of the UN Charter and all the norms of international law and human rights and freedoms."

This concept is based on the plan, put forward by M.S. Gorbachev in his historic 15 January statement to totally eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the century. At this point it is appropriate to recall that it was not our country that began the senseless nuclear arms race. We had to acquire these weapons in response to nuclear blackmail from across the ocean. But for the entire postwar period--both when the USSR had no nuclear weapons and since they made their appearance--our country has never ceased its struggle to eliminate these weapons. Today the Soviet Union has not limited itself to putting forward a plan for the stage-by-stage elimination of the nuclear threat. It has also taken the first difficult step in this direction: The Soviet unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions has lasted for more than a year now. Yes, our country came to the present General Assembly session not only with proposals but also with specific action. That is why the statement that the Soviet Union is prepared to sign a treaty on a total ban on nuclear weapons tests at any time and in any place sounded unconvincing from the high UN rostrum. We are prepared to do this without the UN walls so that the entire world community can be involved in this great act and so that a turning point in the history of mankind can stand as a mark of respect for its will.

The complex of proposals by the socialist states cancels out the traditional arguments of those opposed to eliminating nuclear weapons. Today it is senseless, for example, to blow up the verification issue. Convinced that without verification there can be no confidence, the USSR is completely open to this.

The channel has also been blocked to speculative arguments that nuclear weapons cannot be renounced because, it is said, the Soviet Union and its allies are superior in conventional arms and troop numbers. As is well known, the Warsaw Pact states offered a clear-cut plan to the NATO countries in May for a cardinal reduction in conventional arms and armed forces throughout the European continent--from the Atlantic to the Urals. And the socialist countries are also demonstrating a constructive approach with regard to the Asian and Pacific region. The Soviet Union has put forward clear proposals whose implementation would lead to a sharp reduction of military activity and greater confidence in that region.

Thus, whatever aspect of the international security system one takes, for every one the socialist world offers quite specific solutions. Of course, we are far from considering ourselves exclusive guardians of the truth. That is why our initiatives have been submitted for discussion by the General Assembly--so that ways to a safe world acceptable to all may be found in the course of open debate. We are talking about extremely complex problems, of course. But resolving them is a realistic task.

This is evidenced by the results of the Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, of which the first stage was successfully completed recently in Stockholm. Thirty-five countries were able to overcome their differences and reach accords which are not only important per se. The agreement concluded is the beginning of new thinking in world politics. "This is an example," M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, "of how we can and must rebuild detente and build new relations between states."

Unfortunately, far from all governments are demonstrating an ability to think in a new way. Some continue to build their calculations on the rules of military superiority's unprincipled arithmetic. This is attested to by the U.S. position, set out at the United Nations. It was obviously intended to demonstrate again Washington's "peaceableness" and desire for disarmament. And precisely for this reason there was no shortage of the words "peace," "disarmament," and others like them. But you read them and that old saying "easy does it" comes to mind. The United States seems to favor eliminating nuclear weapons. But this, in its opinion, is something for the distant future. At present, it "has to rely on these weapons." It proposes a reduction of strategic weapons on a selective basis, however, in such a way as to violate the principle of equal security and gain superiority over the USSR.

Instead of moving forward and joining the moratorium on nuclear explosions, Washington is calling for a move backward--in the direction of concluding agreements on some kind of "regulation" of nuclear tests. The United States generally links the problem of banning nuclear explosions and the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons to the realization of its "star wars" program. And it is not difficult to perceive mercenary calculations behind this. Nuclear tests get people use, so to speak, to the idea of space-based strike complexes, the ground is prepared for dismantling the ABM Treaty in the next 5-7 years, and only then will it perhaps be possible to talk about ending nuclear tests and eliminating nuclear weapons. They talk while harboring in their bosom--no, not just malice--the latest space weapons. Here is just one fact indicating the administration's real intentions. The "star wars" program, the American journal U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT reports, has become the number one aim for the U.S. Energy Department. It is precisely within the framework of this program that the department is conducting one nuclear explosion after another in Nevada.

Washington never ceases claiming that SDI is strictly defensive in nature and that it does not intend using it in a first-strike strategy. However, possibilities rather than assurances are taken into account in the field of politics. And from this standpoint space-based strike complexes supplementing nuclear missiles are without doubt an element in an aggressive Pentagon strategy.

The U.S. desire for total political license showed very clearly through the screen of peace-loving rhetoric heard from the UN rostrum. However, this desire became fully apparent later in the day when there was a White House meeting of people militating for a further buildup of American nuclear arsenals. There it was stated with amazing frankness that ending tests of antisatellite systems, stopping the production of binary chemical munitions, and continuing observance of the SALT-II Treaty--as demanded by sensible people--are supposedly contrary to U.S. national security.

The moratorium idea was once again attacked with particular ferocity. Old, false excuses were used: about the need for "verification" of existing nuclear munitions and about monitoring. But the truth was also told. The truth that without tests the United States would not be able to increase the efficiency of its nuclear warheads and that it is precisely on testing that Washington is pinning its hopes of "overtaking the Russian program." Indeed, if one aspires to military superiority there is no point in a moratorium!

Confrontational thinking, as we can see, continues to determine American policy. And in order to justify this Washington resorts to its favorite method--once again whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria. That is why the White House has said that "the Russians are still a ruthless adversary." In order to discredit our country the United States is trying to make use of the case of Daniloff--an ordinary spy caught red-handed in Moscow. And it is with the aim of fanning anti-Soviet feeling that the American administration has taken an action insulting to the world community--it has demanded that Soviet UN staff be cut by 25 persons.

The intention of those who have initiated this unbridled anti-Soviet campaign is obvious. That is why the following question was asked during an NBC television program: "Does the administration really want to reach an agreement with the Russians? It seems that every time we get near to an important meeting there is some flareup: either an accusation of Soviet violations or a fuss over 25 Soviet diplomats."

The question is clearly rhetorical. None of this is accidental, of course. Forces which have no desire for either talks or arms reductions still enjoy a great deal of influence in America. It is really they who provoke anti-Soviet actions.

But the process of realization by both peoples and governments--a process now gathering momentum--of the need to think and act in a new way can hardly be stopped by ventures such as these. The time has come when group and bloc considerations have begun to give way to an understanding of peace as the supreme value. This is fully taken into account by the USSR, which pursues a truly peace-loving, principled policy. But nor can it fail to be taken into account by Washington. At present the administration is trying, by subterfuge, to evade discussion of topical world problems. But the limit to this subterfuge, as we can see, has well nigh been reached. It is time for Washington to wake up to the realities of the world today.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC UN ENVOY CALLS FOR HALT TO ARMS RACE

OW241930 Beijing XINHUA in English 1916 GMT 24 Oct 86

[Text] United Nations, October 24 (XINHUA) -- China called today at the United Nations for a halt to all arms races, especially the nuclear arms race.

Huang Jiahua, China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, speaking at the General Assembly about the U.N.'s International Year of Peace, said that local conflicts and wars since World War II have created "profound anxiety" on the part of the world's people, who wonder about the possibility of another world war.

The people of the world "cannot but be aware of all the latent dangers and respond to this threat by joining the struggle to preserve world peace," Huang said. "To safeguard world peace," he stressed, "it is necessary first and foremost to stop the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race. The arms stockpiles of the superpowers have reached alarming proportions, enough to destroy the earth many times over." The people of the world, he said, "having made disarmament, especially the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons their important goal, strongly demand that the superpowers halt their dangerous arms race."

"To safeguard world peace," Huang went on to say, "It is necessary to stop and remove regional conflicts and local wars. For a long period of time, wars in places like Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the Middle East, South Africa and Central America have caused countless deaths and casualties and threatened peace in the world." He said China attaches great importance to disarmament and calls for the destruction of all nuclear weapons.

He told the assembly that China has declared to the world time and again that "at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons...as an act of good faith, China had reduced its Armed Forces by one million at its own initiative," he added.

The Chinese delegate noted that in the past year China has organized "activities including the 'Chinese people's rally for world peace' and a symposium on the subject, various cultural and sports activities, and exhibitions on calligraphy, painting and photography, all with peace as the main theme."

Huang announced that a film entitled "Under the Same Sun," dedicated to the International Year of Peace, premiered recently in Beijing and will soon be made available to other countries.

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CSO: 5200/4014

RELATED ISSUES

KURANARI VOICES CONCERN ABOUT SS-20 MISSILES

OW090627 Tokyo KYODO in English 0622 GMT 9 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo, Oct. 9 KYODO -- Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari revealed here Thursday that the Japanese Government has informed U.S. officials it wants Soviet nuclear force reductions in Asia to parallel those of Western Europe.

Kuranari, addressing the upper house foreign affairs committee, said Japan is concerned that the Soviet Union may transfer SS-20 nuclear missiles from Europe to beef up its Asian arsenal, if an expected U.S.-Soviet agreement on intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) reduction is limited to Western Europe.

"We are very concerned about it and have requested U.S. officials to make efforts to carry out concrete negotiations," said Kuranari.

The INF issue is expected to emerge in discussions between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, next Saturday and Sunday.

While U.S. officials have already indicated they are aware of Japan's position on INF, the Japanese Government has requested that the message also be passed on to the Soviets during the Iceland meeting.

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RELATED ISSUES

TURKEY'S AMBASSADOR TO UN VIEWS DISARMAMENT ISSUES

TA220731 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 2100 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Turkey's permanent representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Ilter Turkmen, has said that Turkey supports the efforts of U.S. and Soviet leaders to stop the arms race. He was speaking at the UN Disarmament Committee.

Our correspondent Orhan Pak reports from New York:

[Begin Pak recording] Ambassador Turkmen pointed out that the issue of disarmament not only concerns the United States and the Soviet Union; it is closely related to world peace and security. He said that efforts to prevent the arming of space with nuclear weapons must be included within the framework of the disarmament efforts. He called for a reduction in conventional weapons as well as nuclear arms.

Discussing Turkey's policy on these issues, Ambassador Turkmen said: Turkey grasps the importance of these issues better than most because of its strategic position in Europe and its proximity to the clashes in the Middle East. [end recording]

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